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REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)

Counterdefendant.

)

AIA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. (collectively, "AIA"), by and through
their counsel of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell"), submit this
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify the Attorneys and
Law Firms of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP; Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A.; and
Quarles & Brady LLP ("DQ Motion"). This Memorandum is supported by the Affidavits of
John A. Strait, loLee Duclos, Gary D. Babbitt, Richard A. Riley and Patrick V. Collins, and the
Exhibits thereto.
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I. INTRODUCTION

After sixteen months of threats to disqualify Hawley Troxell, Plaintiff has finally filed a
Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell (as well as all other defense counsel except David Gittins),
but not before first: (1) threatening to file a separate malpractice action against Hawley Troxell
and to deliver a copy of the complaint to the Idaho State Bar if the law firm did not voluntarily
withdraw (Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt ["Babbitt Aff."J Exs. 3 and 4); (2) as a precursor to
commencement of a supposedly derivative malpractice action against Hawley Troxell, engaging
co-counsel to deliver to the directors of Hawley Troxell's clients, AIA Services Corporation and
AIA Insurance, a demand that the corporations sue their lawyers (Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond
in Support of Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify, etc. ["Bond Aff."J Ex. 16); and (3) filing a
separate lawsuit alleging supposedly direct claims against Hawley Troxell related to its defense
of the AIA entities in this litigation (Bond Aff. Ex. 38). Plaintiffs motion to disqualify counsel
is one manifestation of a concerted scheme to manufacture conflicts of interest between Hawley
Troxell and its clients in order to gain an unfair and unconscionable advantage in this litigation.
It is an abuse of the judicial process and the spirit of Rules 3.1, 3.4 and 4.4 of the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct.
Hawley Troxell undertook its representation of Defendants AIA Services Corporation
and its wholly-owned subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc., and later agreed to act as local counsel for
Defendant Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. based on its assessment that these Defendants
share a common interest in presenting a united front to oppose Plaintiffs claims and the relief he
seeks against all of them, jointly and severally, and in controlling litigation costs that AIA is
obligated to advance to the individual Defendants. Hawley Troxell's clients have a common

tJt7'L.
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interest in defending against the shotgun claims Plaintiff has asserted indiscriminantly against
them and have common defenses to most, if not all, of these claims.
Disqualification at this late date would result in severe prejudice to the corporate
Defendants and the possible loss of meritorious defenses. It would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for the corporate Defendants to hire new counsel. Moreover, any new counsel, even
separate counsel for each corporate Defendant, would face the prospect of being sued if Plaintiff
did not consent to their appointment.
For the reasons articulated in the Affidavit of John A. Strait and in this Memorandum,
there is no basis whatsoever for disqualification of Hawley Troxell under the circumstances of its
representation of the corporate Defendants in this case. In particular (but without limitation):
o

Plaintiffs motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell is untimely and brought at this
late time for tactical purposes.

o

Reed Taylor is not a creditor, but a former shareholder to whom redemption
payments are restricted by statute and AIA Services' articles of incorporation.

o

Hawley Troxell represents only the corporate Defendants and not, either directly
or indirectly through the Joint Defense Agreement, any of the individual Director
Defendants.

o

All claims between or among the Defendants have been tolled and preserved
pending the outcome of the defense of this case.

o

The Defendants share a common interest in defending Plaintiff s claim.
Accordingly, the Defendants are legally entitled to enter into the joint defense
agreement; and Hawley Troxell's participation in the agreement does not violate
any applicable legal or ethical rules

Plaintiffs Amended Motion to Disqualify Hawley Troxell should be dismissed.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff appears to be using the DQ Motion as a forum for repeating his allegations
against the Defendants, rather than focusing on issues relating to counsel's role. As a result,

AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 2
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Plaintiffs motion to disqualify counsel and the supporting Bond Affidavit l are replete with
inaccurate allegations of unproven (and unprovable) "fact", intermixed with unsubstantiated
opinions and erroneous legal conclusions of Plaintiffs counsel, many or most of which are
irrelevant to Plaintiffs motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell. Insofar as relevant to Plaintiffs
allegations in this case, Hawley Troxell's role has been limited to representation of the corporate
Defendants in the defense of Plaintiffs lawsuit, issuing an opinion letter that had no effect on
Plaintiffs alleged rights, and documenting a transaction that merely permitted AIA Services to
pay its legal bills without impairing Plaintiff s alleged security interest in certain collateral.
The following recitation of facts is limited to those facts pertinent to the motion to
disqualify Hawley Troxell. That this Memorandum does not address certain of Plaintiffs or his
counsel's allegations of fact or conclusions of law should not be construed as tacit admission of
their accuracy or correctness.

A.

1995 And 1996 AlA Services Stock Redemption Transactions.
The original Stock Redemption Agreement between AIA Services and Reed Taylor was

signed as of July 22, 1995. Section 2.5 of the Agreement contemplated that the $1.5 million cash
Downpayment would be delivered at Closing. However, AIA Services did not have the cash
available for that purpose; and the parties executed an Addendum to Stock Redemption
Agreement, also as of July 22, 1995, providing for a short term Downpayment Note in the

1

Mr. Bond's Affidavit is fraught with supposed "facts" of which he cannot possibly have personal
knowledge, as well as opinions and conclusions of law not properly includable in an affidavit. As a
direct result, the opinions proffered by Plaintiffs experts, being expressly based on Mr. Bond's
Affidavit and discussions with Mr. Bond concerning his opinions about the case, are entitled to little
weight because their conclusions are premised on erroneous assumptions.

3q74
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amount of $1.5 million payable within 90 days of the execution of the Addendum. Closing
occurred on or about August 15, 1995.
At the time of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement between AlA Services and Reed
Taylor, AIA Services hoped to raise in excess of$7 million through a private placement of its
Series B preferred stock and warrants. This anticipated private placement and the stock
redemption agreement with Reed were submitted to the shareholders of AlA Services for
approval and were approved at a shareholder meeting held in March 1995. Affidavit of JoLee
Duclos ("Duclos Aff.") Exs. 1,2 and 3.
In connection with the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, in which Reed Taylor was
represented by a Seattle law firm (Cairncross Hempelmann), the law firm of Eberle Berlin
Kading Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd. ("Eberle Berlin") rendered an opinion dated August 15,
1995 addressed to Reed Taylor. Bond Aff. Ex. 2. At that time, Richard A. Riley, now a lawyer
with Hawley Troxell, was a shareholder of Eberle Berlin and worked on the AlA Services stock
redemption transaction. The opinion was given by the law firm, not by any individual attorney
in the firm. Affidavit of Richard A. Riley ("Riley Aff.") '2.
The anticipated private placement of Series B preferred stock and warrants to raise
capital was unsuccessful; and AIA Services was unable to pay the Downpayment Note when due
or to make payments on the $6 million note. Duclos Aff. Ex. 4. In April and June 1996, Reed
Taylor gave AlA Services formal written notice of default, including failure to pay the
Downpayment Note or to pay the interest on the $6M Note. Bond Aff. Ex. 3 , D. The entire
transaction was restructured as of July 1, 1996; and the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement and related agreements replaced and superseded the 1995 Stock Redemption

!J175
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Agreement and related agreements in their entirety. Bond Aff. Ex. 3 ~ G. Eberle Berlin did not
render an opinion in connection with the restructured 1996 obligations. Riley Aff.

B.

~

3.

1999-2000: Organization Of CropUSA.
According to the records of the Idaho Secretary of State, Crop USA Insurance Agency,

Inc. ("CropUSA") was originally incorporated under the name AIA Crop Insurance, Inc. in
November 1999. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to render, and did not provide, any legal
services or other assistance in connection with the formation, ownership structure, governance or
start up of CropUSA. In particular (but without limitation) Hawley Troxell was not engaged to
provide, and did not provide, any advice or other legal services or other assistance concerning
the issuance of Crop USA common stock to the AlA Services Corporation Series C Preferred
Stockholders. Hawley Troxell was first engaged by CropUSA, in February 2001, to provide
legal services in connection with a proposed Regulation A offering of CropUSA stock. At no
time has Hawley Troxell been engaged to provide any advice or other legal services, and at no
time has Hawley Troxell provided any legal advice or other legal services, to AIA Services, AIA
Insurance, CropUSA or any other person concerning the allocation of or accounting for salaries,
other expenses, employees, assets or other resources between or among AIA Services, AIA
Insurance and/or CropUSA. Riley Aff.
C.

~~

6, 7.

2001 Parking Lot Purchase.
The DQ Motion (p. 12) references transactions involving a parking lot purchased by John

and Connie Taylor. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not provide any legal
services or other assistance to John or Connie Taylor, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA
or any other person in connection with any facet of this transaction. Riley Aff.

~

8.
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D.

2004 AlA Insurance Purchase Of AlA Services Stock From Crop USA.
The DQ Motion (p. 4) references an August 2004 transaction in which AlA Insurance

purchased from CropUSA shares of Series C Preferred Stock of AlA Services Corporation for
$1,510,693. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not provide any legal services
or other assistance to AlA Services, AlA Insurance, CropUSA or any other person in connection
with any facet of this transaction. In particular (but without limitation), Hawley Troxell was not
engaged to advise any person in connection with the source of funding for the purchase, the
effect (if any) of Reed's security interest in the commissions earned by AlA Insurance, or the
accounting for this transaction. Riley Aff. , 9.
E.

Radio Station Transactions.
The DQ Motion (p. 13) references transactions involving Pacific Empire Radio

Corporation. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not provide any legal services
or other assistance to AlA Services, AlA Insurance, CropUSA or any other person in connection
with any facet of any transaction involving Pacific Empire Radio Corporation. Riley Aff. , 10.
F.

2006 Hawley Troxell Opinion On Surge Loan To CropUSA.
The DQ Motion (pp. 5-6) references an opinion given by Hawley Troxell in connection

with an October 2006 loan to CropUSA by an umelated lender, Surge Capital (referenced in the
opinion letter as Lancelot Investors Fund). Bond Aff. Ex. 35. Hawley Troxell was engaged by
CropUSA to provide the local counsel opinion of borrower's counsel. Hawley Troxell did not
provide legal services to CropUSA or AlA Insurance in connection with the negotiation or
documentation ofthe loan. Affidavit of Patrick V. Collins ("Collins Aff."), 2. Hawley Troxell
was retained as local Idaho counsel solely for purposes of opining on Idaho law issues that could
not be addressed by Quarles & Brady, counsel for CropUSA. Id.

3~77
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The Surge loan documents included guarantees of the debt by AIA Insurance, Inc. and
John Taylor. AIA Services Corporation was not a party to the loan. In the opinion letter, Hawley
Troxell opined that the execution, delivery and performance of the AIA Insurance guaranty were
duly authorized. The due authorization opinion was based in part on certified copies of
resolutions adopted by the AIA Insurance, Inc. Board of Directors. The AlA Insurance board
resolutions authorizing its guarantee were drafted by the lender's counsel, not Hawley Troxell;
were adopted by the AIA Insurance Board of Directors without involvement by Hawley Troxell;
aJ).d were delivered to Hawley Troxell for the firm's reliance in giving the opinion. See Collins
Aff.

~

3.
The DQ Motion (p. 21) alleges that the AIA Insurance guaranty was expressly prohibited

by the Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services Corporation. (Significantly, Plaintiffs motion
does not - and could not - allege that the guaranty was prohibited by the articles of incorporation
of AIA Insurance.) The reference to AIA Services' Articles of Incorporation likely relates to
Section 4.2.9(c) of the Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation (Bond Aff. Ex. 19) in
which AIA Services covenants, for the benefit of the holder of the Series A Preferred Stock,
Donna Taylor, that AIA Services will not, and will not permit any subsidiary to, guaranty any
Indebtedness (subject to inapplicable exceptions). There is no comparable provision in the
articles of incorporation of AIA Insurance (Babbitt Aff. Ex. lB), which Hawley Troxell
reviewed in connection with the opinion. Because AIA Services Corporation was not a party to
the Surge loan transaction, the legal opinion sought by the lender did not seek any legal opinions
regarding AIA Services Corporation and, therefore, Hawley Troxell did not review the articles of
incorporation of AlA Services in preparing the opinion. Collins Aff.

~4.
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In August 2008, the Surge loan lender assigned its rights as lender to Hudson Insurance
Company; and Hudson subsequently purchased assets of Crop USA and assumed CropUSA's
obligations as borrower under the Surge loan. Babbitt Aff. Exs. 11 and 12. As a result, Hudson
is both lender and borrower, thereby discharging the Surge loan and extinguishing the guarantee
by AIA Insurance. AIA Insurance was never called upon to pay one cent under its guarantee.

G.

Other "Related Party" Transactions.
The DQ Motion (at 16) references "related party" transactions identified in the Affidavit

of Paul E. Pederson. Other than the legal opinion of borrower's local counsel provided to the
lender on behalf of Crop USA in connection with the Surge loan described above, Hawley
Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not provide any advice or other legal services or
other assistance to AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA or any other person in connection
with any of the transactions identified in paragraph 11 of the Pederson Affidavit. Riley Aff.
~ll.

H.

2007 Limited Scope Engagements Of Hawley Troxell To Defend AlA Entities And
CropUSA.
The law firm of Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. initially appeared in this case for

AIA Services, AIA Insurance and John Taylor. After obtaining a temporary restraining order to
enjoin Reed from his wee hour attempt to take possession of the companies' offices and from
interfering with the operation of the companies' business, Clements, Brown & McNichols
withdrew from representation of the two AIA entities pursuant to Court order dated April 13,
2007.

1.

2007 Initial Engagement OfHawley Troxell By AlA. In connection with Hawley

Troxell's agreement to undertake the representation of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, Hawley
Troxell entered into a written engagement/conflict waiver agreement with AlA Services and AIA
AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 8
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Insurance; obtained conflict waivers from all of the other Defendants (as well as CropUSA
which, although not then named as a Defendant, was identified in Reed's complaint as a
participant in transactions that Reed contends were improper); and required that each Defendant
execute a standstill and tolling agreement which tolled and preserved any possible claims that
might be brought against that Defendant by any other Defendant. In addition, the boards of
directors of ALA Services and AIA Insurance reviewed and approved the engagement/conflict
waiver letter agreement and the standstill and tolling agreements at a meeting on April 30, 2007.
Babbitt Aff.

~

8; Bond Aff. Ex. 10.

In connection with Hawley Troxell's appearance in the case, Defendants' counsel
proposed to their respective clients a Joint Defense Agreement among the Defendants. Babbitt
Aff.

~

9. At the April 30, 2007 meeting, the AIA Services and ALA Insurance boards of directors

approved the corporations' participation in the Joint Defense Agreement, as well as execution of
the related standstill and tolling agreements. See Bond Aff. Ex. 10. Each of the Defendants did
in fact sign a standstill and tolling agreement and the Joint Defense Agreement. Babbitt Aff.

2.

~

9.

Subsequent Engagement Of Hawley Troxell As Local Counsel For Crop USA.

Later in 2007, Reed filed an amended complaint naming CropUSA, Connie Taylor, and Jim and
Corrine Beck as Defendants. As an accommodation to CropUSA and its counsel, Quarles &
Brady, Hawley Troxell agreed to serve as CropUSA's local counsel and filed a motion for
limited admission of Quarles & Brady pro hac vice. In connection with the addition ofthe newly
named Defendants and Hawley Troxell's agreement to serve as local counsel for CropUSA, all
of the Representation Agreements were revised to reflect the additional defendants - Connie
Taylor and Jim and Corrine Beck, in addition to CropUSA - named in Reed's amended
complaint. Effective as of November 1,2007, Hawley Troxell entered into an

ALA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL _ 9
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engagement/conflict waiver letter agreement with CropUSA agreeing to serve as local counsel
with Quarles & Brady as lead counsel; AIA Services and AIA Insurance signed an amended
engagement/conflict waiver letter agreement; and all of the Defendants entered into an Amended
and Restated Standstill and Tolling Agreement and an Amended Joint Defense Agreement.
Babbitt Aff.

3.

~

8.

Representation Agreements. Hawley Troxell's representation of its clients in this

case is based on (i) informed written conflict waivers by the three corporations and by each of
the individual Defendants, (ii) standstill and tolling agreements between and among the three
corporate Defendants and all of the individual Defendants, thereby preserving all claims between
or among the Defendants pending the outcome of this case, and (iii) a j oint defense agreement.
These documents are collectively referenced in this Memorandum as the "Representation
Agreements".2

I.

2007 Distribution Of Building Mortgage By ULIC To AlA Services.
In 1993, The Universe Life Insurance Company CULIC"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of

AIA Services, sold the Lewis Clark Plaza office building (the old Lewis Clark Hotel in
Lewiston) to Washington Bank Properties. See documents included in Bond Aff. Ex. 32. The
purchase price included a note payable by Washington Bank Properties secured by a deed of
trust on the building. Id. Title to the note and deed of trust, sometimes referenced by the parties
in this litigation as the "Mortgage", was vested by operation of law in the ULIC Liquidator when
the insurer was placed in liquidation. Idaho Code § 41-3318(1). During the liquidation

2

The Representation Agreements constitute attorney-client and joint defense privileged
communications. To protect the applicable privileges, AIA has filed a motion requesting that the
Court issue an order pennitting AIA to file the Representation Agreements under seal for in camera
inspection.

3CJil
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proceedings, AIA Services and the Liquidator negotiated settlement of certain claims against one
another. The settlement included mutual releases and the distribution of the note and deed of
trust to AIA Services, ULIC's parent company. See documents included in Bond Aff. Ex. 32.
Hawley Troxell worked with the ULIC Liquidator to document the settlement agreement and to
prepare the assignments of the note and deed of trust and related documents necessary to transfer
the Mortgage in accordance with the settlement agreement. Riley Aff.

~

13.

In the Amended and Restated Pledge Agreement dated as of July 1, 1996 ("Pledge
Agreement"), AIA Services granted Reed a security interest in the ULIC stock owned by AIA
Services and in all noncash dividends and other property distributed in respect of the ULIC
shares. Bond Aff. Ex 4. Neither the Pledge Agreement nor the Idaho Uniform Commercial
Code entitles Reed to any dividend or distribution in respect of the pledged ULIC shares,
including (without limitation) the Mortgage, unles's and until Reed forecloses on the ULIC shares
in accordance with the UCc. In pledging the note and deed of trust, AIA Services did not
purport to extinguish any properly perfected security interest Plaintiff may have had. Rather, if
Reed has a valid and perfected security interest in the Mortgage (as apparently asserted by
Plaintiff), that security interest would continue to encumber the Mortgage notwithstanding the
assignment of the Mortgage by AIA Services to CropUSA for security purposes.
J.

AlA's Contractual Obligation To Advance Defense Costs To The Individual
Defendants.

1.

lBCA and Bylaws Obligate AlA to Advance Litigation Expenses. The AIA

Insurance, Inc. bylaw provisions on indemnification and expense advances appear in Article XI

3q82.
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of the Bylaws of A. LA. Inc) adopted January 5th 1988. Bond Aff. Ex. 20. 4 Section 11.1 of the
Bylaws provides that "[t]he corporation shall indemnify the directors and executive officers of
the corporation to the full extent permitted by the Idaho Business Corporation Act, as the same
exists or may hereafter be amended .... " Accordingly, the scope of permissible indemnification
and expense advances is governed by the current statutes, Idaho Code §§ 30-1-850 to 30-1-859.
Idaho Code § 30-1-858(1) provides, in pertinent part:
"A corporation may, by a provision in its ... bylaws ... , obligate
itself in advance ofthe act or omission giving rise to a proceeding
to ... advance funds to pay for or reimburse expenses in accordance
with section 30-1-853(3) .... Any such obligatory provision shall
be deemed to satisfy the requirements for authorization referred to
in section 30-1-853 (3) .... Any such provision that obligates the
corporation to provide indemnification to the fullest extent
permitted by law shall be deemed to obligate the corporation to
advance funds to pay for or reimburse expenses ... to the fullest

extent permitted by law, unless the provision specifically provides
otherwise." (Emphasis added.)
By Section 11.1 of the Bylaws, AIA Insurance, Inc. has obligated itself in advance to indemnify
its directors and executive officers to the full extent permitted by law and thereby, pursuant to
Idaho Code § 30-1-858(1), has obligated itself to payor reimburse all litigation expenses
incurred by the corporation's present or former directors and officers who are Defendants in this
case. Further, Section 11.5 of the AIA Insurance Bylaws expressly provides that "ft} he
corporation shall advance, prior to the final disposition of any proceeding, promptly following

request therefor, all expenses incurred by any director, officer, or employee or other agent of the
corporation ... upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of such person to repay [the

3

AIA msuranee, me. was originally incorporated under the name A.LA., mc.

4

Article XI of the New Restated Bylaws of AIA Services Corporation contains essentially the same
provisions as the AIA msurance Bylaws. See Bond Aff. Ex. 21.

3q~3
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advances] if it should ultimately be determined that such person is not entitled to be indemnified
under this Article XI or otherwise." (Emphasis added.) Each of the individual defendants has
executed and delivered the required undertaking. Duclos AffEx. 8.
Accordingly, AIA Insurance is obligated by its Bylaws and Idaho Code § 30-1-858(1) to
advance litigation expenses to the Defendants in this case. In addition, pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 30-1-858(1), Bylaws Section 11.1 is deemed by statutory fiat to satisfy the authorization
requirement ofIdaho Code § 30-1-853(3).
Note also that Section 11.6 (Enforcement) of the AIA Insurance Bylaws provides that all
rights to indemnification and expenses under Article XI are contractual rights and are
enforceable against the corporation by its directors and officers; Section 11.8 (Survival of
Rights) provides that the rights conferred by Article XI continue as to any person (such as JoLee
Duclos and Bryan Freeman) who ceases to be a director or officer of the corporation;
Section 11.9 (Amendments) provides that repeal or modification of Article XI is prospective
only and shall not affect rights in effect at the time of the alleged occurrence of the act or
omission to act that is the cause of the proceeding against any agent of the corporation; and
Section 11.10 (Savings Clause) provides that, in the event of invalidity of any provision in
Article XI of the Bylaws, the corporation shall nevertheless indemnify each director and officer
to the full extent permitted by any valid provision of Article XI or other applicable law. Section
11.9 in particular, and all of these provisions read together, make it clear that indemnification
and expense advance rights of a director or officer of the corporation vest at the time of the
occurrence of the alleged act or omission that resulted in the litigation filed against the
requesting party.

Y184
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In the Court's May 31, 2007 Order, the Court rejected Reed's motion for a temporary
restraining order enjoining AIA Insurance from expending its resources to pay legal fees
incurred by defendants John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos in defense of Reed's suit.
The court held:
Idaho's statutory scheme specifically provides for payment
of legal fees reasonably incurred by a corporate director, who is a
party to an action because of the individual's status as a director, to
be paid by the corporation if the statutory requirements are met.
The Court's record in the above-entitled matter reflects I.e. § 30-1853 has been met by Defendants John Taylor, Bryan Freeman and
JoLee Duclos[].

2.

AlA Services Shareholder Approval Of Expense Advances. In March 2007, AIA

Services solicited and obtained shareholder approval of the advance of litigation expenses
incurred by the individual Defendants in defense of Reed's lawsuit. See Bond Aff. Ex. 12. Reed
contends that AIA wrongfully obtained shareholder consent without full disclosure or vote of
only disinterested shareholders. 5 DQ Motion (at pp. 9). To the extent Reed may be asserting
this argument as a basis for disqualifying Hawley Troxell, it is wholly irrelevant: Hawley
Troxell was not asked to advise, and did not advise, AIA Services in connection with its
solicitation of the vote of AIA Services shareholders in March 2007 to approve the advance of
litigation expenses to the individual Defendants, or the disclosure made to the shareholders by
the corporation. Babbitt Aff.

5

~

13. Accordingly, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of

This argument is legally incorrect: There exists no legal obligation requiring AIA Services or its
directors to obtain shareholder approval ofthe expense advances. Idaho Code §§ 30-1-861 and
30-1-863 provide a safe harbor if a director's conflicting interest transaction is approved by the
disinterested shareholders after disclosure of the material facts; but failure to obtain such a vote is not
wrongful. Further, as discussed in the text above, the authorization required by Idaho Code § 30-1853(3) is satisfied by the Bylaw provisions obligating the corporation to advance defense costs.
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shareholder approval as a safe harbor for advancement of litigation expenses is irrelevant to
Reed's disqualification motion.
Reed correctly observes that AlA Services and AIA Insurance did not obtain the consent
of Reed Taylor or Donna Taylor for the advance oflitigation expenses to the individual
Defendants. DQ Motion p. 9. But Reed Taylor is not a shareholder of either AlA entity; Donna
is not a shareholder of AlA Insurance: and Donna's Series A Preferred Stock in AlA Services
Corporation is non-voting. See Section 4.2.8 of AlA Services Corporation's Amended and
Restated Articles of Incorporation. Bond Aff. Ex. 19.

K.

2007 Documentation Of CropUSA Loan To AIA Services.
In September 2007, AIA Services Corporation arranged to borrow up to $500,000 from

CropUSA The loan is secured by the assignment to CropUSA, for security purposes, of an asset
of AlA Services Corporation - the promissory note payable by Washington Bank Properties and
secured by a deed of trust on One Lewis Clark Plaza. Hawley Troxell did not have any role in
negotiating or determining the terms of the loan arrangement but rather acted as scrivener to
document the loan terms as agreed by AlA Services Corporation and Crop USA Collins Aff.
~ 5.

III. DISQUALIFICATION STANDARDS
The principles governing the Court's consideration of a motion by one party to disqualify
the attorneys for the opposing party are most recently summarized in Crown v. Hawkins Co., 128
Idaho 114, 122,910 P.2d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 1996). As the party moving for disqualification of
counsel, Reed Taylor has the burden of establishing grounds for the disqualification. Crown v.
Hawkins Co. at 794. Though the decision to grant or deny a motion to disqualify counsel is
within the discretion of the trial Court, the Court's goal should be to shape a remedy that will

?irtlo
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assure fairness to the parties and the integrity of the judicial process. Id. at 795. "Whenever
possible, courts should endeavor to reach a solution that is least burdensome to the client." Id.
(affirming the trial court's determination that the prejudice to the client of removing his counsel
shortly before the trial date "outweighed any potential ethical violation"). The cost of separate
representation is one ofthe factors that may be considered when determining whether common
representation is in the client's interest. Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct ("IRCP") Rule 1.7,
cmt. 19.
Further, as is the case here, "[w]here the motion to disqualify comes not from a client or
former client of the attorney, but from an opposing party, the motion should be reviewed with
caution." !d. Disqualification motions brought by an opposing party are disfavored because they
are "often made for tactical reasons, may result in unnecessary delay, and interfere with a party's
right to employ counsel of its choice." Cohen v. Acorn International. LTD., 921 F. Supp. 1062,
1063-64. (S.D.N.Y. 1995). "For these reasons, a high standard of proof is required of those
seeking disqualification." Id. Out of "concern about 'tactical use of disqualification motions' to
harass opposing counsel," courts act with caution in considering motions to disqualify.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985); see also id. at 441 (Brennan, l,

concurring) ("The tactical use of attorney-misconduct disqualification motions is a deeply
disturbing phenomenon in modem civil litigation.").
Moreover, "[a] motion to disqualify [an attorney] is of equitable nature, and a party
making the motion should do so with reasonable diligence and promptness after the facts have
become known." Schneider v. Curry, 106 Idaho 264, 266, 678 P.2d 56,58 (Ct. App. 1984). A
failure to act promptly warrants denial of the motion. Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 698,
819 P.2d 110,116 (Ct. App. 1991). Amotion to disqualify should be filed with promptness and

5'187
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reasonable diligence; and a failure to act promptly can warrant denial of the motion. Crown, 128
Idaho at 123,910 P.2d at 795.

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Reed Taylor Waived Any Right To Seek Disqualification By Delaying His Motion
To Disqualify For Sixteen Months.
Idaho courts have consistently held that "a motion to disqualify opposing counsel should

be filed at the onset of the litigation, or with promptness and reasonable diligence once the facts
upon which the motion is based have become known." Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698; Crown, 128
Idaho at 123. 6 A failure to act promptly warrants denial of the motion. Crown, 128 Idaho at
123. A motion to disqualify counsel is "properly denied on basis of waiver alone, where
movants had reason to know of existence of basis for potential disqualification several years
before filing the motion." Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698 (citation omitted). The rationale behind the
promptness requirement is to "prevent a litigant from using the motion as a tool to deprive his
opponent of counsel of his choice after completing substantial preparation of the case."

Transmark, US.A., Inc. v. State, Dept. o/Ins., 631 So.2d 1112, 1116 (Fla. App. 1994); see also
Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988,992 (8th Cir. 1978)
("This court will not allow a litigant to delay filing a motion to disqualify in order to use the

6

Reed Taylor cites Nevada Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex reI. County of Clark,
152 P.3d 737 (Nev. 2007), for the proposition that there is no waiver when a party fails to
demonstrate a clear intention to relinquish the right to challenge representation. That Nevada case is
contrary to the timeliness requirement adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court. Moreover, the facts in
Nevada Yellow Cab Corp. are easily distinguishable. There, the parties agreed to mediate a case after
the alleged conflict of interest was identified. The party seeking disqualification "postponed any
motion for disqualification, while stating that it reserved its right to file such a motion if mediation
failed." Id. at 740. Then, "[w]hen mediation failed, ICW promptly filed its motion." Id. No similar
facts exist here.
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motion later as a tool to deprive his opponent of counsel of his choice after substantial
preparation of a case has been completed.").
Courts consider a variety of factors in determining whether a party has waived the right
to seek disqualification, including (1) the length of the delay in bringing a motion to disqualify;
(2) when the movant learned of the conflict; (3) whether the movant was represented by counsel
during the delay; (4) why the delay occurred, and in particular whether the motion was delayed
for tactical reasons; and (5) whether disqualification would result in prejudice to the nonmoving
party. Employers Ins. o/Wausau v. Albert D. Seeno Const. Co., 692 F.Supp. 1150, 1165 (N.D.
Cal. 1988). Here, each ofthese factors weighs strongly in favor of waiver and denial of the
motion to disqualify.

1.

Reed Taylor Waited Over Sixteen Months To Bring This Motion To Disqualify.

The first two factors listed above - the "length of the delay in bringing a motion to disqualify"
and "when the movant learned of the conflict" - weigh heavily in favor of denying the motion to
disqualify. In determining whether a party has waived any right to seek the disqualification of
another party's counsel, Idaho courts place heavy emphasis on the length of delay in bringing the
motion. See, e.g., Schneider, 106 Idaho at 266 (court declined to review district court's refusal to
grant motion to disqualify counsel in part because of the moving party's delay - from June 1980
to October 27, 1980 - in bringing the motion to disqualify); Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698 (noting
that a thirteen month delay in bringing the motion to disqualify supported the trial court's denial
of the motion to disqualify); see also Exterior Systems, Inc. v. Noble Composites, Inc., 210
F.Supp.2d 1062, 1077 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (finding waiver where movant sent a letter objecting to
opposing counsel's conflict of interest, but waited until twelve months later to file a motion to
disqualify).
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Here, the delay in bringing the motion to disqualify is excessive. Reed Taylor and his
counsel have been aware of the alleged conflicts of interest for over sixteen months. Hawley
Troxell appeared on behalf of AIA Services and AIA Insurance on May 7, 2007. The very same
facts that Reed Taylor now relies upon to support his allegations of conflict of interest existed
when Hawley Troxell appeared in this case. Not only did the same facts exist, but Reed Taylor's
counsel was keenly aware of the alleged conflicts. Indeed, he has been vaguely accusing Hawley
Troxell of alleged conflicts of interest since the very inception of this litigation. By way of
example, in a recent email fromMr. BondtoAIA'scounsel, GaryBabbitt,Mr. Bond lectured:
.... I have repeatedly advised all of you in writing, through
telephone conferences and/or in person of the various conflicts.
Even after all my warnings, you have all continued on with the
conflicts to the detriment of AIA Services and AlA Insurance .... I
advised you all time and time again that AIA Insurance should
have separate counsel.
See Babbitt Aff. Ex. 6; see also id. Ex. 4 ("All I have ever done is advised everyone of all

applicable conflicts .... I warned you and warned you, and all you did was ignore me").
Mr. Bond began raising nonspecific conflict of interest accusations in May 2007:
You of all people should know how often I complained about your
ethical violations over and over again. I am forwarding you my
email and attached letter of May 11, 2007, yes, over 1 year and
2 months ago .... Does greed blind you that much?
Id. at Ex. 5 (July 27,2008 email); see also id. at Ex. 3 (July 17, 2008 email asserting: "I recall

sending you a clear and concise letter [regarding conflicts] when you first appeared in this case,
which you ignored.").
Thus, it is abundantly clear that Reed Taylor and his counsel have been accusing Hawley
Troxell of conflicts of interest since May 2007, yet they waited over sixteen months to bring a
motion to disqualify which, for the first time, purports to specifically identify disqualifying
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conflicts of interest. By sitting on his hands for over sixteen months, Plaintiff has waived any
right to seek disqualification of AIA's counsel. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that much
shorter delays constitute waiver. See Schneider, 106 Idaho at 266 (four month delay supports
finding of waiver); Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698 (thirteen month delay in bringing the motion to
disqualify supported the trial court's denial of the motion to disqualify).

2.

Reed Taylor Has Been Represented At All Times By Counsel. In determining

whether a motion to disqualify is timely, courts also consider ''whether the movant was
represented by counsel during the delay." Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Albert D. Seeno Const.

Co., 692 F.Supp. 1150, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Here, Reed Taylor has been represented by Rod
Bond at all times, plus several consecutive sets of co-counsel. Anyone of Reed Taylor's counsel
could have brought a motion to disqualify sixteen months ago ifthey really believed there were
grounds for such a motion.

3.

This Belated Motion To Disqualify Has Been Brought For Tactical Reasons. The

United States Supreme Court has warned that motions to disqualify brought by an opposing party
should be considered with caution out of "concern about tactical use of disqualification motions
to harass opposing counsel." Richardson-Merrell, 472 U.S. at 436. It is abundantly clear that
Reed Taylor has embarked in an improper mission to obtain a litigation advantage by
disqualifying all opposing counsel in this case.
If this motion to disqualify were anything other than a litigation tactic, it would have been
brought sixteen months ago - not now after Hawley Troxell has spent the last sixteen months
defending AIA and preparing for trial. The improper litigation tactic is further evidenced by (i)
the fact that Reed Taylor seeks to disqualify not only Hawley Troxell, but also counsel for each
of his other litigation opponents; (ii) the recently served derivative demand that AIA bring suit
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against its own counsel for "aiding and abetting"; and (iii) his separate direct lawsuits recently
filed against AIA's counsel. It is significant that the Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify counsel
contends that defense counsel should be disqualified because ofthe conflicts between counsel
and client engendered simply by Reed Taylor having made the derivative claims and having filed
the direct lawsuits. See DQ Motion p. 50. A clearer example of manufacturing a conflict to gain
an advantage in this underlying litigation can hardly be imagined.
Reed Taylor's counsel has asserted many times throughout the course of this litigation
that Reed Taylor has considered bringing claims against Hawley Troxell and the other law firms
representing the defendants in this case. ill a July 11, 2008 letter, Rod Bond made a settlement
demand. ill connection with the settlement demand, Rod Bond announced that, unless the case
settled within days, Reed Taylor would be bringing suit against the law firms representing the
various defendants in this case. See Babbitt Aff. Ex. 2 (" .... if this case is not resolved in a
timely manner (days not weeks), then other lawsuits will be filed against numerous other
defendants")) Mr. Bond then conceded that "I do not believe that this [the lawsuits against the
law firms] will be productive, but Reed Taylor makes the decisions." Id. (emphasis added).
In other words, because Reed Taylor "makes the decisions," counsel would bring suit against the

various law firms even though he questioned the merit of such lawsuits.
It became immediately apparent that the purpose behind serving the derivative demand

was to pit client against counsel in an attempt to remove all defense counsel from the case. A

7

While the letter does not explicitly state that the "other lawsuits" would be brought against the law
firms, the context of the letter makes clear that Rod Bond was referring to litigation that would be
brought against Hawley Troxell and the other law firms. Mr. Bond had been telling Hawley Troxell
for months that Reed intended to bring claims against the various law firms. More tellingly, Reed
Taylor served his derivative demand that AIA bring suit against the law firms shortly after the July
11,2008 letter.
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few days after receiving the above-described letter, AIA's counsel contacted Reed Taylor's
counsel for a list of available dates for Reed Taylor's deposition. Mr. Bond responded by
asserting that he would not allow Hawley Troxell to depose Reed Taylor because of the so-called
conflict manufactured by the derivative demand:
Mike Bissell's finn will be filing suit against you, John Ashby,
Dick Riley and Hawley Troxell in the coming days for aiding and
abetting and violations of various rules of professional conduct,
among other claims. Reed intends to also forward copies of the
Complaint to the bar association. In light of these pending events,
please advise me if your finn intends to remain as counsel on this
case. Sorry to be so direct, but it does not make sense for me to set
up depositions when you will probably not be involved much
longer.
Babbitt Aff. Ex. 3. The threat to forward copies of the Complaint to the bar association for
possible disciplinary action, which was clearly intended to induce counsel to withdraw
voluntarily, is a violation of the spirit ifnot the letter ofLR.C.P. 4.4: "In representing a client, a
lawyer shall not: (4) threaten to present criminal charges in order to obtain an advantage in a
civil matter." When Hawley Troxell declined to abdicate its obligations to its clients, the
threatened suit was indeed filed by Mr. Bissell. Bond Aff. Ex. 38. That the purpose of the
separate aiding and abetting suit is to obtain a tactical advantage in this case is clearly
demonstrated by the DQ Motion (p. 25-26), in which Plaintiff asserts that the mere pendency of
the separate claims against Hawley Troxell is "one additional reason ... why the Attorneys
should withdraw or be disqualified."
Finally, the fact that Reed Taylor's motion is no more than a litigation tactic was brought
out in the July 24, 2008 hearing on AIA's motion for a stay pending AIA's inquiry into the
derivative demand. At that hearing, Mr. Bond stated that that Reed Taylor would seek to
disqualify and/or sue all the remaining defense counsel in the case. He followed up that

AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 22

3~~ 3

40005.0006.1309816.2

statement, however, with the assertion that Reed Taylor would consent to Hawley Troxell's
continued representation of ALA if Hawley Troxell would post an $8.5 Million bond with the
Court. This statement makes clear that Reed Taylor is not concerned with supposed violations of
ethics rules but rather with his own pecuniary interests.
It is clear from the timing of this motion and the communications from Reed Taylor's
counsel that this motion is part of a scheme by Plaintiff and his counsel to manufacture conflicts
of interest between attorneys and clients on which to predicate Plaintiffs motion to disqualify
Defendants' counsel, to deprive the defendants of the counsel of their choice, and to obtain an
unfair advantage in this case.

4.

AlA Would Be Severely Prejudiced By Disqualification OfIts Counsel. While it

would obviously serve Reed Taylor's personal interests to force each of his litigation opponents
to find new counsel at this late state of the litigation, Reed Taylor has not proffered any evidence
that he would be prejudiced ifhis motion to disqualify is denied. Conversely, the defendants will
be severely prejudiced if they are deprived of their right to counsel oftheir choosing. Idaho
courts have expressed a strong reluctance to prejudice a party by disqualifying their counsel at a
late stage in the litigation, especially based on so-called conflicts that existed for a long period of
time before the filing of the motion. For example, in Weaver, the Idaho Court of Appeals found
that the moving party had waived any right to disqualify opposing counsel for failing to file the
motion "with promptness and reasonable diligence once the facts upon which the motion is based
have become known." Weaver, 120 Idaho at 698. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
explained:
Given that discovery was well underway and that motions for
summary judgment were pending, the district court concluded that
any possible prejudice to the partnership was far outweighed by the
possible prejudice to Weaver or Lupher of having to obtain new
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counsel if the motion were granted. The court also concluded that,
in light of the relatively advanced nature of the proceedings,
allowing Decker and Hollifield to continue their representation,
while keeping their clients as separate as possible, was the least
damaging alternative under the circumstances.

Id.
The fact that this motion is brought at this late stage demonstrates the prejudice that AIA
and the other defendants would suffer if their counsel were disqualified. In Mr. Bond's own
words, he has pointed out the alleged conflicts to counsel "from day one" of this litigation.
Babbitt Mf. Ex. 8. Since "day one", AIA's counsel has spent sixteen months reviewing
documents, interviewing witnesses, conducting motion practice and discovery and preparing for
trial. As the Court is keenly aware (having had to read and rule upon the myriad motions filed in
this case), this case has turned out to be a complex and fact-laden morass. AIA has incurred
substantial attorney's fees for legal services performed by Hawley Troxell. If Reed's motion is
granted, AIA (and each of the other defendants) would face the extreme prejudice of having to
retain and educate new counsel on the procedural history and complex legal issues. Forcing each
defendant to retain new counsel would require new counsel to get up to speed on this case,
increase attorneys' fees substantially and significantly delay the trial in this matter.
As a practical matter, requiring AIA Insurance, AIA Services, CropUSA and John Taylor
to each retain new and separate counsel would be extremely expensive and may not be feasible.
Reed Taylor has now brought a direct lawsuit against Hawley Troxell and other counsel and he is
now attempting to bring a derivative lawsuit against all defense counsel in the case, based in part
on counsel's mere acceptance of attorney's fees. It would be naIve to believe that all of the
various defendants will be able to find new (much less qualified) attorneys who are willing to
step into the mine-field that this litigation has become. Why would any right-minded lawyer
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agree to represent a defendant in this litigation if that attorney will immediately be sued for
accepting attorney's fees for the representation,8 especially now that Reed Taylor is taking the
position that no law firm could represent either AIA Insurance or AIA Services without
obtaining the consent of Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor? See Section IV.G.3.
In summary, the Court should conclude that Reed Taylor has waived any right to seek
disqualification of counsel by waiting sixteen months before filing his motion to disqualify.

B.

Defendants Have a Common Interest Privilege and Are Entitled to Enter Into a
Joint Defense Agreement.
1.

IRE 502(b) and Common Interest Privilege. The Idaho Rules of Evidence

specifically provide for a common interest privilege, otherwise known as a joint defense
privilege. Rule of Evidence 502(b)(3) provides that "[a] client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client which were
made ... among clients, their representatives, their lawyers, or their lawyers' representatives, in
any combination, concerning a matter of common interest, but not including communications
solely among clients or their representatives when no lawyer is a party to the communication."
The official comment to Evidence Rule 502(b)(3) explains that it is "intended to provide
that when clients who share a common interest in a legal matter are represented by different
lawyers they can communicate with each other in an effort to develop ajoint strategy or
otherwise advance their interests." The official comment further explains the rationale for the

8

Indeed, Mr. Bond has already threatened suit against the newest attorney to appear in this litigation,
David Risley, ifhe accepts fees advanced by AIA Insurance or AIA Services. See Babbitt Mf. Ex. 10
("If you don't want to have Reed Taylor pursue claims against your [sic] and your firm, I recommend
that you not accept payment of any funds that have been derived directly or indirectly from AIA
Services or AIA Insurance or any of their assets in which Reed Taylor has a security interest.").
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privilege as follows: "[P]ersons who share a common interest in litigation should be able to
communicate with their respective attorneys and with each other to more effectively prosecute or
defend their claims." Id. (quoting In Re: Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244,249 (4th Cir.
1990)).
J oint defense agreements, like the one entered into among the Defendants in this case, are
a common practice in cases where multiple defendants share a common adversary. See, e.g.,

Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Services, Inc., 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (Mass. 2007)
(recognizing the "longstanding use and validity of joint defense agreements, an exception to
waiver of the attorney-client privilege under the common interest doctrine."). The courts do not
impose strict limitations on when parties may enter into joint defense agreements. Instead, the
only requirement is that the parties have a common interest in the litigation. "Where defendants
allege a common interest that is no more than a joint effort to establish a common litigation
defense strategy, the requisite common interest is among the easiest to establish." !d. at 1113.
Such defendants need only prove that "(1) the communications were made in the course of a
joint defense effort, (2) the statements were designed to further the effort, and (3) the privilege
has not been waived." Id.

2.

The Co-Defendants Share Common Interests in the Joint Defense ofReed's

Claims. Plaintiffs claims themselves make it self-evident that the Co-Defendants in this case
share common interests in the defense of those claims. The complaint alleges various
"inappropriate" transactions between or among the Defendants, such as AlA Insurance's
purchase of AIA Services Series C Preferred Stock from CropUSA for $1.5 million, the parking
lot and radio station transactions between John Taylor and AIA, and the other "related party"
transactions identified in the Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson. In each case, two or more
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Defendants are involved in the transaction. Accordingly, the successful defense against Reed's
claim of impropriety by one party to a transaction necessarily absolves the other party or parties
to the transaction. Those parties clearly have a common interest in cooperating with one another
to defeat Reed's claims.
Further, Plaintiff has painted the Defendants with the same broad brush, seeking the same
relief against all Defendants without distinguishing among them. Based on alter-ego and
conspiracy allegations in the Fifth Amended Complaint ("FAC"), Plaintiff prays for judgment
against all of the Defendants, jointly and severally, for all sums owed to him under the
promissory note and for all contract and tort damages in an amount to be proved at trial. F AC
,,13.2, 13.3, 14.11, 14.12. For example, FAC, 13.2 expressly alleges what is implicit in the
prior iterations of his complaint, i.e., the claim that all of the Defendants have engaged in a civil
conspiracy. One element that must be proved to establish a civil conspiracy is that there is an
agreement among the Defendants to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful
objective in an unlawful manner. McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317,321
(2003). If a conspiracy is established, each co-conspirator is liable for the acts of each other coconspirator. Dalquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 390,233 P. 883,887 (1925). Obviously, each
Defendant shares with each other Defendant a common interest in refuting Reed's allegations of
the formation of such an agreement and/or the commission of any act by any other Defendant
that could give rise to such joint liability; and all Defendants are benefited if any of them is
successful in that regard.
In addition, the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks, if granted, would, among other things,

limit the corporate Defendants' ability to use or transfer funds and assets, and to borrow money.
Plaintiff also seeks to enjoin the Defendants from negotiating any substantive contracts without
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his approval or permission from the court. [FAC, para. 14.2(f), (g), (h), and (k).] The
Defendants have a common interest in defending against these and other claims Plaintiff has
asserted against them; and they share common defenses to most, if not all, of these claims.
The Defendants also share a common interest in coordinating the defense in order to
eliminate duplication of counsel's efforts on behalf of their respective clients and thereby to
mitigate the attorney fees which, as discussed in Section ILJ above, AIA Services and AIA
Insurance are obligated to advance to the individual Defendants.

3.

Propriety ofJoint Defense Agreement. Plaintiff alleges that the Joint Defense

Agreement is "inappropriate" because AIA should, according to Plaintiff, be suing the other
Defendants. See, e.g., item # 16 in Mr. Bissell's July 21,2008 derivative demand letter (Bond
Aff. Ex. 16). As noted by Professor Strait, this argument puts the cart before the horse (Strait
Aff. Sections VILA.3, VILE.2 and VILF.2); and it would deny the Defendants the right to defend
themselves against Reed's claims. The fact that potential adversity between co-defendants in the
future may be foreseeable does not prevent the co-defendants from entering into a joint defense
agreement to pursue their common interest in defending claims by a third party. See In re Grand

Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated November 26, 1974,406 F. Supp. 381, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
That case involved the exchange of information among counsel and targets of an SEC
investigation, including counsel for a corporation and counsel for certain individuals. The
government claimed that the interests of certain of the participants in the conference were
divergent because the company might have a claim against one of the individual participants,
who was its former officer and director. The court nonetheless found the common legal interest
privilege applicable, stating that even if an action by the company against its former officer were
foreseeable, "[t]hat alone would not have prevented [the] sharing [of] confidential information
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for the purpose of a joint defense against the immediate SEC action.. ,. That a joint defense may
be made by somewhat unsteady bedfellows does not in itself negate the existence or viability of
the joint defense." Id.
Thus, Reed Taylor's assertion that Defendants are not permitted to enter into ajoint
defense agreement because of purportedly diverging interests is not supported by the law. 9 ill
fact, the Official Comment to Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(b )(3) itself recognizes that the joint
defense privilege "will survive a later falling-out among the parties," thus recognizing that
parties with potentially diverging interest can take advantage of the joint defense privilege. See
also Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787-88 (3rd Cir. 1985) ("Communications to an
attorney to establish a common defense strategy are privileged even though the attorney
represents another client with some adverse interests."); Us. v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321,
1336 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that the "joint-interest privilege is not limited to situations in which
the positions of the parties are compatible in all respects"); Gallagher v. Office ofAttorney
General, 787 A.2d 777 (Md. App. 2001) ("The divergence of the parties' interests over the
course of litigation does not necessarily negate the applicability of the common interest rule.").
Professor Strait concludes that Hawley Troxell is representing the AIA entities under an
appropriate Joint Defense Agreement, Standstill Agreement, and limited scope of representation
related to litigation only. Strait Aff. Section IIL2. Further, he opines: "Under Idaho RPC 1.2,
Hawley Troxell may, after full discussion with the AIA entities and with Crop, undertake such a

9

Plaintiff cites Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 650 N.W.2d 364,370 (Mich. 2002), for the proposition
that contracts that violate ethical rules violate public policy and are not enforceable. See DQ Motion
p. 48. That case, however, simply held that a fee agreement that violated ethical rules was
unenforceable. The case has no application here because the joint defense agreement does not violate
any ethical rules.
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joint representation with an appropriately limited scope of representation to the common claims
as authorized by the control groups and consistent with their authority to defend against Reed's
claims." Strait Aff. Section VILB.3.
Defendants' ability to present a unified defense to Plaintiff's claims minimizes
duplication and legal expense. Joint defense will not result in a loss of any claims the corporate
Defendants may have against one another or against the individual Defendants because all such
claims have been expressly preserved by tolling agreements. It is in Plaintiff's interest to divide
and conquer by insisting that each corporate Defendant have separate counsel and that the
Defendants assert claims against one another. It is not, however, in the corporate Defendants'
interest to hire separate counsel to pursue claims against one another while, at the same time,
defending against Plaintiff's claims. It would defeat their ability to provide a unified and
consistent defense, divert their attention from the principal object of defeating Plaintiff's claims,
and result in additional expense they can ill afford.

4.

Joint Defense Is Not Joint Representation. Reed and his attorneys apparently

labor under the misapprehension that the Joint Defense Agreement is ajoint representation
agreement, rather than a j oint defense agreement. 10 Based on this mischaracterization of the
Joint Defense Agreement, Plaintiff contends that Hawley Troxell must be disqualified because
the firm is representing, either directly or indirectly through the Joint Defense Agreement, the
interests of John Taylor and the other individual Defendants in addition to the interests of the
corporate Defendants. See, e.g., DQ Motion at pp. 42 (alleged joint representation without
informed consent of authorized representatives of AIA), 46 (lack of informed consent by Reed

10 Plaintiffs expert, Peter Jarvis, is similarly mistaken. See, e.g., Jarvis Aff. ~ 5.j.
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and Donna Taylor to joint representation), 48-50 (alleged improper joint representation, directly
or indirectly through ajoint defense agreement, of the corporations and their directors/officers,
without Reed's consent).
Plaintiff makes a similar argument, again premised on the erroneous concept that the
Joint Defense Agreement results in joint representation, that Hawley Troxell must be
disqualified because a lawyer cannot represent both an organization and a director or officer in a
fraud action against them. DQ Motion p. 48-49. Plaintiff argues that "the Attorneys may not
directly, or indirectly through any joint defense agreement, represent the interests of John
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA and any other
interested party or individual defendant with claims of corporate malfeasance against him or
her." Id. p. 49 (emphasis added.). To the contrary, Hawley Troxell has not ever undertaken the
representation of any of the individual Defendants in this litigation, either directly or through the
Joint Defense Agreement; and each of the individual Defendants has at all times been
represented by hislher own independent counsel in this litigation. Babbitt Aff. 1 11.
The fact that the parties have entered into a joint defense agreement does not mean that
Hawley Troxell represents any of the individual director Defendants. As explained recently by
one Court:
A joint defense agreement is not synonymous with common
representation. While common representation creates an attorneyclient relationship between common counsel and each defendant
being represented by them, a joint defense agreement is a
mechanism designed to provide confidentiality for
communications made during joint defense strategy sessions. See
United States v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citing Wilson P. Abraham Canst. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559
F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Schwimmer, 892
F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989)). Each defendant, however, retains
his own attorney, and the duty of loyalty only extends from each
attorney to the defendant which he represents. !d.
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Beras v. US., 2007 WL 195352,2 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Us. v. Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318,
1323 (l1th Cir. 2003) ("A duty ofloyalty, however, does not exist [as a result of a joint defense
agreement] and it is therefore improper to conclude that all of the attorneys in the joint defense
strategy session represent all ofthe participating defendants.").

5.

Reed Erroneously Asserts That Hawley Troxell Must Be Disqualified Pursuant To

IRPC 1.6 Because Of Inability To Protect Confidential Information Received From Each Client.
Plaintiff argues that Hawley Troxell should be disqualified because the joint defense agreement
among the Defendants permits sharing of otherwise confidential information, making it
"impossible for the Attorneys to properly keep and protect each client's confidential information
.... " DQ Motion p. 38. 11 IRCP 1.6 (a) provides that "a lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent .... ". If Reed's
argument were given credence, it would be a disqualifying violation of Rule 1.6(a) to enter into
any joint defense agreement because, by the very nature and purpose ofthe agreement,
codefendants share otherwise confidential information and waive any confidentiality as among
themselves.
To the contrary, the courts acknowledge the common interest privilege of codefendants to
share information, coordinate discovery and motion practice and contain costs. Joint defense
agreements are widely utilized and accepted, notwithstanding that each of the participants
waives, as to each other participant, privilege and confidentiality of shared information. See
Sections IV.B.1-4. above.

11 The absurdity of Reed's concern with preservation of confidentiality of each client's information is
manifested by his contention that, when he takes control of AIA Insurance, he will have access to the
information shared by other Defendants under the Joint Defense Agreement, thereby making it easier
for him to pursue the alleged claims against those other Defendants. See DQ Motion pp. 38,51.
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Further, Rule 1.6(a) does not prohibit sharing of information among co-defendants who
have given informed consent, whether those co-defendants are represented by the same counsel
in a joint representation or by different counsel pursuant to a joint defense agreement. Each of
Hawley Troxell's clients made an informed decision and gave informed consent to proceed with
the joint representation, in part because ofthe need to keep defense costs in check. The informed
decision to share information among Hawley Troxell's clients is a matter for their discretion and
business judgment. Strait Aff. Section VII. D. 2 ("Under RPC 1.6, each client, if properly
informed of the risks, has a complete authority to waive confidentiality .... This is a proper and
valid decision for an informed client to make as to whether or not to participate in such a joint
defense agreement.").

c.

AlA's Attorneys Have No Duty to Plaintiff and Have Neither Right Nor Power to
Take Action Independently of Their Clients.
Reed and his attorneys have confused the duties of defense counsel with the duties of

their clients, asserting without citation to any authority that counsel have duties to Reed, in his
capacity as a creditor of AIA Services and as a pledgee of AIA Insurance, Inc. stock. Plaintiff
asserts that: "AIA Services is insolvent and ... the duties of [Hawley Troxell's] representation
are to Reed in light of the insolvency to protect AlA's assets." Babbitt Aff. Ex. 8. Plaintiff also
contends that Hawley Troxell owes a duty ofloyalty to Reed in his capacities as a creditor of
AIA Services and as a pledgee of the stock of AIA Insurance. See, e.g., DQ Motion p. 37
("[T]he Attorneys owe the beneficiary of AIA Services' limited remaining assets, Reed Taylor,
fiduciary duties to preserve the assets by not representing the interests of John Taylor and other
indi viduals.")
Those contentions are simply wrong. Hawley Troxell's obligation as lawyers for AIA
Services and AIA Insurance runs to the corporations, which include the following "authorized
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constituents": directors, officers, shareholders and employees. See IRCP 1.13 and cmt 1.
Neither the law nor the IRCP require Hawley Troxell, as lawyers, to prefer either a creditor or a
pledgee over the recognized constituencies of the corporate clients (for example, the common
shareholders of AlA Services, whose investments are worth less to the extent AlA Services is
obligated to Reed). If Reed's assertion were true, it would be a complete perversion of the
adversarial system on which our jurisprudence is based.
Plaintiff s counsel also makes the outlandish argument that AlA's lawyers owe Reed a
duty to take action, independent of their clients, to protect Reed's interests. In his May 11, 2007
letter (quoted in DQ Motion p. 22), Bond states: "As the counsel for the corporations, [Hawley
Troxell has] a duty to bring claims for the benefit of the corporations, their shareholders and their
creditors in light of insolvency." DQ Motion p. 22; Bond Aff. Ex 29. This argument
misperceives the roles of attorneys. Lawyers serve as advisors and advocates. See Preamble to
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct cmt 2:
"As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various
functions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed
understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and
explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer
zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the
adversary system .... "
As lawyers, Hawley Troxell cannot "bring claims for the benefit of the corporations". At most,
Hawley Troxell can advise the AlA boards of their duties; and Hawley Troxell ensured, as a
condition of representation of the corporate Defendants, that each of the corporate Defendants
and all of the individual Defendants signed a standstill and tolling agreement preserving all
claims among the Defendants pending the outcome of Reed's lawsuit.
Defense counsel have no obligation to prove Reed's case for him. See IRCP l.13(d),
which provides that the lawyer's obligation under IRCP 1. 13(c) to report up the ladder to the
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organization's "highest authority" (i.e., the board of directors, in the case of a corporation) that
an officer or employee "is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to
the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law
that reasonably might be imputed to the organization" and to reveal otherwise confidential
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury
to the organization "shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's
representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the
organization ... against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law." Comment 8 observes
that this rule "is necessary in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of
legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim." Reed's theory that
AIA Services and AIA Insurance should be suing the other Defendants would emasculate this

.

fundamental principle of our legal system.
The argument that Hawley Troxell is obligated to take action to protect Reed's interests
also misperceives the scope of the firm's engagements by the corporate Defendants. Hawley
Troxell has not served as outside general counsel with oversight and comprehensive knowledge
of AIA's or CropUSA's activities. Hawley Troxell's previous representation of those entities
was limited to specific matters referred to the firm from time to time. Hawley Troxell has never
exercised internal supervision ofthe legal or other affairs of any of these entities; and the firm's
familiarity with their businesses, ownership, governance, employees, operations, accounting and
other matters is accordingly limited to information received in connection with matters as to
which it was specifically engaged and as to which it devoted substantive attention. In particular
(but without limitation), Hawley Troxell was not consulted in connection with the alleged selfdealing transactions alleged in Reed's complaint or any of the "related party" transactions
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identified in the Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson other than the legal opinion ofborrower's local
counsel provided to the lender on behalf of CropUSA in connection with the Surge loan in late
2006. Riley Aff.

~~

5, 11.

The finn's engagement for the purpose of defending this lawsuit brought by Reed Taylor
is similarly limited in scope to the specific matter for which the finn has been retained. Hawley
Troxell has not been asked to advise, and has not advised, the AIA entities or CropUSA in
connection with potential claims against one another or against the individual Defendants, in
light of insolvency or otherwise, as such advice is not necessary to the finn's representation of
the corporate Defendants in common defense of the allegations in Reed's complaint. As opined
by Professor Strait: "Under Idaho RPC 1.2, Hawley Troxell may, after full discussion with the
AIA entities and with Crop, undertake such a joint representation with an appropriately limited
scope of representation to the common claims as authorized by the control groups and consistent
with their authority to defend against Reed's claims." Strait Aff. Section VILB.3.
Attorneys engaged to defend a client are not expected to detennine the outcome of the
case before undertaking the defense. Reed asserts that the lawyers have knowingly advanced
frivolous arguments in opposition to Reed's obviously true and indefensible allegations. See
Complaint filed in Civ. No. CV08-01765 (Bond Aff. Ex. 38 at ~~ 32,36 and 53). To the
contrary, Hawley Troxell has had a reasonable belief, at the time of accepting the AIA
engagement and at all times thereafter, that valid defenses to Reed's note exist. Babbitt Aff.
~

12.

D.

Hawley Troxell's Representation Of AlA Services, AlA Insurance And CropUSA
Does Not Violate IRPC 1.7.
Rule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct ("IRCP") provides:
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(a)
Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
(1)
the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client; or
(2)
there is a significant risk that the representation of
one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person
or by the personal interests of the lawyer, including family and
domestic relationships.
(b)
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of
interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1)
the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will
be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each
affected client;
(2)

the representation is not prohibited by law;

(3)
the representation does not involve the assertion of
a claim by one client against another client represented by the
lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal;
and
(4)
each affected client gives informed consent,
confirmed in writing.
Throughout his DQ Motion, Plaintiff contends that Hawley Troxell has violated this Rule in its
representation ofthe three corporate Defendants. See sections 2,6,8,9, 13-18,22 and 25 of the
DQ Motion. For the following reasons, these contentions are wrong.

1.

The Representation Agreements Eliminate Any Direct Adversity Between

Defendants During This Litigation. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if the representation
of one client will be directly adverse to another client. lRCP 1.7 (a)(1). There is no direct
adversity between or among Hawley Troxell's clients for the purposes ofthis litigation, however,
because they are all co-defendants and share common interests in defending against Reed's
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claims in this litigation and because they agreed to toll all claims between or among them. See
Section IV.B.2 above; Strait Aff. Sections III.2 and VII.B.l ("There is no l.7(a)(1) adversity
which has not been reserved and tolled or which is outside the current scope of representation of
Hawley Troxell. RPC 1.7(a)(l) simply does not apply to the current scope of Hawley Troxell's
litigation counsel common defense representation under the agreements.").
A concurrent conflict also exists under IRCP 1.7(a)(2) if "there is a significant risk that
the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibility
to another client .... " Therefore, a conflict of interest might arise when an attorney
simultaneously represents two parties in litigation, such as codefendants.
However, even if a lawyer represents codefendants that might have adverse interests in
future litigation, there is no conflict of interest when an attorney represents "two clients (a) for
their joint purpose, (b) to accomplish a common end result, and (c) to implement their joint plan .

. . ." See Buehler v. Sbardellati, 34 Cal.AppAth 1527, 1540 (1995). In Buehler, the attorney was
aware that the two clients had some concerns regarding the structure of their partnership
agreement, but was hired solely to determine whether the agreement complied with California
law. Id. at 1534. The attorney informed the clients that he could represent them to this extent,
but could not represent either of them if the dealings between the two became adversarial. Id.
The attorney further clarified that he could not participate in any negotiation of one partner
contrary to the other. !d. Because the attorney limited his representation to the extent that the
two partners shared common goals in the attorney's simultaneous representation, their interests
were not adverse. Id. at 1540.
AIA submits that the Representation Agreements between and among Hawley Troxell
and its clients, as well as the other Defendants, assure that Hawley Troxell's representation of the
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corporate Defendants is limited to their common interests in defending Reed's complaint, so that
even if there is any concurrent conflict of interest among the corporate Defendants, that conflict
can be waived under IRPC 1.7(b).
2.

Reed Erroneously Contends That "Irreconcilable" Or "Nonwaivable" Conflicts

OfInterest Require That Hawley Troxell Be Disqualified From Representing Any of the
Corporate Defendants. Plaintiffs DQ Motion and the Affidavit of his expert, Peter Jarvis,

contain vague and unexplained assertions that unspecified conflicts of interest among the
corporate Defendants are "irreconcilable", "unconsentable" or "not waivable". Reed generalizes
that "there can be no joint representation because each of the defendant's interests are
irreconcilably divergent and are in direct conflict." DQ Motion p. 33. Citing IRPC 1.7 cmt. 14
that some conflicts are unconsentable, but without identifying any such conflicts, Plaintiff
concludes that "the conflicts between Hawley Troxell's clients are so irreconcilable that such
conflicts are nonconsentable under RPC 1.7." !d. p. 38. Again without elucidation, Reed
reiterates his contention that "the interests of all three corporations are irreconcilably divergent
and there is no possible way that Hawley Troxell ... could have reasonably believed that the
interest of the corporations would not be adversely affected by joint representation." Id. p. 45.
See also Jarvis Affidavit ~~ 4.a., S.c., S.d.

Neither Plaintiffs counsel nor Mr. Jarvis bothers to inform the Court or opposing counsel
(i) what are the standards for determining whether a concurrent conflict is waivable or nonwaivable, (ii) what conflicts plaintiff perceives to be non-waivable, or (iii) why such conflicts
supposedly cannot be waived. Their conclusory declarations are unaccompanied by
identification of any particular alleged conflict or any explanation of why such conflict is
"irreconcilable" rather than being waivable with informed consent of each client confirmed in
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writing, as was obtained in this case by Hawley Troxell in accordance with IRPC 1.7(b)(4). See,

e.g., Jarvis Aff. ~ S.c.
Non-waivable Conflicts. Under Rule 1. 7(b), concurrent conflicts of interest cannot be
waived through informed client consent: (i) ifthe representation is prohibited by applicable law;
or (ii) if the representation involves a claim by one client against another client represented by
the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before the tribunal

i.e., when the clients

are directly adverse in the same proceeding. IRCP 1.7(b)(2), (3) and cmts 16, 17. Selfevidently, neither ofthese two situations exists in the present case.
Waivable Conflicts. Absent a legal prohibition or direct adversity in the same
proceeding, the representation of codefendants with similar interests in litigation is proper if the
requirements of Rule 1.7(a)(2), (b)(1) and (4) are met. IRCP 1.7 cmt. 23 states:
Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the
same litigation, regardless of the clients' consent. On the other
hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in
litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is
governed by paragraph (a)(2).
Rule 1.7(a)(2) provides that a concurrent conflict of interest exists if "there is a significant risk
that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client .... ,,12 However, Rule 1.7(b) provides that, even if a
concurrent conflict of interest exists, the lawyer may nevertheless represent two or more
codefendants if, under Rule 1.7(b)(l) and (4), the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will
be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client, and each

12 As discussed above, the Representation Agreements assure that Hawley Troxell's representation of
the corporate Defendants is limited to their common interests in defending Reed's complaint, so that
there is no significant risk under Rule 1.7(a)(2) and therefore no concurrent conflict of interest.
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affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. See !RCP cmt. 23 ("[C]ommon
representation of persons having similar interests in litigation is proper if the requirements of
paragraph (b) are met.").
Generally, a lawyer can represent multiple parties "where the clients are generally
aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among them." !RCP 1.7, cmt.
28 (addressing nonlitigation conflicts). Client consent is sufficient to waive both actual and
potential conflicts of interest if the lawyer can reasonably conclude that the lawyer is able to
provide competent and diligent representation. IPRC 1.7(b)(1); see Zador Corp. v. Kwan, 31
Cal.AppAth 1285, 1295 (1995). A client can give informed consent as long as the client is
aware of the circumstances and the "reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have
adverse effects on the interests of that client." !RCP 1.7 cmt. 18.
Informed Conflict Waivers Obtained. Before undertaking joint representation of AIA
Services and AIA Insurance in May 2007, and before proposing that the co-Defendants enter into
a Joint Defense Agreement, Hawley Troxell carefully considered whether such representation
could be undertaken in accordance with the applicable Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and
concluded that, with carefully designed disclosures, informed consents to waive conflicts, and
tolling agreements among the Defendants, such representation and joint defense arrangement are
proper. Based on that consideration, and on the conflict waivers and tolling agreements among
the Defendants included in the Representation Agreements, Hawley Troxell reasonably believed
that the firm would be able to provide competent and diligent representation to both AIA
Services and AIA Insurance. Babbitt Aff.

~~

8-12. In addition, Hawley Troxell reasonably

believed, and continues to reasonably believe, that viable defenses to Plaintiffs claims exist.
Babbitt Aff.

~

12. See, e.g., Section IV.DA of this Memorandum.
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Reed's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell under IRCP 1.7 is misinformed and
misguided. Even ifthere exist concurrent conflicts of interest among the three corporate
defendants, Hawley Troxell's representation of its clients in this case is based on the informed
consent of the firm's clients and the lawyers' reasonable belief that, under the circumstances
detailed in Section IV.R2 above, the lawyers in this firm are able to provide competent and
diligent representation to each affected client as required by Rule 1. 7(b )(2). Those
circumstances include the Representation Agreements, particularly (i) written conflict waivers by
the three corporations and by each of the individual Defendants in accordance with Rule
1.7(b)(4) and (ii) standstill and tolling agreements between and among the three corporate
Defendants and all of the individual Defendants, thereby preserving all claims between or among
the Defendants pending the outcome of this case. I3
Plaintiffs counsel's mantra is that Hawley Troxell should not have represented both AIA
Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. See, e.g., Babbitt Aff. Ex. 6 (Mr. Bond's August
3, 2008 email asserting "I have advised you all time and time again that AIA Insurance should
have separate counse1."). Hawley Troxell carefully considered this question before undertaking
joint representation of AIA Services and AIA Insurance and concluded that, under the
circumstances, such joint representation is proper under the applicable Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct. Babbitt Aff.

~

12. Even if there exists a concurrent conflict of interest

13 It is clear that plaintiff s expert, Peter Jarvis, is unaware of the existence of the Representation
Agreements and did not take them into account in reaching his opinions. See Jarvis Aff. ~ 4.a. (The
Law Firms "are laboring under severe conflicts of interest that either have not been waived or are
nonwaivable."); ~ S.d. ("It does not appear that any, let alone all, of these conflicts can be and have
effectively been waived by disinterested individuals.")
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between the AIA entities, IRCP 1.7(b) provides that the conflict is waivable if - as is the case
here - each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
IRPC 1.2(c), relating to limited representations, provides an appropriate way of analyzing
whether Hawley Troxell's joint representation of the corporate Defendants is permissible in light
of the claims the corporate Defendants may have against one another. See Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers § 121, Comment c (iii) ("Some conflicts can be eliminated by an
agreement limiting the scope of the lawyer's representation if the limitation can be given effect
without rendering the remaining representation objectively inadequate") (citations omitted); N.Y.
City Bar Formal Opinion 2001-3 at 2-3 (decided under New York's version of the Model Code)
("representation may be limited to eliminate adversity and avoid a conflict of interest");

Indianapolis Podiatry, P.e. v. Efroymson, 720 N.E.2d 376,380-81 (Ind. App. 1999) (because
law firm limited the scope of its engagement, there was no direct conflict of interest).
The requirements for limiting a representation are similar to those that exist for obtaining
a waiver of a concurrent conflict of interest. Under Rule 1.2(c), there is both a reasonableness
test (the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances), and a client consent requirement
(the client must give informed consent). Hawley Troxell limited its engagement by AIA to
representation of its clients in Reed's lawsuit and its engagement by CropUSA to local counsel
representation in this suit; and all claims between or among the corporate Defendants and/or the
individual Defendants have been preserved by tolling agreements. Further, each of the
Defendants gave informed consent to the representation. Under these circumstances, the limited
representation was reasonable, and in fact necessary, to enable the corporate Defendants to
defend themselves against Reed's claims. According to Professor Strait: "Under Idaho RPC 1.2,
Hawley Troxell may, after full discussion with the AIA entities and with Crop, undertake such a
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joint representation with an appropriately limited scope of representation to the common claims
as authorized by the control groups and consistent with their authority to defend against Reed's
claims."
Plaintiff asserts that Hawley Troxell must be disqualified in order "to ensure fairness to
Reed Taylor in prosecuting his claims, and uphold the integrity of the legal system". While
Plaintiffhas taken issue with Hawley Troxell's defense of the corporate Defendants - alleging,
for example, that the attorneys are making "inappropriate" arguments and implying lack of good
faith or reasonable basis in fact (DQ Motion p. 10, 12,25,39-40,46), Plaintiff has made no
showing whatsoever that replacing AIA's counsel and/or obtaining separate counsel for AIA
Services and AIA Insurance would in any way change the fairness or unfairness of the defense or
the ability of Reed Taylor to prosecute his claims.
For example, if separate counsel had been obtained for AIA Insurance, would they have
played any different role than Hawley Troxell? Reed presumably would contend that separate
counsel would have brought claims against AIA Services and the individual Defendants for
alleged self-dealing transactions. But this argument suffers from the same defects as above,
including the fact that the same directors and officers manage both the parent company and its
wholly-owned subsidiary; those directors and officers are Defendants in this lawsuit; and any
attorneys for AIA Insurance - whether Hawley Troxell or other counsel -- are entitled, pursuant
to IRCP 1.13(a), to rely on those directors and officers for direction in the conduct of the
litigation. See Section IV.F of this Memorandum below. The likelihood that such management
of AIA Insurance would direct separate counsel to sue themselves is remote.
Fairness or integrity of judiciaI process are not Plaintiffs real concerns. Rather, the crux
of Reed's argument is that Plaintiffs claims are so self-evident that the Defendants should not be
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pennitted to defend against Plaintiff s claims. Instead, Reed contends that Defendants and their
counsel should take him at his word that his claims are unassailable, that Plaintiff and his
attorneys are entitled to act as judge and jury, that Defendants have no right to defend against the
claims, that counsel has no right to serve as an advocate for the Defendants, and that AIA
Services and AIA Insurance should now be suing the other Defendants rather than defending
against Reed's claims. See, e.g., Bond's May 11, 2007 letter (Bond Aff. Ex. 29) ("A careful
review of the pleadings, briefs, oral testimony and hearing exhibits clearly demonstrates that the
corporations have been operated for years for the benefit of John Taylor and others to the
detriment of Reed Taylor and other creditors."); DQ Motion p. 33. Reed and his counsel have
characterized any defense raised by Defendants' counsel as frivolous and as aiding and abetting
allegedly wrongful actions of other Defendants. DQ Motion p. 25; Bond Aff. Ex. 38.
Professor Strait has characterized Plaintiffs premise as absurd. See Strait Aff. Section
VILA.1. ("The heart of the motion to disqualify is the claim, repeated in multiple forms and
multiple times, that the control group of AIA Services, AIA Insurance and Crop are all conflicted
because they have been named in Reed Taylor's suit and, therefore, cannot take a position with
regard to Reed Taylor'S claims. That position is absurd."); see also Strait Aff. Section VII.E.l,
in which Professor Strait observes: "Under [Reed's] theory, no Board could oppose his claims
since he has named every Board member and, therefore, under his theory (unique arid absurd),
the conflicted Board members cannot act on behalf of a closely-held corporation ... to oppose his
theories asserted in his Complaint. Any counsel who cooperates with such a Board and allows
themselves to be hired as litigation counsel is therefore a co-bad actor. Accordingly, no
litigation counsel, whether representing one or more of the entities jointly or solely, could take
an adverse position to Reed's claims on behalf of the entity."
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In addition, Reed chose to sue AIA Insurance, Inc., making AIA Insurance a Defendant
and giving it and its parent company a common interest in ajoint defense against a "hostile
takeover". Cf. Strait Aff. Section VILE. 1. Reed did NOT attempt to assert derivative claims on
behalf of AIA Insurance against AIA Services and/or the individual Defendants, in which case
AIA Insurance would have been a plaintiff, rather than a Defendant, and would have been
represented by Plaintiffs counsel rather than Hawley Troxell. This bed is of Reed's and his cocounsels' own making
3.

Reed Erroneously Contends That Hawley Troxell Cannot Represent The Three

Corporations Without Breaching The Attorneys' Duty Of Loyalty To Each Client. In the
conclusory manner that permeates the DQ Motion, Reed asserts that "it is impossible for Hawley
Troxell ... to simultaneously represent the interest of Crop USA, AIA Services and AIA
Insurance, while at the same time giving each corporation their undivided loyalty" as required by
IRCP 1.7. DQ Motion p. 36. For the same reasons detailed above, Hawley Troxell reasonably
believes, based on the Representation Agreements, that the three corporations share a common
interest in defending against Reed's Complaint, that the clients' interests are aligned for that
purpose, and that the tolling agreements which preserve claims inter se the Defendants removes
any direct adversity that would purportedly make it "impossible" for Hawley Troxell to give
each corporation its undivided loyalty in the context of the defense of the limited engagement to
defend the corporate Defendants against Reed's claims in this litigation.
4.

Plaintiff Is Not A Creditor But Rather A Redeemed Shareholder Subject To

Statutory Payment Restrictions Because OfAlA Services' Insolvency. Plaintiff contends that
Hawley Troxell has not represented the interests of AIA Insurance and AIA Services (Amended
Motion at p. 23), by which Plaintiff apparently means that Hawley Troxell has not represented
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Reed Taylor's interests as a creditor of AlA Services and a pledgee of AIA Insurance stock. The
motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell, both directly and by reference to the separate lawsuit that
Plaintiff has filed against the firm, alleges that the attorneys' conduct of the defense of this case
has been "inappropriate" and that Hawley Troxell has aided and abetted the Defendants in
tortious conduct. See, e.g., Bond Aff. Ex. 38 ~~ 32,36,53; DQ Motion p. 25, 50. To the extent
Plaintiff seeks disqualification of counsel on this basis, AIA incorporates by reference the
Memorandum In Support ofLR.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss filed and pending for
hearing in Case No. CV08-01765. Babbitt Aff. Ex. 13.
In a similar vein, Plaintiff complains that Hawley Troxell participated in ceasing all
payments to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor. Again, this assertion impermissibly conflates
counsel with client. See Section IV.C above.
More significant, however, is the fact - as explained below - that AlA Services
Corporation cannot legally pay Reed Taylor because, as Plaintiff himself alleges, AIA Services
has been insolvent. DQ Motion p. 43. Under the Idaho Business Corporation Act, redemption
of a common shareholder like Reed Taylor is illegal, and the redemption obligations are void and
unenforceable, to the extent AIA Services was insolvent or would be rendered insolvent by the
redemption obligation. Idaho Code § 30-1-6 (as in effect prior to July 1, 1997) provided: "A
corporation shall have the right to purchase ... or otherwise acquire ... its own shares, but
purchases of its own shares, whether direct or indirect, shall be made only to the extent of
unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefor, and, ... with the affirmative vote
of the holders of a majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon, to the extent of unreserved and
unrestricted capital surplus available therefor. ... No purchase of or payment for its own shares
shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment
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would make it insolvent." (Emphasis added.) Idaho Code § 30-1-46 similarly provided: "The
board of directors of a corporation may ... distribute to its shareholders out of capital surplus of
the corporation a portion of its assets, in cash or property, subject to the following provisions:

(a) No such distribution shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such
distribution would render the corporation insolvent. ... " (Emphasis added.)
It is crucial to recognize that Reed Taylor is NOT a creditor who loaned funds to AIA

Services, but rather is a former shareholder. The common stock interest being redeemed from
Reed is on a par with the interest of the other common shareholders. Especially as the

controlling shareholder of AIA Services at the time of the Stock Redemption Agreement in
1995, Reed cannot simply leap into a preferred position as a creditor, to the detriment of the
other common shareholders.
In granting partial summary judgment that AIA Services' note payable to Reed is

currently in default, the Court relied on cases involving creditors. However, AIA Services is not
a borrower; and Reed Taylor is not a lender. Rather, he was a common shareholder whose
interests were redeemed. His rights as a redeemed shareholder are subj ect to the restrictions in
the Idaho Business Corporation Act on a corporation's right to redeem its own shares,
restrictions that are designed to prohibit a shareholder from re-characterizing his common equity
interest in the corporation to a creditor's interest with priority over all other shareholders. See
Idaho Code §§ 30-1-6 and 30-1-46 as in effect in 1995 and 1996. Those statutory rules are
designed to prevent exactly what Reed Taylor is attempting to do in this litigation.
Reed admits that, at least since 2001, AIA Services has been insolvent. See DQ Motion
p. 44;

~

12 of Reed's Complaint against Hawley Troxell in Civ. No. CV 08-01765. Defendants

contend that AIA Services was also insolvent in 1995 and 1996. Consequently, under Idaho
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Code §§ 30-1-6 and 30-1-46, the redemption agreement is void and unenforceable; and, as a
matter oflaw, Reed is not a creditor entitled to any special duties or remedies because of AIA
Services' insolvency.

5.

Acceptance Of Fees For Legal Services Does Not Breach The Lawyer's Duty Of

Loyalty. The DQ Motion (pp. 40, 52) alleges that the attorneys' "sole purpose" in multiple
representation is to earn fees, constituting self-interest in violation ofIRCP 1.7(a)(2». This view
cannot be countenanced.
It is well settled that a conflict of interest requiring disqualification under Model Rule 1.7

does not exist merely because an attorney may be personally interested in the outcome of the
litigation. Lowe v. Experian, 328 F. Supp.2d 1122, 1129 (D. Kansas 2004); Main Events Prod.,

LLe v. Lacy, 220 F. Supp. 2d 353, 358 (D.N.J. 2002). In Lowe, the court recognized that many
attorneys have financial interests in the outcome of litigation, such as attorneys that enter into
contingency fee arrangements with their clients. Lowe, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 1129. Contingency
fee arrangements necessarily mean that the attorney has a personal interest in the outcome of the
litigation because their payment is premised on their client's recovery. Id. However, this
personal interest in receiving a payment has been deemed ethical and would not warrant
disqualification. Id.
Further, the examples set forth under IRPC 1.7(a)(2) do not consider the receipt of
attorneys' fees to be a personal interest for purposes of that rule. Rather, the lawyer has an
impermissible "personal interest" only when the lawyer's interests have an adverse effect on the
representation of the client. See IRPC 1.7, cmt 10. The examples set forth in that comment
include personal interests such as discussions concerning possible employment with opposing
counselor "referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial
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interest." Id. Other potential conflicts based on a lawyer's personal interest deal with the
lawyer's personal relationship, such as when the lawyers representing adverse clients are related
by blood, marriage or other domestic relationship, or entering a business transaction with the
client or acquiring an interest adverse to a client. IRPC 1.7(a)(2) cmt 11; IRPC 1.8.
The examples set forth in the IRCP and the cases addressing personal conflicts of interest
support the conclusion that an attorney's interest in fees does not create a conflict of interest
under IRPC 1.7(a)(2). An interest in receiving fees for legal services performed is ethical; and
the acceptance of such fees is not an action that is contrary to the interest of a client. Therefore,
the mere acceptance of fees for legal services cannot constitute a personal conflict of interest
under IRPC 1.7(a)(2). If it were, Mr. Bond and Mr. Bissell would also have an IRPC 1.7(a)(2)
conflict.
Further, Professor Strait notes that "the AIA entities may enter into transactions designed
to assure adequate financing to fulfill the entities' obligations to indemnify and defend against
Reed's claims since Reed has sued directors individually under the bylaws of the respective
corporations." Strait Aff. Section VILB.3. Accordingly, Hawley Troxell did not breach any
duty ofloyalty to AIA by drafting documentation of the loan by CropUSA to AIA Services. See
Section II.! above.
E.

The "Hot Potato" Doctrine Has No Application to Hawley Troxell.

Citing IRPC 1.9 (Duties to Former Clients), Plaintiff seeks disqualification of all
attorneys "because they cannot drop the representation of anyone or more of the defendants to
remain counsel for another defendant." DQ Motion p. 34. Because joint representation of the
corporate Defendants by Hawley Troxell is appropriate under the circumstances of this case, the
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firm has no intention of dropping representation of any of its clients in order to represent another
preferred client. The "hot potato" doctrine has no relevance to Hawley Troxell.
F.

Hawley Troxell's Conduct Of This Case Is Directed By AlA's Authorized
Constituents Under IRCP 1.13 And Idaho Code § 30-1-801.
Reed complains that Hawley Troxell knows that John Taylor is directing the litigation in

his own interests and alleges that the lawyers are not proceeding in the best interest of the
corporation as required by IRCP 1. 13 (b). See DQ Motion (at pp. 40-42, 47-48). Similarly, in a
May 11, 2007 letter (Bond Aff. Ex. 29), Plaintiffs counsel asserts that "it is inappropriate for
John Taylor to direct litigation on behalf ofthe corporation in light of the substantial claims
already alleged against him."
Under IRCP 1.13 as applied to the circumstances of this case, this argument cannot be
countenanced. Hawley Troxell is authorized and directed by both the Idaho Business
Corporation Act and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct to represent AIA Services
Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. through their duly authorized constituents - i.e., the board
of directors and the duly appointed officers of the corporations.
IRCP 1.13(a) confirms that a lawyer employed or retained by an organization "represents
the organization acting through its authorized constituents". Comment 1 states that officers,
directors, employees and shareholders are "constituents" of the corporate organizational client.
John Taylor is the chief executive officer and president ofthe two corporations, duly appointed
by the respective boards of directors. As such, John Taylor is an authorized "constituent" of the
AIA entities, as are the boards of directors of the two corporations. Further, the boards have
taken an active role in directing Hawley Troxell in this litigation. As IRCP Rule 1.13 comment 5
makes clear, in a corporation "[t]he organization's highest authority to whom a matter may be
referred ordinarily will be the board of directors" or, under certain circumstances, "the
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independent directors of the corporation." This Rule is consistent with Idaho corporate law. See
Idaho Code § 30-1-801(2) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of,
and the business and affairs of the corporation managed by or under the direction of, its board of
·
.... ") .
dlrectors

Other than the ludicrous suggestions (DQ Motion at pp. 42-47, 49-50) that Plaintiff
himself is the only "disinterested" person entitled to choose counsel for the AIA entities, waive
conflicts, approve joint representation of the AIA entities, approve the joint defense agreement
and direct the defense,14 it is unclear who Reed thinks should be directing the AIA defense. As
a practical matter, who else is there to direct the defense of this case besides the Defendant
directors and officers of the corporations? With Reed suing newly appointed directors (i.e.,
Connie Taylor and Jim Beck) and the companies not having directors and officers insurance,
there is no realistic possibility of finding independent directors to direct the litigation. See
Minutes of the August 7, 2008 meeting of the AIA boards of directors (Bond Aff. Ex. 41).
Professor Strait observes: "Under [Reed's] theory, no Board could oppose his claims since he
has named every Board member and, therefore, under his theory (unique and absurd), the
conflicted Board members cannot act on behalf of a closely-held corporation ... to oppose his
theories asserted in his Complaint." Strait Aff. Section VII.E.1.
Reed's partial quotation ofIRCP 1. 13 (b) is misleading (DQ Motion pp. 41-42): He
quotes only the first sentence of the Rule, which provides that "the lawyer shall proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest ofthe corporation" if the lawyer knows that an officer or
employee is engaged in action that is a violation of a legal obligation to the corporation or a

14 See Section IV.G.3 below.
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violation oflaw that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization." However, he
omits the second sentence, which explains that the lawyer normally should report such conduct
up-the-Iadder "to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the
circumstances, to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization .... " Rule 1.7
acknowledges the fundamental principle of corporate law that the boards of directors of AIA
Services and AIA Insurance are the highest authorities in those organizations. IRCP Rule 1.13
cmt 5. Where, as here, the directors themselves are the persons accused of malfeasance, there is
no higher authority which could direct Hawley Troxell in defense of Reed's claims.
From his misconceived argument that interested directors cannot direct the defense
against his claims, Reed contends that AIA Services and AIA Insurance should somehow have
found disinterested directors to give direction to defense counsel. However, IRCP Rule 1.13
does not distinguish between interested and disinterested directors or officers, or between inside
and independent directors or officers. The fact is that, in this case, Reed's own actions have
resulted in every director and officer of AlA Services and AIA Insurance being "interested"
because they are all being sued by Reed. Absent independent directors or officers, there's no
independent person to direct the defense.
In a related but equally misconceived argument, Reed contends (DQ Motion at pp. 47-48)
that "the Attorneys have taken instructions from R. John Taylor in violation ofthe Rules of
Professional Conduct and failed to notify disinterested parties or shareholders of the improper
acts ofR. John Taylor." To the contrary, IRCP 1.13(d) expressly negates any obligation to
.reveal confidential information to any person other than the organization's highest authority (in
this case, the corporations' boards of directors) where the lawyer's representation relates to the

AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 53

L/02l{

40005.0006.1309816.2

investigation of an alleged violation oflaw or the defense of the organization against a claim
arising out of an alleged violation oflaw. As stated in Comment 7:
Paragraph (d) makes clear that the authority of a lawyer to disclose
information relating to a representation in circumstances described
in paragraph (c) does not apply with respect to information
relating to a lawyer's engagement by an organization to investigate
an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization ... against
a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. This is necessary
in order to enable organizational clients to enjoy the full benefits of
legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a
claim.
The gravamen of Reed's complaint in this litigation is that the corporations, through their
directors and officers, have engaged in violations oflaw. Reed's claims bring IRCP 1.7(d)
directly into play. IRCP L 7 is clearly not violated by any alleged failure by Hawley Troxell to
reveal to "disinterested parties or shareholders" otherwise confidential information concerning
alleged misconduct by the Defendants.
G.

Reed Erroneously Contends That It Is Impossible For Hawley Troxell To Have
Obtained Required Consents.
1.

Hawley Troxell's Representation Agreements Were Approved By the AlA Boards,

Which Are the Corporations' Highest Authority Under lRPC 1.13. Mr. Bond's May 11,2007

letter (Bond Aff. Ex. 29) states: "I am surprised that you would not require direction and consent
from a disinterested board of directors prior to your representation of both corporations because
ofthe substantial claims alleged against John Taylor." As a matter of fact, Hawley Troxell
ensured that the AIA Services and AIA Insurance boards approved the Representation
Agreements in connection with the firm's appearance for the two corporations. At the time
Hawley Troxell was retained, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman had resigned as directors. AlA
Services and AIA Insurance re-constituted their boards and approved engagement of Hawley
Troxell pursuant to the Representation Agreements. Connie Taylor and Jim Beck were added to
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the boards with the intention that they serve as independent directors precisely because of the
potential conflict between the corporations and John Taylor given Reed's allegations of selfdealing by John. (At that time, Jim Beck was not a defendant. Connie had been sued, but only
with respect to her community property interest as John's former spouse; and John Hally filed a
motion to dismiss her in that capacity. After Connie joined the AIA boards, Reed then sued her
as a director, and the motion to dismiss was mooted.) Before Connie and Jim were named as
defendants by amended complaint, the two boards approved the Representation Agreements.

2.

Independent Shareholder Approval of Hawley Troxell's Engagement By AlA Is

Not Required. Plaintiff contends that disinterested shareholder approval is required to authorize
Hawley Troxell's engagement by the AIA entities and to authorize the joint defense agreement
among the Defendants. Babbitt Aff. Ex. 8 (Bond's August 5, 2008 email: "[N]o 'true'
independent shareholder approval was ever obtained for your representation, let alone any full
and fair disclosure."); DQ Motion pp. 8-9 (John Taylor "did not seek approval of any joint
retainer or joint defense agreements, and did not obtain votes only from disinterested
shareholders .... "). This contention is unsupportable.
The representation of AIA Services and AIA Insurance by Hawley Troxell, as well as the
conflict waiver letters, the standstill and tolling agreements and the joint defense agreement,
were approved by the AIA Services and AIA Insurance boards. Contrary to Reed's assumption,
there is no obligation to obtain disinterested shareholder approval of such representation. Idaho
Code Sections 30-1-861, -863 provide a safe harbor if a director's conflicting interest transaction
is approved by the disinterested shareholders; but failure to obtain such a vote is not wrongful.
Also, Hawley Troxell had no involvement in AIA Services' solicitation of the vote of AIA
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Services shareholders to approve the advance of litigation expenses to the individual defendants.
See Babbitt Aff.

~

13.

Plaintiff argues that all of the Attorneys should be disqualified because they "failed to
obtain shareholder or disinterested party consent of the joint representation, joint defense and
joint retainer as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct." DQ Motion p. 43. This
argument is based on two fundamental errors: First, it is premised on the mistaken assumption

(id. p. 42) that a joint defense agreement is equivalent to "dual representation" under RPC 1.7
and 1. 13(g). This erroneous assumption is dispelled in Section IV.B.4 ofthis Memorandum.
Second, Plaintiff cites IRPC 1. 13 (g) for the supposed proposition that "the consent shall
be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be
represented, or by the shareholders", incorrectly implying that Rule 1.13(g) requires shareholder
approval of the lawyers' representation of the corporation ifthe directors and officers are also
being sued. Id. This reliance on IRCP 1.13(g) is misplaced, as Reed has quoted only a portion
of the Rule out of context and thereby misrepresented its limited scope and purpose. IRCP
1. 13 (g) provides, in full:
A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of
its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholder or other
constituents, subject to the provision of Rule 1.7. If the
organization's consent to the dual representation is required by
Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of
the organization other than the individual who is to be represented,
or by the shareholders.
Under RPC 1.13(g), if an attorney were representing a corporation, and if the corporation's
consent to dual representation of a director or officer were required by RPC 1.7, authorization to
undertake dual representation might require written consent "given by an appropriate official of
the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders."
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However, IRCP 1.13(g) does not purport to address the question of who is entitled to engage the
attorneys for the corporation itself. In this case, the Rule is inapplicable because no attorney of
record represents both a corporation and any individual director/officer Defendant; and in
particular, Hawley Troxell has not undertaken the representation of any of the individual
Defendant directors or officers of its corporation clients. Babbitt Aff. , 11. Hawley Troxell
represents only AIA Services, AIA Insurance and (as local counsel) CropUSA. Because Hawley
Troxell does not represent any of the individual Director Defendants, IRPC 1.13(g) is not
implicated.

3.

Hawley Troxell's Representation OfIts Clients Does Not Require Reed Taylor's

Consent. Reed Taylor asserts throughout his DQ Motion that Hawley Troxell must be
disqualified because Reed Taylor and/or Donna Taylor have not consented to Hawley Troxell's
representation of AIA Services and AIA Insurance, and that Reed is the only person with
authority to waive conflicts of interest. See DQ Motion, pp. 9,41,46,50. This argument is
premised on the proposition that Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor are entitled to seats on the AIA
Services Board of Directors (see id., p. 41) and that Reed Taylor is entitled to immediate
possession of AIA Insurance (see id., p. 50). As an initial matter, the question of whether Reed
Taylor and/or Donna Taylor are entitled to a seat on the AIA Services Board of Directors is a
disputed issue which has not yet been addressed in this litigation.
More importantly, Reed Taylor's argument that he is entitled to decide which law firm(s)
will represent AIA Services and AIA Insurance in this litigation is inimical to the very nature of
the adversary court system. Reed Taylor cannot possibly be entitled to chose who will represent
the parties that he has sued in this litigation. If Reed Taylor is entitled to make the decision, then
AIA Services and AIA Insurance would be without counsel: Reed Taylor has repeatedly
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asserted in this litigation that it is improper for any attorney to accept attorney's fees from AIA
Services or AIA Insurance, because any funds used to pay attorney's fees should instead be paid
to Reed Taylor. Further, Plaintiff would not consent to any counsel that did not agree with his
position. Thus, Reed Taylor would not consent to any law firm defending AIA Services and
AIA Insurance against his claims, leaving both companies without legal assistance in defending
themselves in this litigation.

H.

The Possibility That A Hawley Troxell Attorney Might Be A Witness Concerning
Certain Matters Does Not Require Disqualification ofthe Firm Under IRCP 3.7.
1.

Disqualification of the Entire Firm Is Unwarranted. Reed apparently seeks

disqualification of the entire Hawley Troxell law firm, pursuant to IRPC 3.7, because Mr. Riley
is allegedly a witness in connection with an opinion given by his former firm, Eberle Berlin, in
1995. 15 DQ Motion pp. 39-40. IRPC 3.7, which is identical to the American Bar Association's
Model Rule of Professional Conduct ("Model Rule") 3.7, provides (in pertinent part):
(a)

A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the
lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless:

***

(3)
Disqualification of the lawyer would work
substantial hardship on the client.
(b)

A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another
lawyer in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a
witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or
Rule 1.9.

As a preliminary matter, note the express equitable exception to the application of Rule
3.7: The lawyer, or in this case the entire firm of Hawley Troxell, should not be disqualified

15 Contrary to the assertion in the DQ Motion (p. 28), Plaintiffs expert expressly disclaimed any
opinion based on IRCP 3.7. See Jarvis Affidavit ~ 4.b.("I therefore do not base my opinion on
attorney-witness considerations .... ").
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from acting as AIA's advocate at a trial, even if a lawyer in the firm is likely to be a necessary
witness, if disqualification of the firm would work substantial hardship on the client. See Section

AA above, addressing the prejUdice to AIA if Reed's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell is
granted.
Plaintiffs counsel argues that "Richard Riley issued an opinion letter to Reed and
[Hawley Troxell is] now tying [sic] to disingenuously argue the $8.5 Million is not owed to
him", referring to the 1995 Eberle Berlin opinion on enforceability of the 1995 stock redemption
agreement. Babbitt Aff. Ex. 8. Plaintiff apparently believes that Mr. Riley would testify
adversely to AIA Services, based on the 1995 opinion, that AIA Services was not insolvent at the
time and that the stock redemption agreement between Reed Taylor and AIA Services was not
unlawful. Comment 6 to IRCP 3.7 recognizes a conflict of interest ifthere is a substantial
conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer who appears as an advocate
for the client at trial.
However, Plaintiff has not shown why Mr. Riley is necessarily a witness to any relevant
facts; and there is no basis in the record for suggesting that Mr. Riley's testimony will conflict
with the interests of Hawley Troxell's clients.1 6 As discussed below, the 1995 Eberle Berlin
opinion is not in any way dispositive of (or even relevant to) the question whether AIA Services
Corporation was insolvent at the time of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement or the 1996
Stock Restructuring Agreement or whether, as a consequence of such insolvency, the redemption

16 For example, the enforceability opinion is expressly qualified by the usual bankruptcylinsolvency
exception. See Bond Aff. Ex. 2 (Opinion #2).
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note and stock pledge agreement are illegal and void under the Idaho Business Corporation
Act. 17
The application of former Idaho Code § 30-1-6 is a question of law for the Court. Even if

Mr. Riley could be required to state his personallegal opinion concerning the meaning or
application of the statute, that testimony would not be either relevant or admissible. Further, the
financial condition of AIA Services is an issue of fact which is best determined from AIA's
financial records. Plaintiff, who was the majority stockholder at the time the 1995 Redemption
Agreement was executed, was aware of AIA's financial condition; and there are financial
statements and other records from which the solvency or insolvency of AIA Services can be
determined.
Ifin fact the corporation was insolvent at the time of the 1995 Stock Redemption
Agreement and/or the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement, the redemption is
unlawful under Idaho Code § 30-1-6 and void regardless whether or not the 1995 Eberle Berlin
opinion was correct and regardless whether Mr. Riley might be a witness. The existence of the
Eberle Berlin opinion that the 1995 agreement is enforceable does not negate the efficacy of the
illegality defense if in fact the company was insolvent and the Agreement (including both the
redemption note and the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement) therefore void.

17 As a fallback position, Plaintiff s counsel threatens that, "even if the illegality argument had merit,
Donna Taylor and Reed Taylor would be suing Hawley Troxell (and Richard Riley) in such an
instance regardless of any circumstances." Babbitt Aff. Ex. 8. See also DQ Motion p. 39 sub~ (6).
The assertion that there could be any claim against Hawley Troxell for an opinion given by Eberle
Berlin in 1995 is frivolous. Further, the opinion was not rendered by Richard Riley or any other
Eberle Berlin lawyer, but rather by the firm itself. Riley Aff. ~ 2. Even if Reed may have a
malpractice claim against Mr. Riley and his former firm if the opinion was negligently given and the
claim is not time-barred, this possibility does not creates a conflict of interest that would prevent
Hawley Troxell from continuing to represent AIA.
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More importantly, even if Mr. Riley were a necessary witness and therefore pursuant to
IRPC 3.7(a) could not act as a trial advocate for the firm's clients 18 , Hawley Troxell would not
be disqualified under IRPC 3.7. The issues of disqualification of a lawyer-witness to act as an
advocate at trial and the disqualification of the lawyer's law firm are addressed separately under
IRCP 3.7(a) and (b), respectively. The Rule does not automatically extend the trial lawyerwitness prohibition to the partners and associates of a testifying lawyer who does not act as an
advocate for the client at trial. Rather, subsection (b) specifically allows a lawyer-litigator to act
as an advocate at trial even where it is likely that the litigator's colleague in the firm will be a
witness, unless Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 precludes the litigator from doing so. As stated in Comment
7 to both IRCP 3.7 and Model Rule 3.7:
Paragraph (b) provides that a lawyer is not disqualified from
serving as an advocate because a lawyer with whom the lawyer is
associated in a firm is precluded from doing so by paragraph (a).
If, however, the testifying lawyer would also be disqualified by
Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 from representing the client in the matter,
other lawyers in the firm will be precluded from representing the
client by Rule 1.10 unless the client gives informed consent under
the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
Thus, unless Mr. Riley is disqualified by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9, there is no requirement that any of
the Hawley Troxell lawyers who have appeared in this case be disqualified from representing
AIA Services Corporation as trial advocates in this case. Moreover, comment 7 makes it clear
that, even if it is assumed that the testifying lawyer would be disqualified under IRPC 1.7 or 1.9,
other lawyers in the firm may act as trial advocates, notwithstanding IRPC 1.10, with the
informed consent of the client.

18 Mr. Riley has not appeared in this action and will not serve as an advocate for AlA Services
Corporation at trial in this case. Therefore, disqualifying him from acting as an advocate at the trial
in this case pursuant to IRCP 3.7(a) is unnecessary.
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In any event, neither Rule 1.7 nor Rule 1.9 is applicable in this situation. Other than the
"hot potato" argument (which, as explained in Section IV.E above, does not apply to Hawley
Troxell), Plaintiffs motion to disqualify counsel contains no reference to Rule 1.9 (dealing with
duties to former clients) in connection with Hawley Troxell's role as counsel in this case.
Rather, Reed contends that Hawley Troxell should be disqualified under Rule 1.7. However, for
the reasons discussed in Section IV.D of this Memorandum, that contention must fail.
Accordingly, in the absence of disqualification under either Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9, the fact that
Mr. Riley might be a witness does not preclude other Hawley Troxell attorneys from serving as
trial advocates for the corporate Defendants.
Courts addressing the issue since the promulgation of Model Rule 3.7 have consistently
concluded that there is no requirement that an entire law firm be disqualified because one or
more of its lawyers will be witnesses. See e.g., Ayus v. Total Renal Care, Inc., 48 F.Supp.2d 714,
717-19 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (attorney's firm not disqualified because attorney will be a witness);

Harter v. University of Indianapolis, 5 F.Supp.2d 657,667 nA (S.D. Ind. 1998)(attorneys in
same firm not disqualified because attorney in firm will testify); Brown v. Daniel, 180 F.R.D.
298,301-02 (D.S.C 1998)(in light of drastic nature of disqualification, Rule 3.7 (b) does not
require disqualification of the entire firm even though the partner will be a necessary witness);

Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1113-14 (S.D.N.Y 1992)(imputing disqualification to fellow
members of lawyer-witness' firm is extremely harsh and should be limited to special
circumstances); Ramsay v. Boeing Welfare Benefit Plan, 662 F. Supp. 968, 970-71 (D. Kan.
1987) (Rule 3.7(b) precluded disqualification of law firm).

2.

Courts Disfavor Attempts To Transform Opposing Attorneys Into Witnesses.

Plaintiff seeks disqualification of the entire Hawley Troxell law firm pursuant to IRCP 3.7 based

AlA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL - 62

L/tJ3~

40005.0006.1309816.2

on the assertion that all ofthe named attorneys are witnesses to one or more of various actions
taken during the course of representing AIA in this litigation that Reed alleges to be wrongful,
aiding and abetting, conspiracy to prevent Reed from exercising his contractual rights, etc. See
DQ Motion pp. 39-40. Plaintifflists 13 topics on which Hawley Troxell attorneys are
supposedly witnesses (most of which deal with the very arguments being asserted by counsel in
this litigation or transactions in which Hawley Troxell was not even involved). DQ Motion pp.
39-40. The topics listed by Plaintiff are not topics on which any Hawley Troxell attorney could
ever be deposed, much less on which a Hawley Troxell attorney could ever be required to testify
at trial.
Courts generally refuse attempts to depose opposing counsel, both on privilege grounds
and also as too disruptive of the litigation process and the attorney-client relationship. The longaccepted standard for whether attorneys involved in the case can be deposed was set by the
Eighth Circuit in Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323,1327 (8 th Cir. 1986).1 9 In
that case, a party sought to depose in-house counsel of its opponent to determine whether
document production was complete. The appellate court refused to permit the deposition, stating
that such attempts are disfavored because:
Taking the deposition of opposing counsel not only disrupts the
adversarial system and lowers the standards of the profession, but

19 Neither the Idaho courts nor the Ninth Circuit have addressed whether they would apply the Shelton
factors when determining whether an attorney could be deposed. See DiLonrenzo v. Costeo
Wholesale Corp. 243 F.R.D. 413, 415 (W.D. Wash. 2007). However, the district courts in the Ninth
Circuit have applied the factors in these circumstances. See, e.g., id.; Lloyd Lifestyle Ltd. v. Soaring
Helmet Corp., No. C06-0349C, 2006 WL 753243, at *2 (W.D.Wash. March 23,2006) (unpublished);
Am. Cas. Co. v. Kreiger, 160 F.R.D. 583, 589 (S.D. Cal. 1995). Additionally, the Idaho Bankruptcy
court also applied the Shelton factors when it encountered this issue. See In re Wiggins, No. 9940458,2000 WL 33712300, at *2 (Bankr. D. Idaho April 10,2000). In fact, most courts that have
addressed this issue have followed Shelton. [d.
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it also adds to the already burdensome time and costs oflitigation.
It is not hard to imagine additional delays to resolve work-product
and attorney-client objections, as well as delays to resolve
collateral issues raised by the attorney's testimony. Finally, the
practice of deposing counsel detracts from the quality of client
representation. Counsel should be free to devote his or her time
and efforts to preparing the client's case without fear of being
interrogated by his or her opponent."
The court identified the following factors to be used in determining whether to permit an
opposing attorney to be deposed: (1) No other means exist to obtain the information; (2) The
information sought is relevant and non-privileged; and (3) the information is crucial to the
preparation of the case. Reed lists thirteen matters in which the individual named attorneys have
allegedly been involved and as to which he contends "the Attorneys are witnesses." But Plaintiff
makes no showing why testimony of Hawley Troxell attorneys would be necessary or proper
with respect to any of these matters, or what relevant, non-privileged information the attorneys
might provide, or why any non-privileged information could not be obtained from other persons
or through other means of discovery.
The potential disruption to the judicial process may be illustrated by putting the shoe on
the other foot: If Reed's argument

i.e., that attorneys should be disqualified because they are

witnesses to meetings and other actions occurring during their representation of their client

is

given credence, then AlA could file a counterclaim against Reed and his counsel for abuse of
process though the concoction oftheir multi-faceted scheme to manufacture conflicts on which
to base Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify counsel. Under Plaintiffs theory, Roderick Bond and
Michael Bissell would be subject to disqualification under IRPC 3.7 because they are witnesses
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to their "inappropriate" and conspiratorial meetings between themselves and with Reed to plan
their scheme. 20

I.

There Is No Appearance Of Impropriety In Hawley Troxell's Representation Of
The Three Corporate Defendants.
Plaintiff contends that Hawley Troxell's representation of the corporate Defendants has

the appearance of impropriety. DQ Motion pp. 52-53. While mouthing the words, Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate any appearance of impropriety under the pertinent tests.
The Court should apply the four-part test the Idaho courts have developed "to determine
whether an appearance of impropriety alone will give a party standing to interfere with an
adverse party's choice of counsel." Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 32, 175 P.3d 186, 194 (2007).
Under that test, the Court considers the following factors:
(1) Whether the motion is being made for the purposes of
harassing the defendant,
(2) Whether the party bringing the motion will be damaged
in some way if the motion is not granted,
(3) Whether there are any alternative solutions, or is the
proposed solution the least damaging possible under the
circumstances, and
(4) Whether the possibility of public suspicion will
outweigh any benefits that might accrue to continued
representation.

20 Plaintiff even goes so far as to assert that Hawley Troxell should be disqualified because Hawley
Troxell attorneys are witnesses to the very arguments they have made in this litigation. See, e.g., DQ
Motion pp. 39-40 (asserting that Hawley Troxell "Attorneys are witnesses to ... arguing against
naming Mike Cashman as a defendant ... [and] improperly restraining Reed Taylor, when they knew
he had the contractual rights and that the corporations were not being operating properly." This
assertion demonstrates the absurdity of Plaintiffs argument. As a participant in hearings on these
matters, Mr. Bond is a "witness" to those arguments as well and, under Plaintiff s theory, would also
be disqualified under IRPC 3.7.
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Id. at 32-33, 175 P.3d at 194-95. Each factor favors allowing Hawley Troxell to continue to

represent the three corporate Defendants in this action.
First, the combination of Plaintiffs derivative demand that the boards of directors of AIA
Services and AIA Insurance sue the corporations' attorneys, the threats by Plaintiff to file a
malpractice action against AIA's counsel and to furnish a copy of the complaint to the Idaho
State Bar, and Plaintiffs actual filing of that separate lawsuit against AIA's attorneys
demonstrates that Plaintiff s motion to disqualify counsel is part of a scheme to harass AIA and
gain for Plaintiff an unfair tactical advantage in this litigation by manufacturing a basis to seek
Hawley Troxell's disqualification. Plaintiffs own brief constitutes unequivocal evidence of this
scheme: He contends that disqualification of Hawley Troxell should be based on the mere filing
of his separate lawsuit against Hawley Troxell, involving claims of aiding and abetting of the
breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, conversion and other claims which are supported by the same
documents and subject matter of this lawsuit. DQ Motion p. 53. Given that Plaintiff, who
Hawley Troxell has never represented and is not a current or former client ofthe firm, is the de
facto source of the disqualification effort, the Court should be wary of the increased risk that
mischief is afoot. See Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho at 697.
Second, Plaintiff fails to explain, in any meaningful way, either (i) how he has already
been damaged as a result of any alleged conflicts of interest between Hawley Troxell's clients, or
(ii) how he would be damaged in the future if Hawley Troxell is not disqualified. Even if AIA
Insurance had had separate counsel from AIA Services and CropUSA, the same directors and
officers would still be directing the defense of AIA Insurance. There would be no difference in
the direction given to counsel in the conduct ofthe defense against Reed's claims. The only
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practical consequence of separate representation of AIA Insurance would be the additional fees
and costs incurred by yet another set of attorneys.
Third, given Plaintiff's failure to identify any legitimate risk of prejudice by Hawley
Troxell's continued representation of the corporate Defendants, the least damaging alternative to
disqualification is to confirm the right of those Defendants to engage counsel of their choosing
and allow the representation to continue.
Fourth, none of the corporate defendants is a public company; and this dispute is not of
public significance. Hawley Troxell's continued representation ofthe corporate Defendants will
not arouse public suspicion about the integrity of the legal process. Discontinuing AIA's right
to the counsel of its choice, however, will impose on AIA the needless cost and inconvenience of
changing counsel.

V. CONCLUSION
The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct guide lawyers, among other ways, in deciding
whether representing a client is ethical and not in breach of a duty to another current or former
client. Hawley Troxell has taken its obligations under the Rules seriously. At the inception of
its engagement as defense counsel for AIA, the firm reviewed and analyzed the pertinent Rules
and reached the considered decision that it ethically can represent its clients in this action. Had
Hawley Troxell reached a contrary decision, the firm would not have undertaken the
representation in the first place, or would have withdrawn voluntarily had conflicts arising during
the representation required it.
The Rules' preamble expresses a cautionary note worth remembering here: "[T]he
purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural
weapons." See Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 32, 175 P.3d 186, 194 (2007) (quoting LR.P.C.
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20 with approval). In other words, opposing parties may "misuse[ ]" the Rules "as a

technique for harassment." Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 697,819 P.2d 110,115 (Ct. App.
1991). Because parties have a fundamental right to choose their own counsel, disqualifYing a
party's chosen counsel at the request of an opposing party is a "drastic" step. Arkansas Valley
State Bankv. Phillips, 171 P.3d 899,911 (Okla. 2007); In re Estate of Wright, 881 N.E.2d 362,

366 (TIl. Ct. App. 2007). Not surprisingly, then, "motions to disqualify are generally
disfavored." Foster, 145 Idaho at 33, 175 P.3d at 195. Courts are particularly wary of motions
to disqualify that come "not from a client or former client of the attorney, but from an opposing
party." Weaver, 120 Idaho at 697,819 P.2d at 115. By all appearances, Plaintiffs DQ Motion is
a gambit in a concerted scheme to gain an unfair advantage for Plaintiff in this litigation.
It is also important to note that disqualification is not mandatory even if the

representation creates a technical violation of one of the Rules. Foster, 145 Idaho at 33, 175
P .3d at 195. Instead, disqualification is warranted only if necessary to "assure fairness to the
parties and the integrity of the judicial process"; and a court considering a motion to disqualify
"should endeavor to reach a solution that is least burdensome to the client." Id. at 32, 175 P.3d
at 194(quoting Weaver, 120 Idaho at 697, 819 P.2d at 115).
Plaintiff contends that Hawley Troxell should be disqualified (i) to ensure fairness to
Reed Taylor in prosecuting his claims, but fails to explain how substituting new counsel would
in any way change the way in which Plaintiff s counsel presents their case or in which the
Defendants would defend those claims; (ii) to uphold the integrity ofthe legal system, again
without explaining how representation of the corporate Defendants by Hawley Troxell has been
conducted other than in conformity with the rules of the judicial process and the obligation to
zealously represent the firm's clients within the bounds of the law; and/or (iii) to prevent the
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appearance of impropriety, which as shown above does not exist in this case. Just as Plaintiff's
whole case assumes that his claims are indefensible and that Defendants and counsel should bow
to his superior wisdom and analysis, Plaintiff's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell is similarly
predicated on his opinion that nonwaivable conflicts of interest exist. Asserting over and over
again that "irreconcilable and nonconsentable conflicts of interest" exist does not make it so. To
the contrary, as demonstrated above, the supposed conflicts of interest between or among the
Defendants are waivable and have been waived pursuant to informed consent of all Defendants
obtained in accordance with IRCP 1.7; and none ofthe Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct
have been violated by Hawley Troxell under the circumstances under which the firm undertook
to represent the corporate Defendants in this case.
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving his charge that grounds exist for disqualifying
Hawley Troxell. Id. AlA respectfully submits that Plaintiff has failed to bear that burden, that
Plaintiff's motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell must be denied, and that fees and costs should be
assessed against Plaintiff and his co-counseL
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

LiJ.- day of October, 2008.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

c:::JL~-
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Gary D. Ba\ili:rSB No. 1486
Attorneys for AIA Services Corporation,
AIA Insurance, Inc., and CropUSA
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CERTlFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTlFY that on this ~ day of October, 2008, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing AIA'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
DISQUALlFY COUNSEL by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
~Email

Michael S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
416 Symons Building
7 South Howard Street
Spokane, W A 99201
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
V Email

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
---lL. Email

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
V Email

David R. Risley
Randall, Black & Cox, PLLC
POBox 446
Lewiston, ID 83501

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
Telecopy
7 Email
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James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700
Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511
[Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
~Email

c==)~
Gary D. Babbitt
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Gary D. Babbitt, ISB No. 1486
D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
Email: gdb@hteh.com
j ash@hteh.com
Attorneys for AIA Services Corporation,
AIA Insurance, Inc., and CropUSA
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
)
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
)
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
)
community property comprised thereof;
)
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE )
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
)
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
)
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
)
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
)
community property comprised thereof,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

Case No. CV-07-00208
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD A. RILEY

----------------------------)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; and AIA INSURANCE, INC., an )
)
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Idaho corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Counterdefendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

The undersigned, Richard A. Riley, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years and competent to attest to the following

matters of my own personal knowledge. I am a partner in Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP.
2.

In connection with the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement, the law firm of Eberle

Berlin Kading Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd. ("Eberle Berlin") rendered an opinion dated August
15, 1995 and addressed to Reed.Taylor. See Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify, etc. ("Bond Aff.") Ex. 2. At that time, I was a shareholder and
employee of Eberle Berlin and, as one of the attorneys for AIA Services Corporation, worked on
the AIA Services stock redemption agreement with Reed Taylor, who was represented by
separate counsel, the Seattle firm of Cairncross Hempelmann. The Eberle Berlin opinion on the
1995 stock redemption agreements was given by the law firm, not by any individual attorney in
the firm.
3.

Eberle Berlin did not render an opinion in connection with the restructured 1996

stock redemption agreements between AIA Services Corporation and Reed Taylor.
4.

I first joined Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell") on March

1, 1999, after over twenty years with Eberle Berlin. I left Eberle Berlin on good terms. By
agreement, I brought certain clients with me to Hawley Troxell. But I did not attempt to solicit
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AIA Services Corporation or any of its subsidiaries, and did not bring any AIA files to Hawley
Troxell.
5.

Since joining Hawley Troxell, the firm has been sporadically engaged to provide

legal services to AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc. and CropUSA Insurance
Agency, Inc. However, neither I nor Hawley Troxell has ever been engaged or served as general
counsel for any of those entities. Our representation of those entities has been limited to specific
matters referred to us from time to time. We have never exercised internal supervision of the
legal or other affairs of any of these entities; and our familiarity with their businesses, ownership,
governance, employees, operations, accounting and other matters is accordingly limited to
information received in connection with matters as to which we have been specifically engaged
and as to which we devoted substantive attention.
6.

According to the records of the Idaho Secretary of State, Crop USA Insurance

Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA") was originally incorporated under the name AlA Crop Insurance,
Inc. in November 1999. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to render, and did not provide, any
advice or other legal services or other assistance in connection with the formation, ownership
structure, governance or start up of CropUSA. In particular (but without limitation), Hawley
Troxell was not engaged to provide, and did not provide, any advice or other legal services or
other assistance concerning the issuance of CropUSA common stock to the AIA Services
Corporation Series C Preferred Stockholders. Hawley Troxell was first engaged by CropUSA in
February 2001, to provide legal services in connection with a proposed Regulation A offering of
CropUSA stock.
7.

At no time has Hawley Troxell been engaged to provide any advice or other legal

services or other assistance, and at no time has Hawley Troxell provided any advice or other
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legal services or other assistance, to AIA Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA or any other person
concerning the allocation of or accounting for salaries, other expenses, employees, assets or other
resources between or among AIA Services, AIA Insurance and/or CropUSA.
8.

The Amended Motion to Disqualify (p. 12) references transactions involving a

parking lot purchased by John and Connie Taylor. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide
and did not provide any legal services or other assistance to John or Connie Taylor, AIA
Services, AIA Insurance, Crop USA or any other person in connection with any facet of any such
transaction.
9.

Plaintiffs Amended Motion to Disqualify (p. 4) references an August 2004

transaction in which AIA Insurance purchased from CropUSA shares of Series C Preferred Stock
of AlA Services for $1,510,693. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not
provide any legal services or other assistance to AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUS A or any
other person in connection with any facet of this transaction. In particular (but without
limitation), Hawley Troxell was not engaged to advise any person in connection with the source
of funding for the purchase, the effect (if any) of Reed's security interest in the commissions
earned by AIA Insurance, or the accounting for this transaction.
10.

Plaintiff's Amended Motion to Disqualify (p. 13) references transactions

involving Pacific Empire Radio Corporation. Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and
did not provide any legal services or other assistance to AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA
or any other person in connection with any facet of any transaction involving Pacific Empire
Radio Corporation.
11.

Plaintiff s Amended Motion to Disqualify (p. 16) references "related party'

transactions identified in the Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson. Other than the legal opinion of
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borrower's local counsel provided to the lender on behalf of CropUSA in connection with the
Surge loan in late 2006, Hawley Troxell was not engaged to provide and did not provide any
advice or other legal services or other assistance to AlA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA or
any other person in connection with any of the transactions identified in paragraph 11 ofthe
Pederson Affidavit.
12.

Contrary to the assertion in Plaintiffs Amended Motion to Disqualify (p. 6), Reed

Taylor's December 2006 notice of default was not in fact delivered to me. After leaving Eberle
Berlin in early 1999, I did not receive any mail addressed to me at Eberle Berlin's mailing
address; and any notice delivered to Eberle Berlin Kading Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd., PO Box
1368, Boise, Idaho Attn: Richard A. Riley in December 2006 in accordance with the notice
provision in the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement (Bond Aff. Ex. 4 p. 12) was not
delivered to me at Hawley Troxell.
13.

In 1993, The Universe Life Insurance Company ("ULIC"), a wholly-owned

subsidiary of AIA Services, sold the Lewis Clark Plaza office building (the old Lewis Clark
Hotel in Lewiston) to Washington Bank Properties. See documents included in Bond Aff. Ex.
32. The purchase price included a note payable by Washington Bank Properties secured by a
deed of trust on the building. Id. At all times since the 1993 sale transaction, the note and deed
of trust, sometimes referenced by the parties in this litigation as the "Mortgage", have been held
in escrow by an independent escrow agent. Title to the note and deed of trust was vested by
operation oflaw in the ULIC Liquidator when the insurer was placed in liquidation. Idaho Code

§ 41-3318(1). During the liquidation proceedings, AIA Services and the Liquidator negotiated
settlement of certain claims against one another. The settlement included mutual releases and
the assignment ofULIC's rights in the note and deed oftrust to AIA Services, ULIC's parent
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company. See documents included in Bond Aff. Ex. 32. Hawley Troxell worked with the UUC
Liquidator in 2007 to document the settlement agreement and to prepare the assignments of the
note and deed oftrust and related documents necessary to transfer the Mortgage to AIA Services
Corporation in accordance with the settlement agreement. At no time has Hawley Troxell ever
had possession or control ofthe Washington Bank Properties note or deed oftrust.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN before me this

am

/O~ay of October, 2008.

.~~~~~

__~~~~~

Notary Public for
Residing at -J=~~~-:J-9~~!4-~-:;:-jr..-r~~
My commission expires --"'''''--s.....L-'=?--=..==~L...-_=--~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of October, 2008, I caused to be served a true
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD A. RILEY by the method indicated below,
and addressed to each of the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
_Vfmail

Michael S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
416 Symons Building
7 South Howard Street
Spokane, W A 99201
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ T~py

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 l3th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor]
David R. Risley
Randall, Black & Cox, PLLC
P.O. Box 446
1106 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck
and Corrine Beck]

~ail

~tmail

_ _ US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
~ail

_ _ US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ ~opy
~mail"·
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James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700
Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511
[Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ .. ~copy
_~_P
Ernrna"il
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Gary D. Babbitt, ISB No. 1486
D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise,ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
Email: gdb@hteh.com
j ash@hteh.com
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation,
AlA Insurance, Inc., and CropUSA
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-07-00208
AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICK V. COLLINS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; and AlA INSURANCE, INC., an )
)
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Idaho corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person,
Counterdefendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

I, Patrick V. Collins, being duly sworn on oath, depose and state:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years and competent to attest to the following

matters of my own personal knowledge. I am a partner in the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis
& Hawley LLP.

2.

In connection with an October 2006 loan to CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc.

("CropUSA") by an unrelated lender, Surge Capital (referenced in the opinion letter as Lancelot
Investors Fund), Hawley Troxell was engaged by CropUSA to provide the legal opinion of
borrower's local Idaho counsel on certain aspects of the transaction. Hawley Troxell did not
provide legal services or other assistance to CropUSA or AlA Insurance, Inc. in connection with
the negotiation or documentation of the loan. Hawley Troxell was retained as local Idaho counsel
solely for purposes of opining on Idaho law issues that could not be addressed by Quarles &
Brady, counsel for CropUSA.
3.

The Surge loan documents included guarantees of the debt by AlA Insurance, Inc.

and John Taylor. AlA Services Corporation was not a party to the loan. In the opinion letter,
Hawley Troxell opined that the execution, delivery and performance of the AlA Insurance
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guaranty were duly authorized. The due authorization opinion was based in part on certified
copies of resolutions adopted by the AlA Insurance, Inc. Board of Directors. The AlA Insurance
board resolutions authorizing its guarantee were drafted by the lender's counsel, not Hawley
Troxell; were adopted by the AlA Insurance Board of Directors without involvement by Hawley
Troxell; and were delivered to Hawley Troxell for the firm's reliance in giving the opinion.
5.

Because AlA Services Corporation was not a party to the Surge loan transaction,

the legal opinion sought by the lender did not seek any legal opinions regarding AlA Services
Corporation and, therefore, I did not review the articles of incorporation of AlA Services in
preparing the opinion.
6.

In September 2007, AlA Services Corporation arranged to borrow up to $500,000

from CropUSA. The loan is secured by the assignment to CropUSA, for security purposes, of an
asset of AlA Services Corporation - the promissory note payable by Washington Bank
Properties and secured by a deed of trust on One Lewis Clark Plaza. I did not have any role in
negotiating or determining the terms of the loan arrangement but rather acted as scrivener to
document the loan terms as agreed by AlA Services Corporation and CropUSA.

J
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this

IOfJ--.. day of October, 2008.

~ .::j;y ~===

~

d

C-,pouu

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at 1b ;JJJLr!-,"-My commission expires _"C--,-/!-,"7--'-+(-1.1..><0_ _ _ _ __
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10 day of October, 2008, I caused to be served a true
copy ofthe foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICK V. COLLINS by the method indicated below,
and addressed to each of the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
---L"Email

Michael S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
416 Symons Building
7 South Howard Street
Spokane, WA 99201
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Deli vered
_ _ Overnight Mail
~mail

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy

David R. Risley
Randall, Black & Cox, PLLC
P.O. Box 446
1106 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck
and Corrine Beck]

~mail

~mail

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
~mail
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James 1. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700
Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511
[Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
~Email
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Gary D. Babbitt, ISB No. 1486
~ D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
--.. 877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
Email: gdb@hteh.com
jash@hteh.com

c:a

ex::
c:::::.

Attorneys for AIA Services Corporation,
AlA Insurance, Inc., and CropUSA
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J . TAYLOR, a single person,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-07-00208
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. STRAIT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

----------------------------)
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; and AIA INSURANCE, INC., an )
)
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Idaho corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
REED J . TAYLOR, a single person,
Counterdefendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-----------------------------------

JOHN A. STRAIT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am an Associate Professor of Law at Seattle University School of Law with

teaching responsibilities in the fields of legal ethics and legal malpractice. I have held this
position since 1976. I am admitted to practice law in the states of California, Oregon and
Washington. I am currently inactive in California and Oregon. My practice includes the
representation of attorneys in disciplinary matters and legal malpractice cases. My practice also
includes consulting, counseling and representing attorneys on issues involving compliance with
the Rules of Professional Conduct. I have represented attorneys both in defending and
prosecuting claims for disqualification arising from conflicts of interest and have consulted
approximately three times a month as a retained consultant and/or attorney since the late 1970s
on such issues. I have appeared by declaration or by live testimony in more than 100 motions to
disqualify. In addition to my for-fee representation and consulting, I consult on a pro bono basis
an average of once or twice a day with various lawyers throughout the Northwest, the
Washington State Bar Office of Disciplinary Counsel and others on a variety of ethical and
malpractice issues. My consulting practice includes giving advice on attorneys' obligations
under the Rules of Professional Conduct and their compliance with the minimum standards of
care with regard to the duties they owe to clients to avoid conflicts of interest. I have provided
such advice an average of two or three times a week since approximately 1976. I have advised
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lawyers on issues regarding potential and actual conflicts of interest between clients, as well as
between current and former clients, on numerous occasions. I have counseled Idaho
practitioners on many occasions with regard to these matters.
2.

I have lectured throughout the United States on the subjects of legal ethics and

discipline for attorneys. I have lectured in some fifteen states and participated in CLE
presentations on the law of ethics and standards for legal malpractice. I have lectured at
numerous Bar presentations on issues arising under the American Bar Association Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and the minimum standard of care for attorneys and law firms with
regard to their ethical obligations to clients. I have done numerous CLE presentations on
conflicts of interest. I average at least one CLE presentation per month and have done so since
the late 1970s. Since the beginning of2004, I have appeared in more than one hundred CLE
programs as a speaker and/or co-chair. Most of these programs included material on the
minimum standards of care for lawyers to comply with their duties to avoid conflicts of interest.
I have lectured to the Idaho bankruptcy bar and judiciary on the application of the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct in federal and state bankruptcy and receivership practice at the request of
the Idaho bankruptcy judiciary.
3.

I have testified in court as an expert witness in the fields oflegal ethics and

malpractice in sixteen counties in the State of Washington, and in the federal district courts
located in Washington, Oregon, Wyoming, California, Alaska, Hawaii, New Mexico, Idaho and
others. I have testified regarding the duties owed by attorneys and law firms to their clients to
avoid conflicts of interest in most of these jurisdictions. I have appeared in Idaho federal
bankruptcy court and filed declarations or affidavits in Idaho state proceedings as well as
participated in arbitrations of conflicts of interest disputes involving the Idaho Rules of
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Professional Conduct and Idaho practitioners. I have also appeared on related effective
assistance of counsel issues under the Federal Sixth Amendment in Idaho post-conviction relief
proceedings.
4.

I have published articles and performed professional research and writings in

these fields. I served on the Rules of Professional Conduct Committee for the Washington State
Bar Association for most of the last twenty years. I created and directed a clinical program in
legal discipline through Seattle University School of Law from 1999 through 2006. In this
clinical program, law students investigated bar complaints under my direction and made
recommendations to the Washington State Bar Office of Legal Discipline on probable cause.
The program was awarded the 1995 Gambrell Award by the American Bar Association for
service to the profession. I also serve as Adjunct Investigative Counsel investigating Bar
complaints for the Washington State Bar Association. As Adjunct Investigative Counsel, I have
investigated Bar grievances involving the ethical responsibilities of attorneys to avoid conflicts
arising from simultaneous adverse representation, and/or from duties owed to former clients, in
more than twenty investigations since 1994.
5.

My resume, a list of some of my CLE presentations, and a list of some of the

cases I have appeared in by deposition or testimony are attached as Exhibits A, B and C. I am
compensated at $300.00 per hour.

II.
SCOPE OF OPINION

I have been retained by the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley
Troxell") and asked to opine whether that firm should be disqualified in this litigation as
requested by Plaintiff Reed Taylor's motion to disqualifY. I have been asked to provide an
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opinion whether the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct require the disqualification of Hawley
Troxell under the circumstances of this case.
III.
SHORT OPINION
In my view, disqualification should not be allowed for a variety of reasons:
1.

The disqualification motion is, in effect, an effort to end run the actual issues in

litigation in the underlying litigation by disarming AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance,
Inc. and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., who are among the targets of Reed Taylor's
litigation, by removing their litigation counsel at a critical point in the proceedings. If this tactic
were to be successful, it would leave AlA Services and AlA Insurance, Inc. unable to adequately
defend the simultaneous motions and/or appeal from the prior orders of this Court which the AlA
entities challenge. Because the disqualification motion is an effort to avoid the litigation on the
merits of Mr. Reed Taylor's claims and is, instead, a tactical use of disqualification to
disadvantage his opponents, the motion to disqualify Hawley Troxell should be denied.
2.

Idaho RPC 1.7(a)(1) does not allow for disqualification of Hawley Troxell, which

is representing the AlA entities under an appropriate Joint Defense Agreement, Standstill
Agreement, and limited scope of representation related to litigation only. Given the nature of the
interlocking directorates, ownership and control of AlA Services Corporation (hereafter
"Services"), AlA Insurance, Inc. (hereafter "Insurance"), and CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc.
(hereafter "Crop") and the control groups' proper estimate of and informed consent to the risks
of entering into a Standstill Agreement and a Joint Defense Agreement with the other defendants
in this litigation, the circumstances do not present an RPC 1.7(a) concurrent conflict of interest
for Hawley Troxell.
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3.

Idaho RPC 3.7 authorizes Hawley Troxell to continue to represent its clients

under the conditions they have properly established (see above ~ 2) and allows Hawley Troxell
to be trial counsel even if Richard Riley is called as a witness by either side.
4.

Concepts of confidentiality among Hawley Troxell's litigation clients comply with

Idaho RPC 1.6 and are not a basis for disqualification.
5.

Disqualification of Hawley Troxell would not result in any change in the litigation

posture of this case other than to disarm Hawley Troxell's corporate litigation clients precisely
when the underlying issues ofthe case are being moved forward and would resolve the ultimate
issues raised by Reed Taylor subject to appellate review which Hawley Troxell's clients are
entitled to obtain if the results are unfavorable at the trial court level.
6.

I disagree with the analysis of Reed Taylor's experts Peter Jarvis and Joe Knight.
IV.
MATERIALS RELIED UPON IN ORDER TO RENDER OPINION

I have reviewed the following materials for purposes of formulating my opinions in this
Affidavit:
1.

Docket Sheets of all Pleading Books. (1-17)

2.

Fifth Amended Complaint.

3.

Answer to Fifth Amended Complaint (Hawley Troxell)

4.

First Amended Answer to Fifth Amended Complaint (Hawley Troxell)

5.

Answer to Fifth Amended Complaint (McNichols)

6.

Answer to Fifth Amended Complaint (Gittins)

7.

Answer to Fifth Amended Complaint (Hally)

8.

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment - Memo attached (Hally)
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9.

Motion to Amend Amended Answer to Fifth Amended Complaint (Hawley

Troxell)
10.

Opinion and Order on Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for

Preliminary Injunction, and Motion for Restraining Order (dated 5/31/07)
11.

Opinion and Order on Pending Motions (Plaintiffs motions: Compel Audit,

Supplement Complaint, and Bifurcate; Defendants AlA motions: to Dismiss and for Protective
Order; Defendant Connie Taylor's motion: to Dismiss 2nd and 3rd Complaints) (dated 8/2/07).
12.

Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and

Motion for Injunction (dated 2/8/08).
13.

Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment for Amount Due

on the Promissory Note and Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification of Judgment (dated 5/8/08).
14.

Order Denying Motion for Permissive Appeal (Supreme Court) (dated 6/12/08).

15.

Correspondence dated June 26, 2008, from Michael S. Bissell.

16.

Correspondence dated June 30, 2008, to Michael S. Bissell.

17.

Correspondence dated July 21, 2008, from Michael S. Bissell.

18.

E-Mail Correspondence dated July 21,2008, from Roderick C. Bond.

19.

E-Mail Correspondence dated July 17, 2008, from Roderick C. Bond.

20.

Affidavit of John Taylor in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and

Clarification and, in the Alternative, Request for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal (filed
February 28,2008).
21.

Affidavit of John Taylor in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary

Judgment against AIA Services Corporation for Amount Due on the Promissory Note (dated
February 28, 2008).
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22.

Draft of AlA's Petition for Court Appointed Independent Inquiry Pursuant to I.e.

§ 30-1-743 and I.e. § 30-1-744 and for Grant of Pending Motion to Stay Proceedings (prepared
August 2008).
23.

Draft of Affidavit of Gary D. Babbitt in Support of AIA's Petition for Court

Appointed Independent Inquiry Pursuant to I.C. § 30-1-743 and I.e. § 30-1-744 (prepared
August 2008).

v.
ADDITIONAL MATERIALS RELIED UPON IN ORDER TO RENDER OPINION
WHICH ARE PRIVILEGED AND SUBMITTED TO THE COURT FOR THE PURPOSE
OF IN CAMERA INSPECTION
1.

Correspondence dated May 1,2007, from Hawley Troxell to Directors of

AlA Services Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc.
2.

Correspondence dated May I, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to Directors of Crop

USA Insurance Agency, Inc.
3.

Correspondence dated April 19, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to John Taylor c/o

Michael McNichols.
4.

Correspondence dated April 18, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to JoLee Duclos and

Bryan Freeman c/o David A. Gittens.
5.

Standstill and Tolling Agreement dated May 2, 2007 among AIA Insurance, Inc.,

AIA Services Corporation and R. John Taylor.
6.

Standstill and Tolling Agreement dated May ---" 2007 among AlA Insurance,

Inc., AIA Services Corporation, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman.
7.

Joint Defense Agreement effective as of May 17, 2007 among AIA Insurance,

Inc., AIA Services Corporation, R. John Taylor, JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman.
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8.

Correspondence dated as of November 1, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to Directors

of AlA Services Corporation. and AIA Insurance, Inc.
9.

Correspondence dated as of November 1, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to Directors

of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.
10.

Correspondence dated as of November 1, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to R. John

Taylor c/o Michael McNichols.
11.

Correspondence dated as of November 1, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to David A.

Gittens.
12.

Correspondence dated as of November 1, 2007, from Hawley Troxell to Jonathan

D. Hally
13.

Amended Joint Defense Agreement dated as of November 1,2007 among AIA

Insurance, Inc., AIA Services Corporation, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor,
JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck.
14.

Amended and Restated Standstill and Tolling Agreement among AlA Insurance,

Inc., AIA Services Corporation, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, JoLee
Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck.
15.

Addendum to Amended Joint Defense Agreement dated as of July 24, 2008

among AIA Insurance, Inc., AIA Services Corporation, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R.
John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck.
I also rely on my teaching experience, practice experience, research and writing in the
field of professional duties owed by attorneys under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and the obligations ofIdaho lawyers under Idaho law.
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VI.

FACTS ASSUMED IN ORDER TO RENDER OPINION
For the purposes of rendering the opinions I accept as true the following:
1.

Reed Taylor was a former shareholder and principal officer of the AIA entities

(AIA Services is the parent corporation of AIA Insurance which is a wholly owned subsidiary).
In 1995, Reed Taylor entered into contractual agreements whereby he relinquished his control
and his ownership interests in the AIA entities in return for a security interest which would allow
him to vote stock of AIA Insurance ifhis buyout and redemption agreements were breached. All
ofthe current litigation represents Reed Taylor attempting to gain control of AIA Insurance in
order to obtain what he claims is the value of his redemption contract.
2.

John Taylor is the current major shareholder and CEO of the AIA entities and also

a principal and substantial owner of Crop, a separate entity with substantially the same
ownership and management structure as the AlA entities. Subject to the resolution ofthe Taylor
v. AlA Services, et al. litigation, Reed Taylor is, from the perspective of AlA entities and Crop, a
creditor who has brought creditor claims against the entities and claimed a right as a creditor to
vote the shares which would give him control of AIA Insurance pursuant to his creditor contract.
From the AIA entities' perspective, Reed Taylor is simply a creditor asserting a claim against the
corporate entities. Stripping away the invective and the multiple claims and causes of action,
Reed Taylor's claim essentially is that he has a right, because of the claimed breach of his
contractual creditor status, to assert control over the remaining solvent AlA entity, AIA
Insurance, which is the wholly-owned subsidiary of AIA Services. He wishes to do so in order
to obtain what he considers to be the value of his original 1995 stock redemption agreement,
which took him out of ownership and control of the entities and put him in a creditor status.
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3.

All of Reed Taylor's claims depend on his status as a creditor changing to one of

de facto ownership and control ifhe prevails. The AlA entities view Reed Taylor as an
attempted hostile takeover and have denied that AlA Services is in default of its contractual
obligations to Reed as a creditor and have defended that he has no right to exercise his
contractual right to vote the stock which would give him control of AlA Insurance and allow him
to transfer ownership or have access to its remaining assets.
4.

All of Reed's allegations -- that he is entitled to vote the AlA Insurance stock and

that all actions taken by the AlA and Crop interlocking Boards were taken in order to defraud
him of his rights -- ultimately depend on the resolution of these underlying claims.
5.

The motion to disqualify and the separate malpractice action against Hawley

Troxell filed by Reed Taylor as an individual direct (not derivative) action appear to be largely
tactical ,and designed to make impossible Hawley Troxell's representation of AlA Services and
Insurance adverse to Reed's claims. Reed incorrectly assumes Hawley Troxell to be general
corporate counsel, a position which Hawley Troxell has never occupied; and Reed has alleged a
conspiracy, in effect, between Hawley Troxell and John Taylor and every member of the Board
of the AlA entities, whom he alleges have engaged in misconduct premised on his prevailing in
his underlying claims. Ifhis underlying claims are invalid as AlA asserts, then all ofthe
allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, exploitation ofthe corporate interest to the benefit of
external interests, etc. also fail.
6.

The tactical nature of the pleadings on the motion to disqualify is further revealed

by the claim of conflict of interest premised on the view that Reed's claims are true, as opposed
to being allegations which must be proven and ultimately reviewed on appeal. Allegations of
conflict of interest derivative from these claims which have been asserted in letters since Hawley
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Troxell joined the litigation have not resulted in a motion to disqualify until shortly before or
simultaneously with other critical motions and an impending trial date. In short, if Reed loses
the underlying litigation, then there is no conflict of interest, no misconduct on the part of
Hawley Troxell and no hypothetical conflict of interest. If Reed prevails and ultimately takes
control of AIA Insurance by voting his contractual stock rights, then the litigation becomes moot
and the role of Hawley Troxell is equally moot because Reed will now control the critical entity.
7.

Hawley Troxell is not general corporate counsel for AIA entities and has never

served in that capacity. The same is true for Crop. All of the entities, as well as the individual
defendants, have entered into a Joint Defense Agreement consistent with each defendant's view
of Reed Taylor's claims; entered into an Amended and Restated Standstill and Tolling
Agreement tolling and preserving potential claims among Crop, AlA Insurance, AIA Services
and the individual defendants; and Hawley Troxell has a limited scope of employment as
litigation counsel, not general counsel.
8.

In light ofthese documents, which are consistent with AlA entities' and Crop's

view of Reed as an outside creditor attacking them, the position that Reed asserts in the motion
to disqualify is essentially an argument that no lawyers can represent any of these entities
adverse to Reed's claims because Reed's claim establishes the improper relationships so that no
lawyer on the other side for any of the three entities could resist. The motion to disqualify is,
instead, a tactical ploy which would equally exclude new counsel as well as existing counsel
from individual representation since it is premised on the position that disagreement with Reed
Taylor's positions is, per se, fraudulent or otherwise inappropriate. For the specific facts relied
upon in support of my opinion, in addition to the items identified above, I assume that the AlA
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entities have raised and desire to fully litigate the following non-frivolous theories as to the
invalidity of Reed Taylor's underlying claims.
9.

First, there is a substantial question oflaw subject to appeal as to whether or not

Services' obligation to Reed under the Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement is in default.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Reed on this point and certified his order for
interlocutory appeal. Although the Idaho appellate court denied that interlocutory appeal, there
would be a right of appeal of the partial judgment available to the AIA entities to determine the
correctness of the trial court's rulings, which would be a non-frivolous appeal.
10.

Further, although by granting Reed's motion for partial summary judgment the

Court has rejected allegations raised by the AlA entities that the 1996 Stock Redemption
Restructure Agreement was subsequently modified by Reed, barring his current assertions in the
underlying litigation, Reed has avoided discovery, moved to continue the trial date, and brought
motions to disqualifY the litigation counsel, Hawley Troxell, which would avoid his having to
submit to discovery which might support the AlA entities' claims.
11.

Second, there is a substantial question oflaw subject to appeal as to whether or

not the original 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement or the 1996 Restructuring Agreement
complies with Idaho law in light of the insolvency of AlA Services at that time. On this issue,
there is a pending motion for partial summary judgment and a pending motion to intervene by
the AlA ERISA plans, which are technically third parties, not party to, the Stock Redemption
Agreements with Reed Taylor.
12.

Third, if Reed Taylor gains control of AIA Insurance by virtue of his claim to be

able to vote the shares of AlA Insurance stock, he could essentially avoid any appellate review of
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the trial court's ruling by voting the shares and, in practical effect, killing the right of the entities
to appeal.
13.

Fourth, the analysis of the underlying claims, once appellate review has

completed, will resolve all the matters that relate to the conflict of interest allegations whereas
resolution of the conflict of interest allegations at this time will not resolve the underlying claims
on the merits but, rather, if the theory ofthe disqualification motion is granted, make it difficult
if not impossible for the AIA entities to resist Reed Taylor's claims.

VII.
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF OPINIONS
A.

The Motion To Disqualify Hawley Troxell As Litigation Counsel For The AlA
Entities Is A Tactical Motion Which Will Not Alter The Merits Litigation Of Reed's
Claims But Only Serve To Disrupt The Ability Of The AlA Entities To Defend
Against Them.
1.

The heart of the motion to disqualify is the claim, repeated in multiple forms and

multiple times, that the control group of AlA Services, AIA Insurance and Crop are all conflicted
because they have been named in Reed Taylor's suit and, therefore, cannot take a position with
regard to Reed Taylor's claims. That position is absurd. If this argument is given credence, then
literally in every relatively closely-held corporation not covered by Sarbanes-Oxley (since none
ofthese corporations are publicly traded), all an outside creditor needs to do to hamstring the
ability of a closely-held corporation which the creditor sues from defending is to name each of
the control group and/or directors ofthe corporation as additional parties defendant and then
claim that the Board cannot make a decision to defend. That is the heart of Reed Taylor'S claim
leading to his conspiracy theories and fraud theories. I am aware of no law which states that an
outside creditor of the corporation can create such an impasse simply by the election to sue
individual board members as well as the corporate entity. This is not a situation in which an
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insider to the corporation, a minority owner or other owner, is asserting a control dispute with the
corporation and where general counsel to the corporation is under an obligation to remain
neutral. As in any other contract dispute, the corporation is free to assert non-frivolous defenses.
In light ofthe case law cited by Hawley Troxell as litigation counsel on behalf of the AIA
entities, it cannot be said that the defenses against Reed as a creditor are frivolous. Although the
Court may ultimately rule against AlA, AIA is entitled to appellate review of that decision.
2.

The effect of excluding Hawley Troxell based on the allegations in the motion to

disqualify would be to effectively bar AIA, since it has no "unconflicted" directors, from
defending Reed Taylor's claims regardless of who the counsel is.
3.

By seeking to disqualify AlA's counsel prior to establishing the right of Reed to

vote the stock he claims he has a contractual right to vote, Reed puts the cart before the horse.
Independently of how that issue is resolved, the AIA entities should be able to keep the status
quo, including their counsel, so that the legitimate issues can be reviewed on appeal. The effect
of the motion to disqualify followed by the lifting of the preliminary injunction will be to
completely change the ownership control of AIA Insurance to Reed Taylor. Reed will then have
avoided the trial court's initial decision and appellate review and will have prevented AlA from
asserting its legitimate interests under AIA's view that Taylor is a third party creditor, at best,
without a right claim to vote the stock.
4.

It also will completely avoid the illegality public policy issue which is a

substantial public policy issue of whether a corporation can provide a stock share redemption
agreement to Reed Taylor if the corporation itself is insolvent. It has long been recognized that
disqualification motions, because of their disruptive effect on the courts, orderly processing of
underlying litigation and the harm they do to the disqualified counsel's client by disrupting their
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position in the litigation, should be viewed with suspicion by the Court. In the circumstances of
Reed's disqualification motion, both its timing and its underlying assumptions that any counsel
on behalf of the AlA entities who disagrees with Reed Taylor's position must be a co-conspirator
even though their role is limited to litigation counsel suggests the real purpose of this motion is
to avoid the underlying litigation by making it moot.
B.

Idaho's RPC 1.7(a)(1) And (a)(2) Have Been Fully Complied With By Hawley
Troxell In Its Joint Defense Of The AIA Entities And Its Partial Representation Of
Crop Against Reed Taylor's Claims.
1.

Unknown to Reed Taylor and his counsel and experts, Hawley Troxell has never

been general corporate counsel to any ofthe entities involved in this litigation. They have never
been outside general counsel to the corporation. Instead, their scope of representation is defined
by privileged agreements which can be reviewed in camera ex parte by the Court but which
ought not be disclosed to the adverse parties: The AlA and Crop entities entered into a Joint
Defense Agreement against the common adversary, from their perspective, Reed Taylor, and
have tolled any adverse claims that may exist among the three entities and/or the individual
defendants pending defense against the common adversary. Under RPC 1.7(a)(1), the scope of
representation is the common defenses against Reed Taylor. The interlocking and substantially
overlapping Boards and ownership of all three entities and their common defenses against Reed
Taylor's claims makes such a joint defense and tolling agreement not only reasonable but
desirable in the context of this litigation. Because Hawley Troxell has never been general
counsel to any of the entities and has only performed limited services on a specific topic basis,
once the control group of each corporation has made its decision of what its litigation posture is,
it is free to direct Hawley Troxell and Hawley Troxell is free to follow that direction as litigation
counsel to oppose Reed's claims based on those common defenses and/or counterclaims. There
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is no 1.7(a)(1) adversity which has not been reserved and tolled or which is outside the current
scope of representation of Hawley Troxell. RPC 1.7(a)(I) simply does not apply to the current
scope of Hawley Troxell's litigation counsel common defense representation under the
agreements.
2.

RPC 1.7(a)(2) might be involved if Hawley Troxell actually had been general

counsel with regard to the transactions from which Reed asserts his claims. Hawley Troxell was
not. Hawley Troxell is not, contrary to the allegations of Reed, a participant in the underlying
subject matter of the litigation as general counsel or otherwise. Any involvement they had with
any aspect of the AlA entities or Crop was solely on an individual assigned topic basis unrelated
to the claims raised by Reed Taylor in the motion to disqualifY and in the underlying pleadings.
3.

Under Idaho RPC 1.2, Hawley Troxell may, after full discussion with the AlA

entities and with Crop, undertake such a joint representation with an appropriately limited scope
of representation to the common claims as authorized by the control groups and consistent with
their authority to defend against Reed's claims. Similarly, the AlA entities may enter into
transactions designed to assure adequate financing to fulfill the entities' obligations to indemnifY
and defend against Reed's claims since Reed has sued directors individually under the bylaws of
the respective corporations.
4.

Neither RPC 1.7(a)(I) or 1.7(a)(2) has been violated by the current scope of

representation which Hawley Troxell has under Idaho RPC 1.2 or by their following the
directions of the appropriate control groups in each corporation. Claims to the contrary by Reed
all depend on the underlying claims of Reed being sustained and cannot be binding unless and
until that has occurred, he has taken control, and those issues have been reviewed on appeal.
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C.

Idaho RPC 3.7 And The Potential Testimony Of Richard Riley Or Other Individual
Members Of Hawley Troxell Does Not Offer A Basis For Disqualification.
1.

Plaintiffs' expert, Peter Jarvis, has opined that Idaho RPC 3.7 would require the

disqualification of Hawley Troxell as litigation trial counsel because a lawyer who was formerly
with another firm and now a member of Hawley Troxell may be a necessary witness to one or
more sides in the litigation. With all due respect to Mr. Jarvis, that opinion is simply wrong or
misleading. Idaho RPC 3.7, which tracks the ABA's Model Rule 3.7, Rule 3.7(b) specifically
allows Hawley Troxell to remain as trial counsel even though a member of the firm is called as a
witness. Mr. Jarvis is either citing to an erroneous and predecessor version ofRPC 3.7, such as
used to exist in Washington State, which vicariously disqualified all other members of the finn if
a lawyer witness was called to the stand at trial, or in fact it is a redundant RPC 1.7 cite and
misleading.
2.

If Mr. Jarvis is referring to the portion ofRPC 3.7(b) which says that, ifRPC 1.7

would prevent the law firm or other lawyers in the law finn from continuing the representation,
then the firm could be disqualified, he is simply redundantly citing Rule 1.7, which I have
already addressed supra. Because, contrary to Mr. Jarvis' assumptions, Hawley Troxell is not
general counsel for any of the involved entities but only litigation counsel, for the reasons
described above, RPC 1.7 does not apply or require disqualification of Hawley Troxell. Idaho
RPC 3.7 is simply irrelevant to disqualification in this case.

D.

Allegations That Idaho RPC 1.6, Duties To Maintain Confidentiality, Have Been
Breached By Hawley Troxell's Representation Of Its Clients As Litigation Counsel
Are Simply Wrong.
1.

As part of the Joint Defense Agreement, the Standstill and Tolling Agreement,

and the scope of representation documents under which Hawley Troxell undertook these
representations, there is a specific and knowing waiver of confidentiality among the represented
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clients, as proper joint defense agreements would require. While Reed Taylor should not be
entitled to review these documents since they are clearly confidential and it is his motion to
disqualify which has made it necessary to review these matters, the Court can examine them
in camera and determine whether or not they adequately, as I have opined, addressed the
confidentiality and conflict issues.
2.

Joint defense agreements on common defense theories obviously require that each

independent client be advised of how that shared information might be adverse to their interests.
Under RPC 1.6, each client, if properly informed of the risks, has a complete authority to waive
confidentiality. Each client in the current situation has done so by its authorized control group.
That is a proper and valid decision for an informed client to make as to whether to participate or
not in such a joint defense agreement.

E.

Reed Taylor's Theory Of His Motion To Disqualify Would Bar Any Counsel From
Defending Reed's Claims On Behalf Of Any Of Hawley Troxell's Clients, Whether
Separately Represented Or Not.
1.

Under the Joint Defense Agreement and the Standstill and Tolling Agreement,

and given the common control groups and interest in defending against Reed Taylor's claims to
avoid a hostile takeover and related damage or injury to the entities, the AlA entities have chosen
a joint defense represented by Hawley Troxell as litigation counsel. Crop has subsequently
associated independent counsel as well. Because of the theory of fraud and essentially civil
conspiracy asserted by Reed Taylor because Hawley Troxell, according to his pleadings, has
conspired to defeat Reed Taylor's claims, separate representation would not alter his theory.
Under his theory, no Board could vote to oppose his claims since he has named every Board
member and, therefore, under his theory (unique and absurd), the conflicted Board members
cannot act on behalf of a closely-held corporation which is not publicly traded to oppose his
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theories asserted in his Complaint. Any counsel who cooperates with such a Board and allows
themselves to be hired as litigation counsel is therefore a co-bad actor. Accordingly, no
litigation counsel, whether representing one or more ofthe entities jointly or solely, could take
an adverse position to Reed's claims on behalf of the entity.

2.

The thrust of his argument on the disqualification motion is that independent

counsel on behalf of each entity would decide to agree with him if directed to do so by a
"unconflicted Board" meaning a Board which agrees with Reed. The disqualification motion
literally puts the cart before the horse. It is precisely the purpose ofthe underlying litigation to
determine these issues, not appropriate for a motion to disqualify as a de facto way of avoiding
litigating the underlying issues.

F.

I Have Reviewed The Expert Opinions Of Peter Jarvis, Joe Knight, And Steven
CalandriIlo. I Disagree With Their Respective Opinions.
1.

I have known and worked with Peter Jarvis for years, and Joe Knight is currently

a colleague at Seattle University School of Law where I am a Professor. Professor Calandrillo is
a respected expert in the field of corporate law, as is Professor Knight. All three expert opinions
rely on the assumption that Reed Taylor is properly voting the shares of stock and is, therefore,

an insider, at least in authority, to the corporation. But that is the underlying issue of the
litigation. The conflicts of interest analysis, which each asserts, derives from the assumptions of
the correctness of Reed Taylor's underlying litigation position.

2.

That is an assumption which experts cannot make in analyzing the conduct of

Hawley Troxell as litigation counsel. Hawley Troxell is certainly entitled to follow the
directions ofthe control group as litigation counsel as to the litigation posture they choose. They
are not under a general duty to advise the Boards of the respective entity clients of their legal
authority as general counsel to the corporation, which they are not. Litigation counsel is entitled
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to rely upon the control group's directions when operating under the scope of representation as
documented in this case and which can be reviewed by the Court in camera to defend against the
claims of Reed Taylor. Assuming the truthfulness of Reed's claims is, again, putting the cart
before the horse.
3.

Secondly, I note that the materials reviewed by Peter Jarvis, a professional

colleague and friend whom I respect, are only the allegations of Reed Taylor. They do not
include any of the contravening material and, of course, cannot include the confidential and
privileged material which the Court should, if the Court deems it necessary, review in camera
and ex parte. With all due respect to my colleague, Peter Jarvis, he simply doesn't have the
relevant infonnation from which to opine. As is often the case when qualified experts in the
field of conflict of interest, attorney as witness, etc., disagree, most often it is because the
assumptions which they are given differ rather than that their analysis of conflicts differs
substantially. Each of the experts, including the respected experts in the field of corporate law,
Professors Knight and Calandrillo, assume the propriety of Reed's claims that he is entitled to
vote the stock and therefore should be treated as a corporate insider rather than as an outside
creditor with a claim against the corporations. Again, that assumption begs the issue which
really is before the Court, which is controverted and which should be not only subject to the
Court's ruling but, appellate review. Professors Knight and Calandrillo essentially echo the
statements in Mr. Jarvis's Declaration and are similarly based on a one-sided perspective of the
evidentiary and the legal claims in this case and obviously cannot include the privileged material
which the Court, if it deems necessary, should review in camera and ex parte.
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VIII.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the material that I have reviewed, Hawley Troxell's scope of representation
and its representation as litigation counsel only of its various corporate clients do not present a
basis for disqualification. This disqualification motion is, in fact, an effort to avoid the litigation
on the merits by substituting a disqualification motion premised on a theory which would bar all
corporate representation as litigation counsel ofthe various clients of Hawley Troxell even if
they had separate litigation counsel. For the reasons stated, I do not believe a legal basis for
disqualification of Hawley Troxell exists.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

late Professor of Law
tile University School of Law

SSO

STATE OF WASHINGTON)
) ss.
)
County of King
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from 5 to 15 minutes in length which have been presented to the Bar
Association of Alaska, in CLE progranls in \Vashington and in California.
7.

Lawyers Liability Review: 'Written Fee Agreements," January 1987.

8.

Lawyers Liability Review: "Avoiding Conflict ofInterest--Repairing It
Once Recognized, May 1986.
II

9.

"So Your Client Wants to Lie," Washington State Bar News. Volume 41,
No.4, April 1987.

10.

The Ethical Limits of Advertising and SoliCitation, 1988, CLE materials.

11.

'The Trial of Clarence Darrow: Ethics Then and Now." Article for the
Washington State Bar Association annual convention for 1991 as part of
a presentation and dramatization of Clarence Darrow's trial for perjulY
arising from the bombing of the Los Angeles Times.

12.

"Voir Dire in Washington: The Constitution, Statutes and Cases,"

Prepared for the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association and for the
Washington State Bar Association in 1991 and 1992.
13.

"Review of Evidence Case Law" for the year of 1991. repeated in 1992 and
in 1993 for the Washington AsSOCiation of Criminal Defense Lawyers and
for the Litigation Section of the Washington State Bar Association.

14.

"Deposition Practice in Alaska." Materials including a case file, witness
statements, a review of Alaska law and deposition practice for use in a
two-day training program in deposition practice including ethical
behavior in deposition practice in which I was the program director and
leader of 14 faculty (l992).

15.

"Ethics for Legal Assistants." An article written for the Washington State
Trial Lawyers Association and for the Washington State Bar Association
(l992).

16.

"Ethics for CPAs." Materials written for the Tacoma Community College's
continuing CPA program (1992).

17.

"Scenarios in Ethics and Professionalism." Written for the Washington
State Bar Association annual convention in September 1992.

18.

"Ethics for Alaska Attorneys. A set of materials written for the Alaska
State Bar Association, including an annotation of Alaska cases from
territorial days to the present, covering concepts of professional
responsibility and legal malpractice.
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19.

The Seattle Port Authority. Appointed to an ethics advisory committee
for which I wrote a definition of ethics and a procedural manual to
address ethics complaints involving commissioners and employees of the
commission.

20.

'The Ethics of Marketing. Advertising and Solicitation in Washington."
For the Washington State Bar Association (1993).

21.

"Ethics for Legal Assistants." For use in training advocates for mentally
disabled or other institutionalized individuals for the federally funded
Protective Advocacy System (1991).

22.

"Ethics for the Sole Practitioner." For the first annual convention of the
ABA's General Practice section.

23.

"Ethical Close Calls and the New Rules of Professional Conduct." A set of
materials for the Alaska State Bar Association covering its 1993 adoption
of the Rules of Professional Conduct with Alaska variants and a digest of
all relevant Alaska case law.

24.

"Professionalism and Ethics in Sentencing." For the 1993 Washington
State Bar Association Bar Convention.

Past Bar Association Activities Relevant to Professional Responsibility:
1.

Washington State Bar Association lawyer representative to the Judicial
Ethics AdviSOry Committee as appointed by the Washington State Bar
Governors and the Washington State Supreme Court.

2.

Funded member, Rules on Professional Conduct Committee, Washington
State Bar ASSOCiation.

3.

Frequent speaker on Lawyer and Judicial Ethics for the Washington
State Bar Association.

4.

Member King County Bar Association Campaign Ethics Committee.

5.

Member Seattle-King County Bar Association Committee on Advertising.

6.

Co-Chair Seattle-King County Bar Association Selection Committee II.
1992-93.

Qther Professional Associations Regarding Responsibility:
1.

The American Association of Law Schools Professional Responsibility
section; speaker and organizer for presentations on how to teach
professional responsibility and problems in professional responsibility for
lawyers.

Ex-Board member Puget Sound Legal Assistance Foundation;
professional responsibility subcommittee of the board; duties include
Exhibit A
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reviewing problems of professional responsibility which arise from
National Legal Services Corporation: Regulations and Rules applicable to
legal services attorneys and reviewing cases that arise within the Puget
Sound Legal Assistance Foundation for ethical problems and solutions.
3.

Board member, Washington Chapter American Judicature SOCiety;

4.

Executive Committee Member, Washington State Bar Association
Crinlinal Law Section;

5.

Special District Counsel, appointed by the Board of Governors of the
Washington State Bar Association to investigate disciplinary complaints;

6.

Washington State Bar Association Board of Governor's appointee to the
Statute Law Commission supervising the code revisor's office publishing
cases statutes and administrative regulations for the State of
Washington.

7.

Member. Seattle Port Authority, Ethics Advisory Committee.

Other Past Professional Associations Regarding Responsibility:

1.

Society for American Law Teachers subcommittee on professional
responsibility.

2.

Currently Board Chair Washington Appellate Defenders Association With
responsibility for ethical problems at W.A.D.A.

3.

Co-chair, Seattle King County Bar Association Judicial Screening Panels;

4.

Co-chair, Seattle King County Bar Association Campaign Fair Practices
Committee;

5.

Member. Steering Committee. Seattle King County Bar ASSOCiation
Martin Luther King Commemorative Event;

6.

The Rules of Professional Conduct Committee (member for the last 10
years) issuing adviSOry opinions on the Washington Rules of Professional
Conduct.

Others Activities Since January 1999:

1.

Member, Innocence Project working on The Wenatchee Child Sexual
Abuse Cases.
Exhibit A
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2.

The Washington State Bar Association InterProfessionalism Committee
coordinating professional relationships with medical and other forensic
professional organizations.

3.

The Washington State Bar Association Professionalism Committee trying
to upgrade the professionalism of lav.yers in Washington.

Lecturer and Consultant:
1.

National Institute for Trial Advocacy; 1974 to present.

2.

Hastings College of Trial Advocacy; 1977 to 1991.

3.

Hastings College of Civil Advocacy, personal injury programs 1985. 1987,
1988, 1990.

4.

Washington State Bar Association Bar convention speaker, 1980. 1982,
1983. and 1987-92.

5.

American Judicature Society and National Appellate conference speaker.

6.

King County Bar Association speaker in numerous CLE programs on
ethics.

7.

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, speaker. 1979-81,
1987, 1989 and 1992.

8.

National Legal Aid and Defender Association speaker and panel
coordinator on legal ethics, 1980 convention.

9.

Alaska Bar Association speaker for CLE programs on legal ethics.
1983-85, and 1988-93.

10.

Alaska Attorney General's Office and District Attorneys Association
speaker on legal ethics, 1982, 1983 and 1986.

11.

Hawaii Public Defender Association speaker on legal ethics 1975, 1988
and 1990.

12.

New Mexico District Attorney Association speaker 1978 and 1979.

13.

National Legal Services Corporation speaker, 1977-84, 1987, 1989, 1991
and 1993.

14.

Washington State Judicial Conference, 1983 and 1984.

15.

Washington State District Court Judges Association speaker 1978, 1984
and 1988.
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16.

Alameda County District attorneys office speaker on legal ethics,
1980-81.

17.

Traveler's Assurance Company house counsel training progTarn 1981-86
(this includes specific training on the trial of legal malpractice cases and
legal ethics for insurance defense counsel).

18.

The National Endowment for the Humanities, 1979.

19.

World Affairs Conference, Boulder, Colorado, 1979 and 1980.

20.

House counsel training program for the law firm of Baker and Botts in
Houston, Texas, 1985. 1986. 1988, 1990-93.

21.

Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 1986 to present.

Litigation:

Between 1978 and 1996, I have represented an average of three cases per year
before the Washington State Bar on attorney discipline; and am retained as an
expert witness an average of two to three times a month on professional
responsibility issues with practitioners in the states of Alaska. Washington and
California.
Expert Witness Q1JaUfied in the Field of Professional Responsibility:

Since 1980, I have testified in an average of three cases per year as an expert
witness for either plaintiff or defendant in legal malpractice cases. I have been
qualified as an expert witness in the Superior Courts for Skagit County, King
County, Kitsap County. Whatcom, Clark, Spokane, Walla Walla, SnohOmish,
Mason, Thurston, and Kittitas Counties and in the Federal District Court for
the Western District of Washington. I have testified in the states of Alaska,
Hawaii, California and Wyoming. Among other cases of note in which I have
been either an expert witness or involved as a consultant are Ross v. Seannell,
97 Wn.2d 598 (1992) and Demopolis v. Short and Cressman, 103 Wn.2d 52
(1985).
Arbitration:

I have testified as an expert witness in arbitrations in King and Pierce County
and have sat as an arbitrator in legal malpractice or professional ethics related
claims in Pierce County in approximately 20 cases.
Consultant:

Since 1978 I have consulted regularly with attorneys on legal ethics and legal
malpractice related matters. I receive an average of one to two such calls daily
at. the current time.
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2002 Northwest Deposition Program

National Institute for Trial Advocacy

2002

2002 Real Property, Probate and Trust
Section Midyear Seminar and
Meeting

WSBA

2002

A Civil Action: Civility and
The Duty of Representation

Seattle University School of Law

2002

Advanced Real Estate Purchases &
Sales

Law Seminars International

2007

Advertising and Solicitation and the
Constitution and Ethics Codes

W A State Bar Association

1988

Advocacy and Ethics

HI Public Defenders Office

1986

Advocating for Immigrants

SU-Access to Justice

2006

Advocating for Immigrants

SU-Access to Justice

2007

Alaska Rules of Ethics

AK Bar Association

1991

Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct
and New Ethical Issues in Fees.
Billing, and Malpractice

AK Bar Association

1995

ALJ Code of Conduct?

WALJAlNAA'S September CLE
Conference: COMMITMENT TO
EXCELLENCE IN PUBLlC SERVICE

2007

Amanda Kumar's Case: An Interactive
Discussion of the Ethical Issues that
Attomeys Face in their Day-to-Day
Practice

Seattle University School of Law

2004

An Attorney's Duty to Investigate and
Disclose

Oregon State Bar Association's 16
Annual Northwest Bankruptcy
Institute

2003

Annual Ethics Advisory

University of Washington

2000

Annual Ethics Advisory: A Review of all
Washington Cases and Opinions on
Ethics

Washington Law Institute

2000

Annual Ethics Round Up Review

Washington Legal Education Institute

1999

Annual Ethics Teleconference

WSTLA

2001

Annual Review of Criminal Law Cases
For The State of Washington

The Year 2000 Criminal Justice
Institute

2000

th
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TITLE

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION

DATE

Appellate Ethics

W A State Trial Lawyers Association

2000

A Single Shot of Ethics

WDTL Practice Development
Committee
The ADL Lawyers' Roundtable and
the Jewish Federation of Greater
Seattle's Cardozo Society for
Lawyers
W A State Bar Association

2007

Attorney and Ethics: Representing the
Dissenters

Attorney-Client PrivilegelWork Product
And Ethics

2003

2003

Avoiding Ethical and Liability Issues in
Real Estate Transactions

HALF MOON SEMINARS PRESENTS:
WASHINGTON COMMERCIAL REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS

2007

Avoiding Malpractice: What Every
Lawyer Needs To Know

King County Bar Association
Continuing Legal Education

2001

Business of Lawyering: Managing Your
Solo or Small Practice

Small Business Legal Services

2007

Changes Made to the Washington State
Supreme Court to the Committee's
Proposed Rules and Rationale

KCBNs Ethics Workout

2006

Child Abuse and Disclosure
Requirements and the Ethics of
Attorneys

WA State Bar Association Criminal
Law & Family Law Joint Sections

1985
1986

Civil Division Ethics Program on RPC

King County Prosecutor's Office

2002

Civil Litigation Institute

WA State Bar Association Litigation
Section

2000

Commentary on the Comments

4th Annual WSBA Conference on the
Law of Lawyering

2006

Conflicts for Defense Counsel

WA Defense Lawyers' Association

2000

Conflicts of Interest in Insurance and
Coverage

Annual Washington State Bar
Insurance Law Section CLE

1999

Conflicts of Interests in Employment
Cases: Minimize Your Risk When
Representing Multiple Parties

WSTLA Teleconference

2002

Conflicts With Other Professionals

WSBA

2000

Common Prosecution and Defense
Ethics Issues Under the New Rules
of Professional Conduct

WSBA Criminal Law Section

2006

Criminal Justice & Psychiatric
Testimony

Western State Hospital Graduate
Fellow Program

1998,1999,2000

4.2

c:straitIResume/Exhibit B Publications & CLEs 2007.doc

Page 2 of 15

811312008 4:28 PM

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. STRAIT

41f1IJ

TITLE
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Criminal Justice Institute Ethics
Program

W A State Bar Association

1997,1998,2000

Criminal law - Ethics in Sentencing

WA State Bar Association

1999

Criminal Law: The Year in Review

WA Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers

1990

Dances with Wolves and Other
Predators: Ethics of Advocacy

W A State Bar Association

1991

Deposition of Experts

AK Bar Association

1994

Deposition Practice in Alaska

AK Bar Association

1994

Discipline & Ethics Caselaw Review

WA State Bar Association

2003,2005

Disciplinary Training Special District
Counsel

WA State Bar Association

1999

Discovery: A Tool, Not a Club: The
Ethics of Discovery Practice

W A State Bar Association Business
Law Section

1996

Disqualification Motions and Ethics

University of Washington

1989

Eastside Criminal Practitioners Ethical
issues; Co Chair and Presenter

Washington State Bar Association
Criminal Law Section

1999

Effective Assistance of Counsel and
Post Conviction Relief

Innocence Project Northwest Training
Program for lawyers Assisting in
the Project

1999

Election Ethics
Essentials of Evidence: Ethical
Obligations in Discovery

NW legal Foundation
W A State Bar Association

2005
1994

Essentials of Washington Civil
Procedure and Ethics

WA State Bar Association

2004

Ethical Issues in Capital Appointments

WDPAC: The Changing Tide in
Capital Punishment
King County Bar Association Planning
for the Elderly: A Seminar for
General Practitioner

2005

Ethical and Professional Responsibility
Issues in Representing Property
Owners and Property Managers

W A State Bar Association

1996

Ethical Close Calls and the New Alaska
Rules of Professional Conduct

AK Bar Association

1993

Ethical Issues in Transfers of Property
by the Elderly

Ethical ConSiderations

th

6 Annual Labor and Employment
Law Conference
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Ethical Considerations

WA State Bar Association

2004

Ethical Considerations

2006

Ethical Considerations

The Seminar Group: Raising the Bar
of Continuing Education
South Asian Law Student Association
Presents: Civil Rights within the
Local Muslim Community

Ethical Considerations In Motion
Practice

WSBA Making the Most of Motion
Practice

2006

Ethical ConSiderations - MultiProfession Discussion of Ethical
Issues Regarding Ethics in Domestic
Violence Cases, and Ethics in
Sexual Abuse Cases

WSBA

2002

Ethical Dilemmas for the Practicing
Lawyer

W A State Bar Association

1996,1999,2004

Ethical Dilemmas for the Practicing
Lawyer
Ethical Dilemmas In Handling Civil
Litigation

Seattle University Alumni CLE

2003

Washington State Bar Association
And The Federal Bar Association
Of The Western District Of
Washington Fifth Annual Civil
Litigation Institute: Your Guide
For A Successful Trial Practice

1999

Ethical Dilemmas in Handling Civil
Settlement

WA State Bar Association

2006

The Ethical Implications Of Taking An
Equity Interest In Your Client

Intellectual Property Law Society and
the ABA Law Student Division

2001

Ethical Issues

Housing Justice Project Volunteer
Legal Services Program

2005

Ethical Issues and Civil Litigation

The Annual Civil Law Litigation
Section of the State Bar
Association

1999

Ethical Issues for Supervision of
Paralegals

W A State T rial lawyers Association

1989

Ethical Issues In A Real Estate Practice

Seattle King County Bar Association
Real Property Section

2001

Ethical Issues of Concern

W A State Bar Association

2004

Ethical Issues of Concem

WSBA Elder Law Issues In Estate
Planning

2005

Ethical Issues Regarding White Collar
Crime And Whistleblowing

W A State Bar Association

2003

Ethical Limits on the Use of Non-lawyer
Staff

WA State Trial Lawyers Association

1986
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Ethical Pitfalls of the In-house and
Outside Counsel Relationship
Ethical Pitfalls: Strategies to Avoid the
Problems Attorneys Face in Day-toDay Practice

2006 Ethics Teleconference

2006

WSBA

2003

Ethical Program

WA State Bar Association Convention

2000

Ethical Responsibilities of Judges to
Disqualify

10th Annual Conference for Judicial
Conduct Organizations, American
Judicature Society, Chicago, IL

1986

Ethics

SU School of Law 1st Annual Golf
Tournament

2007

Ethics

The Year 2000 Millennium Convention
for the State Bar Association

2000

Ethics

The Access to Justice Foundation

2000

Ethics

Washington State Bar Association in
Spokane

2000

Ethics

Loren Miller Bar Association

2002

Ethics

3rd Annual Labor and Employment
Law Section Meeting and Seminar

2003

Ethics

7th Annual Labor & Employment Law
Conference

2004

Ethics

Asian Bar Association of Washington

2004

Ethics

THE WSBA CRIMINAL LAw SECTION
PRESENTS: Crim inal Law Update

2005

Ethics

ACCESS TO JUSTICE INSTITUTE:
Advocating for Immigrant Victims
CLE

2005

Ethics

WASHINGTON DEFENSE TRIAL LAWYERS
Assoc. C.LE.

2005

Ethics

Washington Defense Trial Lawyer'S
Construction Seminar

2006

Ethics

WSBA CRIMINAL LAw SECTION

2006

Ethics

Access to Justice Institute:
Advocating for Immigrant Victims

2006

Ethics AdviSOry 2001 , 2002, 2003

Washington Law Institute

2001,2002,2003

Ethics and Landlord Tenant Practice

WSBA Residential Landlord -Tenant
Law

2002
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Ethics and Landlord Tenant Practice

WSBA Residential Landlord -Tenant
Law

2002

Ethics and The Public Defender

Washington Defender Association

2003

Ethics and The Rules of Professional
Conduct

77th Annual Meeting Association of
Transportation Law Professionals

2006

Ethics and Professionalism -- Revisiting
the Basics

Professionalism Committee of the
King County Bar Association

2002

Ethics and Professionalism Issues in
Civil Litigation

WaShington Defense Trial Lawyer's
Association

2003

Ethics and Professionalism: The
Changing Views of Loyalty and
Disclosure for Professionals

Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle
CLE

2006

Ethics and Strategies

18th Annual Advanced Conference on

2006

Commercial Real Estate Leases
Ethics Considerations

The Seminar Group: Washington's
Annual Corporate and Securities
Law Update

2004

Ethics - Ex Parte Communications with
School District Personnel

Washington State Council of School
Attorneys' Fall Workshop

2006

Ethics: Fee Disputes

WSTLA Legal Educational Seminars
& New Member Committee

2007

Ethics for Accountants

Tacoma Community College

1989

Ethics for Administrative Law Judges

W A State Bar Association

2006

Ethics for Advocates

National Institute for Trial Advocacy
Regional program sponsored by
Seattle University and the National
Institute Trial Advocacy

2001

Ethics for an Adversary System

American Bar Association

2000

Ethics for Appellate Practice

Washington Supreme Court

1999

Ethics For Appellate Practitioners

Washington State Trial Lawyers
Association Appellate Practice
CLE

2000

Ethics for Attorney Generals

Government Lawyers Bar Association

1999

Ethics for Business Practitioners

W A State Bar Association Business
Law Section

1999

Ethics for Civil Utigators

WSBA Civil Litigation Annual Institute

2000

Ethics For Civil Practitioners

Seattle King County Bar Association
Professionalism Committee

2000
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Ethics for CPAs

WA Association of CPAs

1987

Ethics for Criminal Defense and
Prosecuting Attorneys Handling
Driving while Under the Influence
And Related Criminal Cases

Lorman Foundation.

2001

Ethics For Criminal Law Practitioners,
Co-chair and presenter

Washington State Bar Association
Crimina! Law Section Program

1999,2000

Ethics for Defense and Prosecutors

W A State Bar Association Crim inal
Law Section

2000

Ethics for Elder Law

W SBA Elder Law Section

2000

Ethics for Federal Attorneys After
McDade

U.S. Attorney Western District

1999

Ethics for Federal Practitioners

Federal Bar Association

2000

Ethics for Govemment Attorneys in
Alaska

The Alaska Department of Law

1995

Ethics for Insurance Practitioners

Washington Defense Lawyers
Association

2000

Ethics For Investigators

Washington State Police Training
Program

1999,2002

Ethics For Investigators

NITA 2002 Deposition Program

2002

Ethics for Investigators

University of Washington

2004

Ethics for Labor Lawyers

King County Bar Association Labor
Law Section

2004

Ethics for Landlord Tenant Practice

Washington Law Institute

1999

Ethics for Lawyers Practicing Criminal
Law

WSBA CRIMINAL LAw SECTION

2005

Ethics for Legal Assistants

WA State Trial Lawyers Association;
WA Ass'n of ParalegalS

1986, 1987, 1989

Ethics for Legal Services Practitioners
Working With Child Clients

Columbia Legal Services

2000

Ethics For Legal Services And Clinical
Programs Supervisors

Annual Clinical Education Conference
at Sleeping Lady Resort,
Washington

1999

Ethics for Litigators

WSBA Section On Litigation

2000

Ethics For Utigators

National Institute for Trial Advocacy
Northwest Regional Conference

1999
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Ethics For Multiple Client
Representation

Washington legal Education Institute
ClE for Landlordl Tenant!
Commercial Landlords

1999

Ethics for NAlS

2004

Ethics for Non-lawyers

National Association of legal
Secretaries
W A State Trial lawyers Association

Ethics for Paralegals

Catholic Community Services

1989

Ethics For Police, Probation Officers,
Prosecutors and Defense Counsel

2001 Criminal Justice Institute

2001

Ethics For Post Conviction
Representations

Innocence Project Northwest CLE

2000

Ethics for Prosecutors

Washington Criminal Justice Center

1999

Ethics for Prosecutors

Washington Association Of
Prosecuting Attorneys, Spring
Training Program

2000

Ethics for Prosecutors and Defense
Counsel

The Washington State Bar
Association Criminal Law Section

2001

Ethics for Practitioners

SKBA Real Property, Probate And
Trusts Section

2001

Ethics for Prosecutors

Washington Association Of
Prosecuting Attorneys Support
Enforcement Project

2007

Ethics for Public Defenders

The Defender Association

2004

Ethics for the Sole Practitioner

American Bar Association Section on
General Practice

1991

Ethics for Wills and Trust Practitioners

Seattle King County Bar Association
Wills and Trust Section

2000

Ethics: Getting to Know the New RPCs

Chelan 2005 Annual Conference

2005

Ethics: Getting to Know the New RPCs

YAKIMA THIRD ANNUAL VOLUNTEER
ATTORNEY SERVICES CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION SEMINAR FOR
CENTRAL WASHINGTON
Washington State Supreme Court
Washington Historical Society

2005

Ethics in Bankruptcy Practice

Annual NW Bankruptcy Conference

1994,1995,
1996. 1998

Ethics In Business Law And Tax
Practice

Washington State Bar Association
Business lawlTax Sections CLE

1999

Ethics In Appellate Advocacy
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Ethics In Criminal Representation,
Co-chair and Presenter

Washington State Bar Association
Criminal Law Section

1999

Ethics in Deposition Practice

NITA

2000

Ethics in Discovery

W A State Bar Association

1986

Ethics in Drafting and Using Trusts

W A State Bar Association

2006

Ethics In Federal Practice After McDade

The Federal Bar Association for the
Western District of Washington

2000

Ethics in Health Law

Health Lawyers' Association

2000

Ethics in Legal Malpractice

W A State Bar Association

1986

Ethics in Pro Bono Cases

Access to Justice Institute

2004

Ethics in Review

University of Washington

1997, 1998, 1999

Ethics In Representing The Elderly

The Elder Law Section of the WSBA

2000

Ethics In Sentencing Proceedings For
Practitioners, Co chair and Presenter

Washington State Bar Association
Criminal Law Section sentencing
CLE
King County Bar Association
International Law Section Meeting

1999

Ethics Issues in International Practice

2002

Ethics Issues in Purchase & Sales

Law Seminars International: Advanced
Real Estate Purchases & Sales

2006,2007

Ethics of Advertising

University of Puget Sound School of
Law

1990

Ethics of Advocacy

Master Advocates Program. University
of California, Boalt Law School,
Berkeley, CA

1991

Ethics of Advocacy

Baker & Botts, Houston, TX

1987.1988,
1991,1993

Ethics of Business and Insurance
Defense Representation

In-house Training Program for Gordon
Thomas Honeywell in Tacoma,
Washington

2001

Ethics of Civil Litigation

University of Washington

1986

Ethics of Dissolution Trial Practice

WSBA Handling Your First or Next
Dissolution Trial with Confidence

2006

Ethics of Federal Litigation

Federal Bar Association

1999

Ethics of Gray Areas in the Intersection
of Professions

Washington State Bar Association
Inter-Professionalism Committee

2000

Ethics of Insurance Representation

Insurance Law Institute

2000
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DATE

Ethics of Lawyers in Employment Cases

Third Annual Employment Law
Institute -- Washington State Bar
Association

1996

Senior Legislating Drafting
Conference, Seattle University
School of Law

1993

Ethics of Legislative Staff Counsel

Ethics of Marketing, Advertising, and
Solicitation

WA State Bar Association

1986, 1988, 1989,
1990, 1992, 1994

Ethics of Public Defenders and
Prosecutors

WA State Bar Association Criminal
Justice Institute

1994

Ethics of Subpoenas

2006

Ethics of Supervision

THE 2006 OFFENDER UNIT RETREAT:
SOCIETY OF COUNSEL
The WSPA Fall Conference

Ethics of SuperviSing Attorneys

W A State Trial Lawyers Association

1989

Ethics of Trial Advocacy

University of Washington

1986

Ethics of Tribal Entity Representation

Nineteenth Annual Federal Bar
Association Indian Law
Conference

1994

Ethics Program

Washington Defense Association

2001

Ethics Panel

NITA NORTHWEST REGIONAL

2006

Ethics Panel

NITA NORTHWEST REGIONAL

2007

ETHICS, Part One: AddreSSing
Changes to the Washington Rules
of Professional Conduct

11th Annual Washington Criminal

2004

Ethics Presentation to Business &
litigation Practice Groups

Betts, Patterson, and Mines, P.S

2004

Ethics Roundup

Washington Law Institute

1997, 1998, 1999

Ethics Seminar

Criminal Law Section Members

2004

Ethics: The Hard Questions #1

AK Bar Association

1991

Ethics: The Hard Questions #2

AK Bar Association

1994

ETHICS UPDATE: CONFIDENTIALITY AND
CLIENT MISCONDUCT

AK Bar Association

2005

Evidence and Ethics Seminar

Yakima County 2 Annual Volunteer
Attorney Service

2003

Justice Institute
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TITLE

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION

DATE

Evidence: Obtaining, Preserving,
Presenting

Washington State Trial Lawyers
Association

2002

Expert Witnesses in the Courtroom

WA State Bar Association Criminal
Law Section

1987

Exposing a Judge or Getting Even? And
Other Recent Moral Tales in
Washington Ethics Caselaw

11th Annual Professional

2003

Federalism Implications of Recent US
Supreme Court Decisions And The
Role of the Government Lawyer

Washington State Government
Lawyers Bar Association

1999

Fifth Annual Civil Litigation Institute:
Your Guide For A Successful Trial
Practice

Washington State Bar Association
And The Federal Bar Association
Of The Western District Of
Washington

1999

Fifth Annual Labor & Em ployment Law
Conference

WSBA Labor Law Section

2002

Honesty and Collaborative Law:
Pushing Honesty to Its Umits?

Seattle University School of Law
presents: HONESTY AND THE LAw:
HONESTY AS ADVOCACY

2007

Hospital & Health Law Seminar

Washington State Society of Healthcare 2000
Attorneys

How Legal Supervisors Are Affected by
Changes to the RPCs

Seattle University School of Law

Hypotheticals

WSBA12 Annual Criminal Justice
Institute

2005

In-House Ethics Program

Halverson Applegate, P.S.

2001

In-House Ethics Program

Seed Intellectual Property Law Group
PLCC

2003

In-House Ethics Program

Stanislaw Ashbaugh. LLP

2004

Insurance Defense Ethics

WA State Bar Association

1999

Judicial Ethics

WA State Judicial Conference

1986

Judicial Ethics and the Judicial Conduct
Commission

Annual Joint Education Session for
judges and court administrators
sponsored by the Office of
Administrator of the Courts for the
State of Washington

2001

Law of Search & Seizure in W A, Justice
Robert Utter (edited)

University of Puget Sound Law
Review

1988

Legal Ethics and Litigation

Battelle Institute, Seattle, W A

1986

c:straitiResume/Exhibit B Publications &
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TITLE

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION

DATE

Legally Bound: Supervised Visitation
And Domestic Violence Protection
Orders In Family Law Case

King County Bar Association

2001

Legal Malpractice in Washington

University of Washington

1987

Malpractice: Case Law Survey and
Update

WA State Bar Association 3 Annual
Conference on the Law of
Lawyering

2005

Malpractice: Washington Case Law
And Current Trends

WA State Bar Association

2003

Malpractice Pitfalls and Prevention:
Emerging Areas of Concern,
Practice Tips and Recognizing and
Minimizing Risks

American Academy of Marriage
Lawyers

2004

Making and Meeting Objections: Ethics
of Trial Practice

University of Washington

1993

Marketing and Ethics

W A State Bar Association

1990

Marketing for Lawyers

W A State Bar Association

1989

McDade Amendments

U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western
District of Washington

1999

Methods of Teaching Ethics

Association of American Law Schools
Western Meeting

1986

Minimizing Conflicts of Interest in MultiParty Representation

The American Bar Association
Section of Labor and Employment
Law and the ABA Center for
Continuing Legal Education
Present a Live SO-minute
TeleConference and Live Audio
Webcast

2002

Misuse of Motions to Disqualify in
Litigation

University of Washington

1987

Multidisciplinary Practice and
Representing Clients in a Limited
Capacity: How Will the Practice of
Law Change?

Seattle University School of Law Fall
2002 CLE PROGRAM

2002

Navigating The Maze - A Checklist
Approach Toland Use And
Environmental Law, #03741

WSBA Environment & Land Use Law
Section

2000

New Discipline Rules and the Impact on
Ethics Behavior

2nd Annual WSBA Conference on the

2004

New Rules of Professional Conduct

DNA-PEOPLE'S LEGAL SERV1CES 40
ANNIVERSARY

rd

Law of Lawyering

c:straitlResumelExhibit B Publications & CLEs 2007.doc
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TITLE

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION

DATE

New Rules of Professional Conduct:
How Might Your Life Change?

SEATTLE UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW
ALUMNI ETHICS

2005

NW Regional Ethics For Litigations

NITA

1999

Plenary Session: A Smorgasbord of
Practical Ethical Issues - Tegman,
Brown, Joint and Several Liability;
Individual and Entity Defenses

11 th Annual WSBA Employment Law
Institute

2004

Plenary Session On Ethics: Giving
Legal Advice In The Shadow Of
Enron

Washington State Bar Association
th
Continuing Legal Education 10
Annual Employment Law Institute

2003

Professional Responsibility -- Tribal
Attorneys and Tribal Members
Conflicts of Interests in Estate
Planning

Seattle University Continuing Legal
Education: UNDERSTANDING
AIPRA: THE AMERICAN INDIAN
PROBATE REFORM ACT

2006

Proposed Changes to the Rules of
Professional Conduct

Washington State Society of
Healthcare Attorneys Annual
Spring Hospital & Health Law
Seminar

2004

The Proposed Rules of Professional
Conduct and False Testimony

VOLUNTEER LAWYER PROGRAM
SKAGIT COUNTY CoMMUNITY ACTION
AGENCY

2005

Proposed Rules of Professional
Conduct for Alaska

AK Bar Association

1990

Prosecuting, Defending. and Avoiding
Malpractice Claims

University of Washington

1987

Recent Changes to Washington's Legal
Ethics and Discipline Procedures
and Potential 2003 Changes

WA State Bar Association

2003

Recent Rule Changes In Ethics
Nationally and Locally

University of Washington Annual
Ethics Review Program

2000

Review of Criminal Law and Evidence

Second Annual Criminal Justice
Institute
HI Prosecuting Attorneys Annual
Training

1995

Review of Recent Changes in the
Washington Ethics Rules

In-House CLE for StanislawAshbaugh, LLP Lawyers Counselors - Advisors

2007

Revisiting the Basics

WA State Bar Association

2002

Seattle University School of Law ABA
Law Student Division

2003

Review of Developments of the Law of
Ethics in Hawaii

Role of the Attorney as Moral
Counselor: Right, Wrong. Legal and
Illegal. Where's the line, what
should you advise, and what's the
difference?
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TITLE

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION

DATE

Role of Expert Witnesses in Psychology
and Psychiatry In Civil and Criminal
Litigation in Washington

University of WashingtonlWestern
State Hospital Institute for
Psychology and Psychiatry

1999

Role of Forensic Evidence in Criminal
Law

WSBA

2001

Rule Changes and the work of The RPC
Committee

University Of Washington Annual
Ethics Continuing Legal Education
Program Year-End Review

1999

Rules of Professional Conduct
Committee

University of Washington Annual
Ethics Review Program

2000

Self Defense For Lawyers

Irwin H. Schwartz

2001

Selected Ethics and Professionalism
Issues for Criminal Law
Practitioners

WSBA Criminal Justice Institute 14th
Annual CLE

2007

Selected Ethical Problems in Business

Washington State Bar Association
1999 Purchase And Sale Of A
Smaller Business From Asset
Valuation To Zero Hour Closing

1999

Selected Ethic Problems For Civil
Defense Lawyers

Washington Defense Lawyers Annual
Eastside Convention

2000

Selected Washington/Oregon Ethics
Issues

Oregon Reciprocity Seminar

2002

Seventh Annual Ethical Dilemmas for
Washington Practitioner; Co Chair
and Presenter

WSBA

2000

Seventh Annual Tort Law Update

W A State Trial Lawyers Associations

2000

Seventh Annual Washington Criminal
Justice Institute

WSBA

2000

Sixth Annual Litigation

In-House Ethics Program For
Halverson Applegate. P.S.

2000

Special District Counsel Investigation of
Disciplinary Cases Training Session
for Attorneys Desiring to be SDC

W A State Supreme Court and W A
State Bar Association Joint
project on Discipflnary Training

1999

Taking Equity Interest in Your Cfienfs
Business

Seattle King County Bar Association

2000

The Straight and Narrow: Ethical Issues
in Purchases and Sales

Law Seminars International: Real
Estate Purchases & Sales

2004

The Trial of Clarence Darrow: Ethics
Then and Now

WA State Bar Association and W A
Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers

c:strait'ResumelExhibit B Publications & CLEs 2007.doc
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TITLE

SPONSORING ORGANIZATION

DATE

Three ethics presentations in various
forms with materials

Washington State Bar Association's
Annual Convention

1999

Thirteenth Annual Insurance Law
Seminar

2000
Washington Defense Trial Lawyers
Defense Lawyers Fighting For Justice Ir
Courts

T rial Advocacy and Ethics

AK District Attorneys Association

1989

Understanding the Residential LandlordTenant Act and the Unlawful
Detainer Process

Housing Justice Project Free CLE

2004

Use of Judicial Evaluation Programs
and On Access to Justice for
Indigents

The Access to Justice Subcommittees
Education and Jurisprudence

Since 1999

Voire Dire in Washington

W A State Bar Association

1988, 1992

Washington Criminal Justice System
and the Role of Psychiatrist and
Psychologist

University of WashingtonlWestern
State Institute for Forensic
Psychology and Psychiatry

2000
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DEPOSITION & TRIAL TESTIMONY
Exhibit C
CASE NAME
Andreas Meyn v.
Christopher Fletcher

JURISDICTION
Superior Court
Whatcom County

Bernard v. Hernandez

Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services,
Seattle

Boyd H. Graves, et a/. v.
John A. McGary, et
al.

Superior Court, King
County, WA

94-2-26227 -1

Trial testimony

Chenega Corp., et al. V.
Fortier and Mikko

AK Superior Court 3rd
Judicial District

3AN985599

Deposition

DeLiew, et al. v. Dodge
etal.

AK Superior Court 3rd
Judicial District

3AN-96-8492 CiVIL

Deposition

Del! D. Jackson v.
Cynthia Coulter, et
al.

Superior Court, Third
JUd. District, AK

3-AN-90-6535 CiV

Deposition

Diane Rommel v.
Walthew Warner,

King County Superior
Court

98-2-19908-3SEA

Deposition

Dicran Kassouni v.
Cathleen
McLaughlin, et a!.

Superior Court,
Anchorage AK

3AN-02-8638 CIV

Deposition

Douglas A. Young v.
Chase Riveland, et
al.

U.S. District Court,
Western Dist., WA

C 91-1-1267R

T estirnony & deposition

Frank Shiers, et a/. v.
W. Ronald
Groshong, et al.

Superior Court, King
County, WA

92-2-29576-6

Deposition

Hansen v. Bart
Anderson

Arbitrator's Division
Superior Court, King
County

Testimony

Harry Schafer, et al. v.
David Utevsky, et al.

CAUSE NO.
002-00820-8

Deposition

Testimony

94-2-11435-2

Deposition & Trial
testimony

Hensey v. Farmer's
Insurance Co.

Superior Court of King
County, WA

97-2-28353-1 SEA

Deposition

In re Brett

Clark County Superior
Court

98-1-01038-3

Deposition and
Testimony

c:straiVResume/Exhibit C Deposition and Trial Testimony 2004.doc
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EXHIBIT "e"

CASE NAME

JURISDICTION

CAUSE NO.

In Re Burlington
Northern & Santa
Fe Railway Co.
Employee
Settlement
Agreements
Utigation

Federal District Court
Western District of WA

MOL #1418

In Re Colby

Supreme Court of
Washington Judicial
Conduct Proceeding

In re Consolidated
Seattle Slew
litigation cases

Superior Court, Yakima
County, WA

92-2-01880-1

Deposition

In re Corporate
Dissolution of
Ocean Shores Park
inc .• et al. v. Gloria
Rawson-Sweet

Superior Court, Grays
Harbor Co. WA

02-201024·1

DepOSition

In re Douglas Schafer

Bar Disciplinary Hearing

In re Hammermaster

WA Judicial Conduct
Commission

In Re Hammermaster

Supreme Court of
Washington Judicial
Conduct Proceeding

Testimony

U.S. Bankruptcy Court
District-Oregon

Testimony

In

re Smith
Furnishings

Home

Deposition

Deposition

Testimony
139WA2d211

Testimony

Inslee Best. et al. v.
Dennis Kenneley, et
al.

Superior Court,
County, WA

King

94·2·29357-5

Deposition

Interactive Financial
Services Group Inc.,
et al. v. Perkins Coie,
LLP, et at

Superior Court
County. WA

King

02-2-15004-7SEA

Deposition

Ito Int'l Corp., et al. v.
Prescott, Inc., et al.

Superior Court,
County, WA

King

94-206070-8

Deposition

U.S.
District
Court,
Western Dist.. WA

CR 91-5523B

Deposition & Trial
testimony

Jerry Omer v. City of
Bellevue

U.S. District Court
Western Division

C-98-0529L

DepOSition

JIJ Inc. V. Oles,
Morrison, Rinker. &
Baker

Superior
County

99-2-o807-USEA

Deposition

Jack Stein
Wood

v. Tana

Court

King

c:straiVResume/Exhibit C Deposition and Trial Testimony 2oo4.doc
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CASE NAME

JURISDICTION

CAUSE NO.

John Hayden, et al v.
Kirk Veis, et al.

Superior Court Thurston
County

99-2-02065-8

Deposition

John Wilfiam Taylor, et
al. v. Pauline Yuri
Shigaki, et aJ.

Superior Court,
County. WA

King

93-2-04997-9

Trial Testimony

Joseph Clerget, et al. v.
Donald Lyderson, et
al.

Superior Court, Pierce
County. WA

90-2-07035-8

Deposition

Kake Tribal Corp. v.
Selaska Corp., et al.

Superior Court,
Jud. District. AK

1-JU-91-1026 CIV

Deposition

Levernier Construction
Co. v. St. Paul Life
Insurance Co.

Superior
Court.
Spokane County WA

02-2-06716-1

Deposition

Leonard Kerr, et al. v.
Michael Caryl. et al.

Superior Court,
County. WA

King

89-2-08553-4

Deposition

Uisa Wickersham v.
Lowell K. Halverson

Superior Court,
County, WA

King

94-2-07362-1

Deposition

Lowell Halvorson v.
Romelle Lowry

Superior
County

King

98-2-05130-2SEA

Testimony

Meyn vs. Fletcher;;

Whatcom County

00-2-00820-8

Michael O'Rourke v.
Robert Sennett, et
at

Superior Court, King
County. WA

91-2-20581-7

DepOSition

Moev. Wise

Superior Court, Grays
Harbor County, W A

91-2-00056-1

Deposition

Ok Sik U v. Kenneth
Burrows

Superior Court, King
County, WA

88-2-05509-2

Deposition & Trial
testimony

Court

First

Omer v. City of
Bellevue, et al

Deposition

Paradise Orchards v.
Fearing, et at.

01-2-01030-9

Deposition

Patricia Absher v.
Ronald A. Offret, et
al.

Alaska Fee Arbitration

1993 F 062

Testimony

Paul Hayes, et aL v.
Laurel Tiller, et al.

Superior Court, Lewis
County, WA

91-2-00776-2

Deposition

Sandra Johnson v.
Timothy McGarry

Superior Court King
County

OO·213786-9SEA

Deposition
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CASE NAME

JURISDICTION

CAUSE NO.

Sansome v. Garvey
Shubert

Multnomah Circuit Court

981007633

Testimony

Schumacher v. Douglas
Wilson, etal.

Superior Court, King
County, WA

93-2-02049-6

Deposition

Sea lion Corp. v.
Ronald E.
Cummings, et al.

Superior Court, Third
Judicial District, Ak

3-AN-90-8961

Deposition & Trial
testimony

William Dussault v. MidCentury Inc., et al.

Superior Court, King
County, WA

91-2-00847-7

Deposition

Willis v. Holm

King County Superior
Court

Workland and
Witherspoon, PLLC,
et al. v. Marcus A.
DeWood, M.D.

Court,
Superior
Spokane Co. WA

DepOSition

02206348-3
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Gary D. Babbitt, ISB No. 1486
D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228
HA WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: (208) 344-6000
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
Email: gdb@hteh.com
jash@hteh.com
Attorneys for AlA Services Corporation,
AlA Insurance, Inc., and CropUSA
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
)
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
)
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
)
community property comprised thereof;
)
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE )
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
)
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
)
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
)
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
)
community property comprised thereof,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

Case No. CV -07 -00208
AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. BABBITT

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; and AlA INSURANCE, INC., an )
)
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Idaho corporation,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Counterdefendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

GARY D. BABBITT, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years and competent to attest to the

following matters of my own personal knowledge. I am the lead litigation attorney for the law
firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell") in this litigation.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit lA is a true and correct copy of the Idaho

Secretary of State's Certificate of Amendment dated May 8, 1996, to which is attached the
Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation. Attached hereto
as Exhibit IB is a true and correct copy of the Articles ofIncorporation of ALA, Inc. filed with
the Idaho Secretary of State on January 31, 1977, as amended by Articles of Amendment filed
January 6, 1985, July 16, 1990, November 1, 1994 and June 5, 1995.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of a letter from

Plaintiffs counsel dated July 11, 2008.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibits 3 through 10, respectively, are true and correct

copies of emails from Plaintiff s counsel, Roderick C. Bond, dated July 17, July 21, July 27
August 3, August 4, August 5, August 6 and October 7, 2008.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 11 is a true and correct copy of an Assignment

Agreement dated as of August 11, 2008, pursuant to which the lenders assigned to Hudson

AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. BABBITT - 2
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Insurance Company ("Hudson") all of the lenders' interest in a loan (the "Surge Note") made to
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA")
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 12 is a true and correct copy of excerpts from

an Asset Purchase Agreement between CropUSA and Hudson dated as of August 29,2008,
pursuant to which Hudson assumed the Assumed Liabilities, including (as indicated on
Schedule 1.3) all of Crop USA's obligations under the Surge Note, without limitation.
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 13 is a true and correct copy of the

Memorandum In Support ofLR.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss filed and pending for
hearing in Reed Taylor v. Hawley Troxell (Case No. CV08-01765).
8.

Before undertaking joint representation of AlA Services and AlA

Insurance in May 2007, and before proposing that the co-Defendants enter into a Joint Defense
Agreement, Hawley Troxell carefully considered whether such representation could be
undertaken in accordance with the applicable Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and
concluded that, with carefully designed disclosures, informed consents to waive conflicts, and
tolling agreements among the Defendants, such representation and joint defense arrangement are
proper. Accordingly, in connection with Hawley Troxell's agreement to undertake the
representation of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., Hawley Troxell entered
into a written engagement / conflict waiver agreement with AlA Services and AlA Insurance;
obtained conflict waivers from all of the other Defendants (as well as CropUSA which, although
not then named as a Defendant, was identified in Reed's complaint as a participant in
transactions that Plaintiff contends were improper); and required that each Defendant execute a
standstill and tolling agreement which tolled and preserved any possible claims that might be
brought against that Defendant by any other Defendant. The boards of directors of AlA Services
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and AlA Insurance reviewed and approved the engagement/conflict waiver letter agreement and
the standstill and tolling agreements.
9.

In connection with Hawley Troxell's appearance in this case, Defendants'

counsel proposed to their respective clients a Joint Defense Agreement among the Defendants,
based on Defendants' common interest and common defenses in defending against Plaintiffs
claims. Each of the Defendants did in fact sign the Joint Defense Agreement and a standstill and
tolling agreement.
10.

Later in 2007, Reed filed an amended complaint naming CropUSA,

Connie Taylor, and Jim and Corrine Beck as Defendants. As an accommodation to CropUSA
and its counsel, Quarles & Brady, Hawley Troxell agreed to serve as CropUSA's local counsel
and filed a motion for limited admission of Quarles & Brady pro hac vice. In connection with
the addition of the newly named Defendants and Hawley Troxell's agreement to serve as local
counsel for CropUSA, all of the Representation Agreements were revised to reflect the additional
defendants - Connie Taylor and Jim Beck, in addition to CropUSA - named in Reed's amended
complaint. Effective as of November 1,2007, Hawley Troxell entered into an engagement /
conflict waiver letter agreement with CropUSA agreeing to serve as local counsel with Quarles
& Brady as lead counsel; AlA Services and AlA Insurance signed an amended

engagement/conflict waiver letter agreement; and all ofthe Defendants entered into an Amended
and Restated Standstill and Tolling Agreement and an Amended Joint Defense Agreement.
11.

Hawley Troxell has not ever undertaken the representation of any of the

individual Defendants in this litigation. Each of the individual Defendants has at all times been
represented by his/her own independent counsel in this litigation.
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12.

Based on the limited engagement agreements with AlA Services

Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and later Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., and the conflict
waivers by and standstill and tolling agreements among the Defendants included in the
Representation Agreements, Hawley Troxell reasonably believed that the firm would be able,
and continues to believe that it is able, to provide competent and diligent representation to each
of the corporate Defendants in the defense of Reed Taylor's claims in this litigation. In addition,
Hawley Troxell reasonably believed, and continues to reasonably believe, that valid defenses
exist to Plaintiffs claims.
13.

Hawley Troxell was not asked to advise, and did not advise, AlA Services

in connection with its solicitation of the vote of AlA Services Corporation shareholders in March
2007 to approve the advance of litigation expenses to the individual Defendants, or the
disclosure made to the shareholders by the corporation.
14.

I never, and to my knowledge no other attorney at Hawley Troxell ever,

advised the board of directors, any officer or employee of AlA Services or AlA Insurance in any
matter relating to:
a.

Pacific Empire Radio Corporation;

b.

Parking Lot; or

c.

Series C Preferred Stock transaction.

15.

I never, and to my knowledge no attorney in this office ever, advised the

board of directors, officers or employees of AlA Services or AlA Insurance concerning the
allocation of expenses or the propriety or timing of debits or credits allocated under the 2001
Master Marketing Agreement, the 2001 Management Agreement or the 2003 Administrative
Agreement between CropUSA and AlA Insurance, Inc.
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Further your affiant sayeth naught

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 6r- day of October, 2008.

ar
Residing at _-'-----"-'-="""'-u=.-=...;.._ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
My commission expires ~9-'iI-'I~)'-"7-'+I-+,-"'o'-------
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this l b~day of October, 2008, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. BABBITT by the method indicated below,
and addressed to each of the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
V Email

Michael S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
416 Symons Building
7 South Howard Street
Spokane, VVA99201
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
..J::::::::::::Email

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
[Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor]
David R. Risley
Randall, Black & Cox, PLLC
P.O. Box 446
1106 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
[Attorneys for Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck
and Corrine Beck]
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_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
;--Email
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James 1. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700
Chicago, Illinois 60661-2511
[Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance]

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
::2'Email

c:::::d== ){)<tS~
Gary D. Babbitt
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CERTIHCATEOFAMENDNrnNT
OF
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION
File Number C 74568
I, PETE T. CENARRUSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho,

hereby certify that duplicate originals of Articles of Amendment to the
Articles of Incorporation of AlA SERVICES CORPORAnON duly executed
pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Business Corporation Act, have been
received in this office and are found to conform to law.
ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the auUlOrity vested in me by

law, I issue tins Certificate of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation
and attach hereto a duplicate original of the Articles of Amendment.
Dated:

May 8, 1996

~(}i'~
SECRETARY OF STATE

EXHIBIT
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ORIGINAL

Pursuant to the provisions of §30-1-58, §30-1-59 and §30-1-61 of the Idaho Business
of Amendment to its
Corporation Act, the undersigned corporation adopts the following ArticJes
,
~

Articles of Incorporation, as filed on December 20, 1983 and previously amended on October 14,
1986, December 29; 1987, April i 1, 1995 and August 3, 1995.
FIRST: The name of the corporation is AlA SERVICES CORPORATION.
SECOND:

On December 14, ]995, the shareholders of the corporation adopted and

approved the following Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of AIA Services
Corporation, pursuant to which Section 4.3.3 of Article Fourth was amended by replacing it in its
entirety.
tfAMENDED AND RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
OF
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION
Except for the amendment of Section 4.3.3 of Article Fourth by replacing it in its entirety,
these Amended and Restated Articles ofIncorporation of AIA Services Corporation correctly set
forth without change the corresponding provisions of the original Articles of Incorporation as
hereinbefore filed on December 20, 1983 and amended on October 14, 1986, December 29, 1987,
April 11, 1995 and August 3, 1995; and these Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation,
including the amended Article Fourth, supersede the original Articles of Amenclnient and all
previous amendments thereto.
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THIRD
The purpose for which the corporation is organized is for the transaction of any or all lawful
business for which the corporation may be incorporated under the Idaho Business Corporation Act.

FQURTH
4.1
Authorized Capital. The aggregate number of shares which this corporation shall
have authority to issue is 11,700,000 shares, of which 700,000 shares shall be Preferred Stock and
11,000,000 shares shall be Common Stock ($0.01 par value). The corporation is authorized to issue
thePteferred Stock in two classes designated as "Series A", consisting of200,OOO shares of Stated
Value Preferred Stock (without par value); and "Series C", consisting of 500,000 shares of 10%
Preferred Stock ($1 par value). The respective preferences, limitations and relative rights of each
of the two classes of Preferred Stock and the Common Stock of the corporation are set forth in the
following provisions of Article Fourth:
4.2

Series A Preferred Stock.

4.2.1 General. Each share of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the rights and
preferences conferred in this Section 4.2 of Article Fourth. Holders of Series A Preferred Stock
shall have no rights to share in any distribution of the profits or assets of the corporation, whether
in the form of cash or stock or dividends or otherwise, except to the extent specifically provided
herein..
4.2.2 No Dividends. The Series A Preferred Stock shall not payor accrue any
dividends.
4.2.3 Demand for Redemption. (a) The holder of Series A Preferred Stock shall
have the right to require the corporation to redeem such stock from any legally available funds upon
breach of any covenant of the corporation set forth in this Article Fourth, but only to the extent such
redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act restrictions on the corporation's
redemption of its own shares. This right may be exercised by giving the corporation written notice
of demand for redemption specifYing the default and a redemption date not less than ninety (90) days
from the date such notice delivered to the corporation; provided however that, if the corporation
cures such specified default within sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice by corporation, the
right to redeem Series A Preferred Stock on account of such specified default shall be extinguished.
(b)
The holder of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the right to require the
corporation to redeem such stock from any legally available funds at any time after September 14,
1993, but only to the extent such redemption shall not violate the Idaho Business Corporation Act
restrictions on the corporation's redemption of its own shares. This right may be exercised by giving
the corporation written notice of demand for redemption specifYing a redemption date after
September 14, 1993 and not less than ninety (90) days or more than one hundred eighty (180) days
from the date such notice is delivered to the corporation.
4.2.4 Call for Redemption. The Series A Preferred Stock may be called for
redemption by the corporation, in whole or in part, upon payment of the redemption price from
legally available funds at any time prior to the demand for redemption by the holder of Series A
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Preferred Stock. Notice of such call for redemption, specifying the redemption date not less than
thirty (30) days from the date such notice is mailed, shall be mailed to each record holder of Series
A Preferred Stock. If fewer than all shares of Series A Preferred Stock are to be redeemed, the
shares shall he redeemed prorata from the holders thereof

4.2.5 Redemption Price If Series A Preferred Stock is redeemed on or before
September 14, 1990, the redemption price is $&.00 per share if paid in a lump sum. If Series A
Preferred Stock is redeemed any time during the three-year period beginning September 15, 1990
and ending on September 14, 1993, the redemption price is $8.50 per share if paid in a lump sum.
If not paid in a lump sum on or before September 14, 1993, the redemption price for Series A
Preferred Stock is $10.00 per share, provided that the redemption price may be paid, at the
corporation's sole option, in monthly installments on a fifteen (I5) year amortization schedule
beginning on the day after the redemption date and accruing interest at a rate of one-and one-half
(I Y2) points under the First Interstate Bank ofIdabo, N.A., prime lending rate, adjusted quarterly.
4.2.6 Redemption Procedure and Effect.

(a)
Lump Sum Payment. If the redemption price is to be paid in a lump sum, the
corporation shall deposit, or shall cause its nominee to deposit, on or before the redemption date
specified in the notice of redemption, the aggregate redemption price of the shares of Series A
Preferred Stock to be redeemed with a bank or trust company specified in the notice, payable on the
redemption date in the amounts and to the respective orders of the holders of the shares of Series A
Preferred Stock to be redeemed, on endorsement to the corporation or its nominee as may be
required and upon surrender of the certificates for such shares. Unless the corporation or its
nominee fails to pay the lump sum redemption price on or before the redemption date, the shares of
Series A Preferred Stock subject to such redemption shall be deemed to have been redeemed, and
shall be deemed no longer to be outstanding, from and after the redemption date set forth in the
notice of redemption. On or after the redemption date, subject only to payment of the redemption
price, Series A Preferred Stock so called for redemption shall cease to be entitled to any interest or
right in the corporation; and holders of such Series A Preferred Stock shall thereafter cease to be
shareholders and shall be entitled only to payment ofthe amount of the redemption price, without
interest, upon surrender of the certificates evidencing such stock. If the lump sum redemption price
shall be paid by a nominee of the corporation, such nominee shall upon such payment become the
owner ofthe shares with respect to which such payment was made; and certificates of stock may be
issued to such nominee in evidence of such ownership.
(b)
Installment Payment. If the corporation elects to pay the redemption price in
instaIlments, the number of shares of Series A Preferred Stock equal to the principaJ portion of each
installment divided by $10.00 per share shall be deemed to have been redeemed and to be no longer
outstanding from and after the date of such instaIJment. On and after such payment date, such
number of shares of Series A Preferred Stock shall cease to be entitled to any interest or right in the
corporation; and holders of such shares shall thereafter cease to be shareholders of the corporation
with respect to such shares, whether or not the certificates evidencing such shares have been
surrendered. Upon request of the corporation from time to time, certificates evidencing shares of
Series A Preferred Stock including redeemed shares shall be surrendered to and reissued by the
corporation in reduced amount to reflect any and all installment redemptions of shares prior to such
request.
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4.2.7 Liquidation Preferenc~. In case of the voluntary liquidation or dissolution
of the corporation, the holder of Series A Preferred Stock shall have the right to be paid in full,
before any amount shall be paid to the owners of the Common Stock or to the owners of the Series
C Preferred Stock, as follows:
$8.00 per share if the liquidation price is paid on or before September
14, 1990.
$8.50 per share if the liquidation price is paid after September 14,
1990 and on or before September 14, 1993.

$10.00 per share if the liquidation price is paid after September 14,
1993.

In case of the involuntary liquidation or dissolution of the corporation, the holder of Series A
Preferred Stock shall have the right to be paid $10.00 per ~hare, in full, before arty amount shall be
paid to the owners of the Common Stock or to the owners of the Series C Preferred Stock. After
payment to the holders ofthe Series A Preferred Stock of the full preferential amounts hereinabove
provided, the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock as such shall have no right or claim to any of
the remaining assets of the corporation either upon any distribution of such assets or upon
dissolution, liquidation or winding up; and the remaining assets to be distributed, if any, upon a
distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up, may be distributed among
the holders of the Series C Preferred Stock and the Common Stock in accordance with the provisions
of this Article Fourth.
4.2.8 Limited Votinl;: Rights. The Series A Preferred Stock shall have no right
(except as required bylaw or as provided by Section 4.2.12 of this Article Fourth) to receive notice
of or to vote at any regular or special meeting of stockholders, except that the holders of a majority
of the shares of Series A Preferred Stock shaH have the right, voting separately as a class, to elect
one director to the board of directors of the corporation.
4.2.9 Covenants. So long as any shares of Series A Preferred Stock are outstanding,
and except with the consent of the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares of Series A
Preferred Stock.

(a)
Common Stock. The corporation shall not issue any Common Stock for less than book value.
(determined as of the end of the immediately preceding fiscal year), except for Common Stock
issued to pay a dividend payable solely in shares of Common Stock or issued to employees or agents
pursuant to incentive stock option or bonus plan.

(b)
Preferred Stock. The corporation shall issue no Preferred Stock or securities
convertible into such stock, other than the Series A and Series C Preferred Stock.

I~debtedness. The corporation win not, and will not permit any of its
(c)
Subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly, create, incur, assume, guaranty or otherwise become or remain
directly or indirectly liable with respect to, any Indebtedness, except:
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(1)
The corporation may remain liable in respect of Indebtedness
outstanding on the date of adoption ofthls Article Fourth by the corporation's shareholders.
(2)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may become and remain liable
with respect to Indebtedness that is not secured by a Lien on any of the assets of the
corporation or its Subsidiaries, provided that the aggregate principal amouht of such
unsecured Indebtedness shall not exceed Consolidated Net Worth less goodwill of the
corporation at any time; and
(3)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may become and remain liable
in respect of Indebtedness secured by any of the following Liens:

(i)
Liens for taxes, assessments or governmental charges or
claims the payment of which is not yet delinquent or is being contested in good faith,
if such reserve or other provision, if any, as shall be required by generally accepted
accounting principles, consistently applied, shall have been made therefor;
(ii)
Statutory Liens of landlords and lines of carriers,
warehousemen, mechanics, materialmen and other liens imposed by law incurred in
the ordinary courses of business for sums not yet delinquent or being contested in
good faith, if such reserve or other appropriate provision, if any, as shall be required
by generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied shall have been
made therefor;

(iii)
Liens incurred or deposits made in the ordinary course of
business in connection with worker's compensation, unemployment insurance and
other types of social security, or to secure the performance of tenders, statutory
obligations, surety and appeal bonds, bids, leases, governmental contracts,
performance and return-of-money bonds and other similar obligations (exclusive of
obligations for the payment of borrowed money);
(iv)
Any attachment or judgment Lien; provided that if the
judgment it secures exceeds $250,000 (alone or when aggregated with all other
judgments secured by Liens permitted by this clause (vi», such judgment shall,
within forty-five (45) days after the entry thereof, have been discharged or execution
thereof stayed pending appeal, or shall have been discharged within forty-five (45)
days after the expiration of any such stay;
(v)
Easements, rights-of-way, restrictions and other similar
charges or encumbrances not interfering with the ordinary conduct of the business
of the corporation or any of its Subsidiaries;
(vi)

Any interest or title of a lessor under any lease;

(vii)
Any Lien existing on any asset of any corporation at the time
such corporation becomes a subsidiary if such Lien was not created in contemplation
of such event;
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(viii)
Any Lien on any asset securing Indebtedness incurred or
assume for the purpose of financing not more than Eighty-five percent (85%) of the
cost of acquiring such assets; provid5<Q that such line attaches to such asset
concurrently with or within ninety (90) days after the acquisition thereof;
(ix)
Any Lien on any asset of any corporation existing at the time
such corporation is merged into or consolidated with the corporation or a subsidiary,
if such Lien was not created in contemplation of such event;

Any Lien existing on any asset prior to the acquisition thereof
(x)
by the corporation or a Subsidiary, if such Lien was not created in contemplation of
such acquisition;
(xi)
Any Lien arising out of the refinancing, extension, renewal or
refunding of any Indebtedness secured by any Lien permitted by any of the foregoing
clauses of this Section 4.2.9(c); provided that the amount of such Indebtedness is not
increased and that ·such Indebtedness is not secured by any additional assets; and

(xii) Liens not otherwise permitted by the foregoing clauses of this
Section 4.2.9(c) (including. without limitation, Liens on stock of Subsidiaries,
whether consolidated or unconsolidated) securing Indebtedness in an aggregate
principal amount of any time outstanding not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the
difference between Consolidated Net Worth and the amount of the goodwill of the
corporation.
(d)
Corporate Existence. The corporation will maintain its corporate existence
and will not liquidate, wind up or dissolve itself (or suffer any liquidation or dissolution), or enter
into any transaction of merger or consolidation with any Person (including any Subsidiary) unless
(i) this corporation is the surviving corporation following any such merger or consolidation, and (ii)
the Consolidated Net Worth of the surviving corporation immediately following such merger or
consolidation equals or exceeds the Consolidated Net Worth of this corporation immediately prior
to such merger or consolidation.
(e)
Sale of Assets. The corporation will not, and will not permit any of its
Subsidiaries to, convey, sell, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose of all or any material part of its
business, property or assets, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, except:

(1)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may convey, sell, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose
of investment assets in the ~rdinary course of business;
(2)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise dispose of
Capital Assets or real property if the asset so disposed of is concurrently replaced by a
substantiaUy equivalent asset having a value equal to or greater than the assets disposed o~
(3)
The corporation and is Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise dispose of
obsolete or worn out property in the ordinary course of business;
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(4)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell and lease back any
newIy acquired asset for the purpose of financing the acquisition of such asset and securing
the repayment of Indebtedness, provided that such Indebtedness shall not exceed eighty-five
percent (85%) of the cost of such asset and is otherwise permitted by the covenants
contained in this Article Fourth; and
(5)
The corporation and its Subsidiaries may sell or otherwise dispose of
any of their other assets; provided that any such sale or other disposition is made for the fair
market value of such assets.
(f)
Acquisitions. The corporation will not, and will not permit any of its
Subsidiaries to, acquire by purchase or otherwise all or substantially all the business, property or
fixed assets, or the stock or other evidence of beneficial ownership, of any Person unless,
immediately prior to and after giving effect to such transaction, no violation of any of the covenants
or other provisions contained in this Article Fourth shall have occurred and be continuing or wouId
be caused by such acquisition.
(g)
Transactions with SharehQlders and Affiliates. The corporation will not, and
will not perhlit any of its Subsidiaries to, directly or indirectly, enter into or permit to exist any
transaction (including, without limitation, the purchase, sale, lease, loan or exchange of any property
Of the rendering of any service) with any director or officer or any holder of equity securities of the
corporation, Of with any Affiliate of the corporation or of such director, officer or holder, on terms
that are less favorable to the corporation Of that Subsidiary, as the case may be, than those which
hlight be obtained at the time from Persons who are not such a director, officer, holder or Affiliate;
provided that the foregoing restriction shall not apply to (i) any transaction in effect at the date of
adoption of this Article Fourth by the corporation's shareholders; (ii) any transaction between the
corporation and any of its wholly-owned Subsidiaries or between any of its wholly-owned
Subsidiaries; (iii) compensation (net of amounts contributed or repaid to the corporation or any
Subsidiary or to Lewiston Land Company and contributed or repaid to the corporation or any
Subsidiary), by way of salary or bonus, paid to director or officers of the corporation in an amount,
as to anyone individual, not greater than the greater of $400,000 or the total compensation paid in
ca1endaryear 1986; (iv) compensation paid to any director or officer ofthe corporation in amounts
equal to income tax liability of such director or officer attributable to transactions involving the
corporation, AlA, Inc., AlA Travel Services, Inc., AlA Travel, Inc., Lewiston Land Company,
AlA Bancard Services Corporation or Taylor Brothers Aircraft on or before January 1, 1988 or to
other personal income tax liability of such director or officer for tax years ended before January 1,
1988; or (v) any loan to Of account receivable from an officer, director or stockholder which is
repaid in full at least annually on or before the last day of the fiscal year.
(h)
Consolidated Net Worth. The corporation will not permit Consolidated Net
Worth at any date to be less than the number of shares of Series A Preferred Stock outstanding at
such date multiplied by $10.00 per share.
(i)
Dividend Restriction. The corporation will not, directly or indirectly, declare,
order, make or set apart any sum for payment of any dividend in respect of its Common Stock (other
than a dividend payable solely in shares of Common Stock), except that the corporation may declare
and pay Common Stock dividends in an aggregate amount not exceeding the Dividend Availability
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Amount.
(j)
DebtlEquity Ratio. Neither the corporation nor any Subsidiary will incur any
new Indebtedness (other than Indebtedness permitted by Section 4.2.9(c)(xi) of this Article Fourth)
if, at the time of incurring such Indebtedness, the ratio of Consolidated Long Tenn Debt to
Consolidated Net Worth exceeds, or such additional Indebtedness would cause such ratio to.exceed,
3.6 to 1.0.

(k)
Debt Service CQverage. Neither the corporation nor any Subsidiary will incur
any new Indebtedness (other than Indebtedness permitted by Section 4.2.9(c)(xi) of this Article
Fourth) it: at the time .of incurring such Indebtedness, the ratio of (i) Consolidated Net Income plus
depreciation and amortization expenses plus compensation contributed or repaid to the corporation,
any Subsidiary, Lewiston Land Company or AlA Travel Services, Inc. during the immediately
preceding fiscal year of the corporation, divided by (li) current maturities of Long Tenn Debt is, or
such additional Indebtedness would cause such ratio to be, less than .8 to 1.0.
4.2.10 Definitions. For the purpose of Section 4.2.9 of this Article Fourth, the
following terms shall have the following meanings:
"Affiliate", as applied to any Person, shall mean any other Person directly or
indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, that Person. For the purposes
of this definition, "control" (including, with correlative meanings, the terms "controlling",
"controlled by" and "under common control with"), as applied to any Person, means the possession,
directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies
of that Person, whether through the ownership of voting securities or by contract or otherwise.
"Capital Asset" shall mean, as at any date of detennination, those assets of a Person
that would, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied, be
classified as plant, property or equipment on the balance sheet of that Person.
"Consolidated Long Term Debt" shall mean, as at any date of determination, the
tOtal of all Long Term Debt of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis
determined in accordance with generally accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for
which GAAP financial statements are not prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently
applied.
"Consolidated Net Worth" shall mean, as at any date of determination, the sum of
(a) the capital stock and additional paid-in capital, (b) plus retained earnings (or minus accumulated
deficit) of the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis, determined in conformity
with generally accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for which GAAP financial
statements are not prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently applied.
"Consolidated Net Income" for any period, shall mean the net income (or loss) of
the corporation and its Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis determined in conformity with generally
accepted (or, in the case of an insurance company for which GAAP financial statements are not
prepared, statutory) accounting principles consistently applied.
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"Dividend Availability Amount" shall mean, as at any date of detennination, an
amount equal to flfty percent (50%) of Consolidated Net Income for the period (taken as single
accounting period) commencing January 31, 1987 and ending on the last day of the fiscal quarter
immediately preceding such date of determination.
"Indebtedness" as applied to any person, means (a) all indebtedness for borrowed
money, (b) that portion of obligations with respect to finance leases which is capitalized on a
balance sheet in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, consistently applied, (c)
notes payable and drafts accepted representing extensions of credit whether or not representing
obligations for borrowed money, (d) any obligation owed for all or any part of the deferred purchase
price of property or services which purchase price is (i) due more than six (6) months from the date
of incurrence of the obligation in respect thereof, or (ii) evidenced by a note or similar written
instrument, and (e) all indebtedness secured by any Lien or vendor's interest under any conditional
sale Of other title retention agreement existing on any property or asset owned or held by that Person
regardless of whether the indebtedness secured thereby shall have been assumed by that Person or
is non-recourse to the credit of that Person; provided, however, that "Indebtedness" shall not include
policy claims, potiey reserves or mandatory securities valuation reserves of a regulated insurance
company; and further provided that "Indebtedness" shall not include indebtedness of the corporation
to any Subsidiary.
"Lien II shall me'an any lien, mortgage, pledge, security interest, charge or
encumbrance of any kind (mcluding any conditional sale or other title retention agreement, any lease
in the nature thereof, and any agreement to give a security interest).
"Long Term Debt", as applied to any Person, shall mean all Indebtedness of that
Person which by its terms or by the terms of any instrument or agreement relating thereto matures
more than one year, or is directly renewable or extendable at the option of the debtor to a date more
than one year (including an option of the debtor under a revolving credit or similar agreement
obligating the lenders to extend credit over a period of one year or more), from the date of creation
thereof, but excluding any payments due under the terms thereof within twelve (12) months of any
date of determination.
"Person" shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust,
unincorporated organization or any other jurisdictional entity, or a foreign state or any agency or
political subdivision thereof.
"Subsidiary" shall mean any corporation of which at least a majority of the
outstanding stock having by the terms thereof ordinary voting power to elect a majority of the board
of directors of such corporation (irrespective of whether or not at the time stock of any other class
or classes of such corporation shall have or might have voting power by reason ofthe happening of
any contingency) is at the time directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the corporation or one
or more of its Subsidiaries or by the corporation and one or more of its Subsidiaries.
4.2.11 Conversion Right. The holders ofthe Series A Preferred Stock shall have
the following conversion right ("Conversion Right"):
(a)

Right to Convert. Each share of Series A Preferred Stock shall be convertible,
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at the option of the holder thereof, at any time prior to the date on which notice of redemption is
given under Section 4.2.3 or Section 4.2.4, at the office of the corporation or any transfer agent for
the Series A Preferred Stock or Common Stock, into one fully paid and nonassessable share of
Common Stock.
(b)
Mechanics of Conversion. Before any holder of Series A Preferred Stock
shall be entitled to convert such stock into shares of Common Stock, he shall surrender the
certificate or certificates for such Preferred Stock, duly endorsed, at the office of the corporation or
any transfer agent for the Common Stock, and shall give written notice to the corporation at such
office that he elects to convert such Preferred Stock and shall state therein the number of shares of
Series A Preferred Stock being converted. Thereupon the corporation shall promptly issue and
deliver at such office to such holder of a certificate or certificates for the number of shares of
Cornmon Stock to which he shall be entitled.
Such conversion shall be deemed to have been made immediately prior to the close
of business on the date of such surrender of the shares of Series A Stock to be converted (the
"Conversion Date")~ and the person or persons entitled to receive the shares of Common Stock
issuable upon such conversion shall be treated for all purposes as the record holder or holders of
such shares of Common Stock on such date.
(c)
Fractional Shares. No fractional share of Common Stock shall be issued upon
conversion of Series A Stock. In lieu of any fractional shares to which the holder would otherwise
be entitled, the corporation shall pay cash equal to the product of such fraction multiplied by the fair
market value of one share of the corporation's Common Stock on the Conversion Date, such value
to be determined in good faith by the Board of Directors.
(d)
Reservation of Stock Issuable Upon Conversion. The corporation shall at all
times reserve and keep available out of its authorized but unissued shares of Common Stock, solely
for the purpose of effecting the conversion of the shares of the Series A Stock, such number of its
shares of Common Stock as shall from time to time be sufficient to effect the conversion of all
outstanding shares of the Series A Preferred Stock; and if at any time the number of authorized but
unissued shares of Common Stock shall not be sufficient to effect the conversion of all then
outstanding shares of the Series A Preferred Stock, the corporation will take such corporate action
as may, in the opinion of its counsel, be necessary to increase its authorized but unissued shares of
Common Stock to such number of shares as shall be sufficient for such purpose.
(e)
Termination of Redemption Right. Upon exercise of the Conversion Right
under this Section 4.2.11, all rights of a holder of Series A Stock to require redemption of such
stock under Section 4.2.3 shall automatically be terminated; and no holder of Common Stock
acquired upon conversion of Series A Preferred Stock shaH have any right of redemption.
4.2.12 Modification of Rights and Preferences. The rights and preferences hereby
conferred on the Series A Preferred Stock shall not be changed, altered or revoked without the
consent of the holders of the majority of the Series A Preferred Stock outstanding at the time.

4.3

Series C Preferred Stock.
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4.3.1 General. Each share of Series C Preferred Stock shall have the relative
rights, preferences and limitations set forth in this Section 4.3 of Article Fourth.
4.3.2 Restricted Voting Rights. The holders of the Series C Preferred Stock shall
have no right (except as required by law) to receive notice of or to vote on any matter (including,
without limitation, the election of directors of the corporation) at any regular or special meeting of
stockholders of the corporation, except that the holders of a majority of the shares of Series C
Preferred Stock shall have the right, voting separately as a class, to elect one director to the Board
of Directors ofthe corporation.
4.3.3 Cumulative Dividend Preference The Series C Preferred Stock shall be
entitled to receive, when and as declared by the corporation's Board of Directors, cash dividends at
the per annum rate of 10% of the Liquidation Rate (as defined in Section 4.3.4), cumulative, payable
quarterly at March 31, June 30, September 30 and December 31 of each calendar year out of any
funds legally available for the payment of dividends, and in preference to any dividends upon the
Common Stock. The dividends on the Series C Preferred Stock shall be cumulative, whether or not
declared, so that, if for any period such dividend shall not be paid, the right to such dividend shall
accumulate as against the Common Stock; and all arrears so accumulated shall be paid before any
dividends shall be declared or paid upon the Common Stock. No dividends shall be declared or paid
on the Series C Preferred Stock if the redemption payments due to the holders of the Series A
Preferred Stock under Section 4.2. of this Article Fourth are in arrears. No dividend shall be
declared or paid upon the Common Stock nor shall any Common Stock be purchased or otherwise
acquired by the corporation for value (other than payment of amounts due to Reed J. Taylor for
redemption of his Common Stock), unless all dividends on the Series C Preferred Stock for aU past
period shall have been paid or shall have been declared and a sum sufficient for the payment thereof
set apart for payment.
4.3.4 Liquidation Preference. In the event of any liquidation, dissolution or
winding-up of the corporation, whether voluntary or involuntary, before any other distribution or
payment is made to the holders of Common Stock or any other series of Preferred Stock (except the
corporation's Series A Preferred Stock), the holders of the Series C Preferred Stock shall be entitled
to receive, out of the assets of the corporation legally available therefor, a liquidation payment in
the amount of$10.00 cash per share of Series C Preferred Stock ("Liquidation Rate"), plus a further
amount equal to the dividends accumulated and unpaid thereon to the date of such liquidation
payment. 1£ upon any liquidation, dissolution or winding up ofthe corporation, the assets available
for distribution are insufficient to pay to the holders of all outstanding Series C Preferred Stock the
full amount of the Liquidation Rate and all accumulated but unpaid dividends, the holders of the
Series C Preferred Stock shall share pro rata in any such distribution of assets. Such rights of the
holders of the Series C Preferred Stock shall be subordinate only to the right of the holder of the
Series A Preferred Stock to be paid the redemption price of such stock in full, together with accrued
interest, in accordance with Section 4.2 of this Article Fourth. After payment to the holders of the
Series C Preferred Stock of the full preferential amounts hereinabove provided, the holders of the
Series C Preferred Stock as such shall have no right or claim to any of the remaining assets of the
corporation either upon any distribution of such assets or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding
up; and the remaining assets to be distributed, if any, upon a distribution of such assets or upon
dissolution, liquidation or winding up, may be distributed among the holders of the Common Stock.
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4.3.~

Redemption t

(a) Mandatory R~emption by Corporation. Subject to the conversion rights
provided in Section 4.3.6 of Article Fourth, the Series C Preferred Stock shall be called for
redemption by the corporation upon payment of the aggregate Redemption Rate from legally
available funds upon the dosing of the earliest of the following events ("Equity Offering"):
(i)
an offering of the corporation's securities conducted pursuant to the
registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (" 1933 Act") in which gross proceeds
of at least $5,000,000 are raised;
(ii)
an offering of the corporation's securities pursuant to exemptions from
registration under the 1933 Act in which gross proceeds of at least $5,000,000 are raised; or

(iii)
an offering of any securities convertible into corporation's Co'mmon Stock
that are sold in an offering that conforms to the parameters of subparagraph (i) or (ii) above.
The redemption price for each share of Series C Preferred Stock ("Redemption Price lt ) shall be the
"Redemption Rate" equal to 100% of the Liquidation Rate if such redemption occurs within two (2)
years from the issuance of the first shares of Series C Preferred Stock. After such two year period,
an amount equal to 5% of the Liquidation Rate will be added to the Redemption Rate immediately
and each 180 days thereafter until all outstanding shares of the Series C Preferred Stock are fully
redeemed, viz:
'

Time from Original Issuance

Percentage of Liquidation Rate

Within two years

100%

After two years
but
before two years plus 181 days

105%

After two years plus 180 days but
before two years plus 361 days

110%

After two years plus 360 days
but
before two years plus 541 days

115%

...

. ..

Notice of such can for redemption, specifYing the anticipated date of closing of the Equity Offering,
shall be mailed to each record holder of Series C Preferred Stock as soon as practicable before such
closing date. The redemption date for mandatory redemption of the Series C Preferred Stock shall
be the actual closing date ofthe Equity Offering. Mandatory redemption of the Series C Preferred
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Stock under this Section 4.3.5 of Article Fourth shall automatically be cancelled upon determination
by corporation's board of directors that the Equity Offering will not be consummated for any reason.

(b) Voluntary Redemption byCQrporation. The Series C Preferred Stock may be
called for redemption by the corporation, in whole or in part, upon payment of the Redemption Price
from legally available funds at any time prior to the closing of an Equity Offering. Notice of such
call for redemption, specifYing the redemption date not less than thirty days from the date such
notice is mailed and the number or percentage of outstanding shares of Series C Preferred Stock to
be redeemed, shall be mailed to each record holder of Series C Preferred Stock. If fewer than all
shares of Series C Preferred Stock are to be redeemed, the shares shall be redeemed prorata from
the holders thereof; and, upon request of the corporation, certificates evidencing shares of Series C
Preferred Stock including redeemed shares shall be surrendered to and reissued by the corporation
in reduced amount to reflect any and all partial redemptions of such shares prior to such request.

(c) Redemption Procedwe and Effect.
The corporation shall deposit, on or before the redemption date specified in the notice of
redemption, the aggregate Redemption Price of the shares of Series C Preferred Stock to be
redeemed with a bank or trust company specified in the notice, payable on the redemption date in
the amounts and to the respective orders of the holders of the shares of Series C Preferred Stock to
be redeemed, on endorsement to the corporation as may be required and upon surrender of the
certificates for such shares. Unless the corporation fails to pay the Redemption Price on or before
the redemption date, the shares of Series C Preferred Stock subject to such redemption shall be
deemed to have been redeemed, and shall be deemed no longer to be outstanding, from and after the
redemption date set forth in the notice of redemption. On or after the redemption date. subject only
to payment of the redemption price, Series C Preferred Stock so called for redemption shall cease
to be entitled to any interest or right in the corporation; and holders of such Series C Preferred Stock
shall thereafter cease to be shareholders and shall be entitled only to payment ofthe amount of the
redemption price, without interest, upon surrender of the certificates evidencing such stock.
4.3.6 Conversion of Series C Preferred Stock. Subject to the provisions of Section

4.3.7, each holder of Series C Preferred Stock shall have the right, exercisable beginning at the
earlier of the date of receipt of notice of mandatory redemption of the Series C Preferred Stock
pursuant to Section 4.3.5(a) or two years after the first issuance of Series C Preferred Stock and
ending oil the closing date of an Equity Offering, to convert Series C Preferred Stock into Common
Stock at the Conversion Rate determined as foHows: Each share of Series C Preferred Stock shall
be convertible into that number of shares of Common Stock which equals .0000693% of the
Common Stock on a fully diluted basis at the effective date of exercise, including by way of
inclusion and without limiting the foregoing, any conversion or exercise rights contained in any
Preferred Stock, options, warrants, or other rights to Common Stock, granted by the corporation in
any form or manner, as if :fully exercised at the effective date of exercise. Any holder of Series C
Preferred Stock who exercises this conversion right prior to the closing date of an Equity Offering
sharI be protected against dilution in the event of any Common Stock issuance or other transaction
which occurs prior to an Equity Offering and increases the number of outstanding shares of
Common Stock on a fully diluted basis: For each share of Series C Preferred Stock converted prior
to an Equity Offering, the Company shall issue to the holder thereof such number of additional
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shares of Common Stock as necessary to maintain, at all times prior to an Equity Offering, such
holder's 0.0000693% interest in Company's outstanding Common Stock on a fully diluted basis.
Subject to the provisions of Section 4.3.7) this conversion right shall be exercisable
by any holder of Series C Preferred Stock as to all or any number of the shares of Series C Preferred
Stock owned of record by such holder and shall be exercised by giving the corporation written notice
of the exercise of such right) specifying the number of shares of Series C Preferred Stock to be
converted and the effective date of such conversion, provided that the effective date of the
conversion shall not be later than the closing date of an Equity Offering.
4.3.7 Re~ulatory Limitation on Conversion Ri~ht. Notwithstanding any other
provision of Section 4.3.6, the right to convert the Series C Preferred Stock into Common Stock of
the Company shaH be subject to receipt of prior approval by all regulatory authorities with
jurisdiction over the acquisition of such Common Stock. Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing limitation, the Holder shall not be permitted to convert Series C Preferred Stock into
Common Stock if and to the extent that, after such exercise, the Holder would, directly or indirectly
(or by exercise of any unrestricted right to convert into or to acquire Company's voting securities
or otherwise) be in "control" of an insurer within the meaning of any applicable state insurance
holding company act, unless and until such change of "control" has been approved by all applicable
state insurance regulators under their respective insurance holding company acts. If the time for
exercise of any conversion rights shall expire or be scheduled to expire within two weeks of any
fmal regulatory approval, then the applicable time periods to exercise any such conversion rights
shall be extended for such a period of time equal to the period oftime from delivery of notice of
exercise of any rights until the corporation notifies such rights holders of all applicable regulatory
approvals.
4.4
Common Stock. Holders of the Common Stock are entitled to one vote per share
on all matters to be voted on by stockholders, including the election of directors. Common
. Stockholders are not entitled to vote their shares cumulatively in the election of directors. Holders
of Common Stock of the corporation shall be entitled to elect all of the directors of the corporation
other than the director appointed by the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock and the director
elected by the holders of Series C Preferred Stock. The holders of any series of Preferred Stock of
the corporation have a preference over the holders of Common Stock of the corporation on the assets
of the corporation legally available for distribution to stockholders in the event of any liquidation,
dissolution, or winding up of the affairs of the corporation. In the· event of any liquidation,
dissolution or winding up of the affairs of the corporation, holders of the Common Stock will share
ratably iIi any assets ofthe corporation legally available for distribution to holders of Common Stock
after satisfYing the liquidation preferences of the Series A and Series C Preferred Stock. Holders
of Series C Preferred Stock have a preference over the holders of Common Stock as to the payment
of dividends. Holders of Common Stock have rights) share for share, to receive dividends if and
when declared by the Board of Directors out of funds legally available therefor, after paying
preferred dividends to the holders of Series C Preferred Stock.

FIFTH
Holders of any class or series of corporation's stock shall not have a preemptive right to
acquire unissued or treasury shares of any class or series or securities convertible into such shares
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or carrying a right to subscribe to or acquire such shares, except as provided in the Idaho Business
Corporation Act.

SIXTH
The location of the initial registered office of the corporation is One Lewis Clark Plaza,
Lewiston, Idaho 83501; and the name of its initial registered agent at such address is R. Jolm Taylor.

SEVENm
The number of directors constituting the initial Board of Directors is fouf, and the names and
addresses of the persons who are to serve until the first annual meeting of the shareholders and until
their successors are elected and qualified are:

Address
Reed 1. Taylor

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston ID 83501

R. John Taylor

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston ID 83501

Raymond R. Heilman

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston ID 83501

Mary K. Frost

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston ID 83501

EIGHTH
The name and address of the incorporator is as follows:
Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box 538
Lewiston ID 83501

NINTH
The Board of Directors is expressly authorized to alter, amend or repeal the Bylaws of the
corporation and to adopt new Bylaws, subject to repeal or change by a majority vote of the
shareholders.

TENTH
Shareholders entitled under Article Fourth to vote in the election of directors of the
corporation shall not be entitled to vote their shares cumulatively in the election of directors of the
corporation.
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ELEVENm
A director of this corporation shall not be personally liable to this corporation or its
shareholders for monetary damages for breach offiduciary duty as a director, except for liability (a)
for any breach of the director's duty ofloyalty to this corporation or its shareholders, (b) for acts or
omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law,
( c) under Idaho Code §30-1-48, or (d) for any transaction from which the director derived an
improper personal benefit. If the Idaho Business Corporation Act is amended to authorize corporate
action further eliminating or limiting the personal liability of directors, then the liability of a director
of this corporation shall be eliminated or limited to the fullest extent permitted by the Idaho Business
Corporation Act, as so amended. Any repeal or modification of this Article Eleventh by the
shareholders ofthe corporation shall not adversely affect any right or protection of a director of the
corporation existing at the time of such repeal or modification. II

THIRD: The number of shares of the corporation outstanding at the time of such adoption
was 1,079,520 shares of Common Stock, 170,562 shares of Series A Stated Value Preferred Stock,

and 185,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock; and the number of shares entitled to vote thereon
was 1,079,520 shares of Common Stock and 185,000 shares of Series C Preferred Stock.
FOURTH: The designation and number of outstanding shares of each class entitled to vote

thereon as a class were as foHows:
Class

Number of Shares
1,079,520

Common

185,000

Series C Preferred

FIFTH: The following table sets forth the number of shares of Common Stock and the
number of shares of Series C Preferred Stock voted for and against such amendment:
Number of Shares
Against

Class
Common

865,093.5

Series C Preferred
DATED this

r

-f

165,000

48.153.5
-0-

day of May, 1996.
AlAS
By~~~~~~~~~~__

Daniel L. Spickler,
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dispose of. and/or /UJnvey ro~ and per8onol. Proloiorty altuoto in ot'" oute:ido (It
thll Stat!) of IdAho.

or

(18) Genal'ally to do 1111 thtn\rli nelltlElsory 01' oonvonicmt whioh are
con~aoted wtth !ho S'ot'laril} "bua!nolul abOVIl tMntlonad I which

ineldrmtel to or

11 nllturl\-l pt)t"91)n rni~ht Or COUld ,do.
(1Q) Additfdnol to tho toroaoing t . to hAVO all or tho pOwor.1l or co~orat1on
ti%'ovided by the .w.WD of t.h.(I StlltQ of ldilho I and l?lll."tiauio.rly 1\11~! tho r1a'ht.il
and pow()ra $<!t torth in Idaho Code :10-114, and aU laws Ilmandtltory CU'ld BUP1I1o-

.mentnI

thOl."Qto.

B:dfltor'lt;IE
The oorporudon I!Iha..l1 hl1'v6 a perpetual oxwtanco.

LOQQtlon

be at 418 WeisS"':rbor Building. Lllwtl>tDn. lde.ho 33501. i~ the County' of Nu PCrc~,

Sti\.til of Idaho. Brllnah Qfttcos Or plQOelil of bllsim:uu, may be IQ(mtod Or (nrt.o.bliahCld
by tho cOl:pOrntlon lIt such OtiH,Il' l?la()ol'S within Or without the Stall!!

ot Idaho as

A.RTtcL8 F1'VB

Ttla' capitd stock ot thio corporation

IIh~

aOflllillt o! 100 .000

f.lhl\t"li~

of clipitru stock I eamtt beiQIiI' common wring &'took. at f1.00. par ShllrQ pAr vo..lUIl.

I
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Troxell

•

tor

II.

totnl
oapiWiUlt1on of $100 .000 .00.
,

~4Ch ;nllrc

of COM(non stOck chnll hnva

one: full vote lIt thO' stO()l<I'I0Idol's' me(ltinl,ru of tho ool'porll.tiQIl.
Such shtl.l,"es oC stQQk al\1I11 have the (oIIowing rOlltrio.tiom'l and'll,lo1i('iOIl"

(a) Tho ahaM'lfl OCthCl corpQ~aUon llhllIl not bo lIold 01' tr!l.n1lCol'l'od by
my holder "thoI:'¢01 without tho w:z.oittoll conscnt of nil common atookholdClrll. unlOSIi
the lIamo shall hav!) l1l"'st boon oft'ored (or 1!.1I1Cl in wrltinll to the oor-poratlon llnd
I:ICll;lond. to each
thD other 69mmon lOlto$:holdoa.l!ll of tho corporation lit jI..prloe
that olln ba bonn tidQ obtained from nnothor. rt tha corpOration hila rotused. in
writing'. to purCMOQ Ilmd stock within 30 MYS nttor- the rC$!eipt of Buch watton
0([&1' of /I ale , Or I:llrld period of :SO dllYB hIlS pfUlllod wHnout l100cptllnQQ
suoh
aftor by tho OOl.'pOl'Rtion. then auch Wf'tttcn offet' to SeU chnU bo made) to elloh
C:>lMlon Gtockhaldal' tor II. Uko por1oCl of 30 dara. and, it, tho (ivtJnt such otter hila
not bean ncoep~od. by oither the COrpOl'lltton 01' the other COmmon frtoakholdOl'1l tn
th~ timo QPIJoif'iad, then such ehllroo mAy ba $01d 0)." ttiln!lt'ared by tho holder thQt'aol
to l!tJy person or oorpol'll.t.fon.

or

or

(b) !n tho Qase ot'tllo death ot MY t!tot;:lI;holdllt' th a cc.!l.·pOl'lltion nhll.H
hllvQ th., f.lr.,t Imd prior f'ight tol' II I?ol"locl ot un dllYs from tho dabt of donth of
stdd utOckholdol' in whiQh t¢ I:lurohal:lc aaid srock !It thb book vA1UO ot'tlio corpot'ation
,,:hcllll'tl by the tl.mmciol IIt11tomont or the QOrpor!l.tion prcplU'od by th.Q l'oft't111l.J:'

as

ACCOtlntMt of th.; cOrpo:r-ation I'\S ot tho dllta or dOll1:h or ilia atoo\d1(1lder Or tho
priCe tl:\at Ute admfuistrator or o:xocuto:r ¢f th" dacceed /ltoakholdol" qu.n bOfill
I' tide oot:run from lU'lotl'\4t". whichovo.l.' mothod or val.nAtiQn tho dOQocaed hnim mny
olltct.

11'1 till:! event llIo.l!I corpol"ution

r~ll.l

ot' l'at\lslIs to purah.lu7o aaid atoQk

",{thin said UO days the'n ellch. COlnlllOll. /rtl.:lr;:kl'101der BIlI.llI have 60 dllya, tQ pl.iI."OI'1(1SQ
$otd (;f.(Ie:lC. In the event /JuQh stook h.1US (j¢t \)Cen Plu'chllllCd by c:dtho,'!:o tho aot;poru.~
tiOtl or nnv othQl' oommOn li,toOkllOldel' in tho timo £lpl)¢Ulod, tl"tan the adminiatrlltol"

or

4~QutQr

Ii hnl'ca

oJ thQ ~tll.te o! the doocill,'led
to IlIl'Y poraon Or Q(t~Ol"l1t1cm.

~tOI)\t:Mld(lrt! 1(IilY'

flel! (It" t'r'unstilt' !laid

.
I

MTrCLE SIX

!-

t -

Ilnd tho numb or or .. haroR of atock

or tho oorpo1'lltlon (or whi(:Ch oach hlltl (!tub·

.iI: ___ _
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\

SCl:!l;)tl:d IU'O OS foLlows:

Nitrile an'l Address:
Riled J. Tllylor, 1034 R.ipon. towillton. [dillie 835111
H. ,John 'fuylQI', o(j9 Iill~ aa Avenue. I..~wit;ton. laa.lw 8:!!'IO !.

lArry ii. Profitt. P, 0, 5538, ..B<;i:!e, Idnho 63705

1'<"

'rho numb«n' 0( dtractol"l1 ¢( thi6 oOL'porntion ShilU 00 110t 10il& th(m
throe Q);"1l1oi'e than seven, ~xoept that

in

the qy"nt liB or

tile

·Q:hIl.I'CG

or tho

corporlltlon Bl:'O ownQd bcnel'l.duUy liod of recOl'(l by althor onc (l) or two GO
s~ckhQldQ~'S,

tho number uf 4lrllctoP& mil}' 1:>4 lou thl\.l'l fh!.'ec (5). 1;1I.1t nOllaRs

thlll'! (,IO nunlber o( II tookho/dot'S .
of I!:l~(;thm, Wile: lind

pUU)U

The qIJIiH.I'iCn.tioos, LoIil'lIllS of amell., mallner

or maotingll. Ilnd J:!OWQl'lI or directors und their duties,

Th~ Soard ai' Uircctot'$ of thin ':)Ol'P01'll!:iOll ilhnU
ll.uUll)rl~ed

bo.

tl.nd thl))r' ilL'!!

to dotermine tho 1flllu!!) or my proj)Otty or CORsiclcrnUnll Other th(lfl

1,rfI'ICLl':, SICiHT

The Holtj"d or OlrQctOt'a ofU'l:ill COrpol'llt:!on fihnll "live tho powflt' ton(lopt

by~

lilw!!. nl~d the ume muy ba rnOdit'lad a~" «melldad"l)y tnt) HaRt"a or I)!rQ~tol"tl.

"

-6-

..
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•

All. TI OLE NINE

}l'Q..!,REM!'TlV,E R10HTS
Onle!UI otharw}so

dotormln~l;!

by th<'/ bolU'6 of dl.l'oo1oro. no holdQ1." of

stocl{ oC the 1l0l:'pot'ation shllll bo ontitlod

Il.a

U matter of right. to lIUl'Challe

oi' !'lubacriba for any !Jtoak ot ony clQ$o which tho c:orporntion may il!lsue 01." I$QU.
whl!lthl!i:

or not exchll.llgelible (or any

stock or tba {Jo11l01'P-t1on

or nny -tll.wls or

clnlisilli f1nd 'whothor out ot unftHlUo!l .;;n(l.ralOl truthorb;ad by tho IlrticloQ

ot inOO1"'p-

~.

,.~

..

of Clhlll'M ot Qtock of the corporation floquit"¢d by it nftC)'t" UlQ

i~

i~tluo thoreof. Llnd

(

whetnc:t' [BBued for cash. 1noo1' done. pSl,"sonlll proPQrty I oX' root Pt'OPqrty • (Ii"
l.aanOI;! thel!'eot. NOt". unle.lllJ othorwiso dotorminl;ld by tho l)olll'd of dh:ooto,,"o.
llhllli nny holdo1' of 1l..l'I1 ohp-r/J/l (If tho oup:\.tal I:Itack ot the C<>l'porn.tion ho qp,titlr:ld
Oil 11 !'(Ul.ttC1,"

of l'!s'ht. to pU'rehnaQ or ~I\jbscribe {or nny obl1ll'litiOn wh1Cl1

.

thQ corporAtion may iSf\ue ot' sall tl18.t shall bo convo1'dblo into or O¥.onMr{enble
fOr any snares

ot tho

IItock of tha (l't):rpo):"iltlon of My claeo 01' cltlflseB. or to whioh

nnaH be llttnahod Qr ll-ppU.t'tc\1tLnt 1m,! worrn.nty 01' wll1'l'nnll! Qr nny Qt\11lt' imltrumc:mt
or in:ltrumc.ntl! that sholl cantll:r upon tho holdct" 01:' hOiderli' ot such obUgl1tlon tho

stoc.k Or uny OlallS Or clIlSSQII.

Th!) fouow-!n", provisions are het'Qby QIP-'oad to for tho pUrpOIlQ or

reltUtllting th", (!(Induot of tile llfi'iUt'D 0/1:1'10 corporll.t.!(:l!1:

,

-'/-
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(1) With thQ oonsent in writing'. or PUl'GIl!lnt to Q vOto ol tho
of a mlijority of tho Ol1pi.ttU stocK illlll.lUd Il1Id outatnndinB'

h.old~a

and ontItl.Dd to

VQt~,

tho Dil'actors shall havo Quthority to a!Gth" w holD pl"Oporty of thiD corporl1tion.

POIlQ I in any mltni1c:tt.

of

(2) Tha 8toc!l:holdDrIl and DlroctotG ena.U hay!! l;hQ powe!:" to bOld
th~.\' meutinll'r.! and keop the books t documonts E.lnd PQP~"o 0' the
Co)."poration ouWdG or tho Stllte of Idll.)'IO. III auch plncos 11$ mtly
be Cl'01l'l time to tlmt.! designated by tho By-lowe Ol" by l'osolution
of the Stockholdl)).'S, or DireatoI'l'I. excopt ILl! otherwioe 1'QQ uu-e<:l
by the laws ot ldnho.
-

1
I.

(3) /Uly ant:! aU ot the Dil'ccto).'G or the Corpol"P,tion ~ny bQ l.'lIrriovod

at any timo. with ot' without allu8a. by 1:110 boldara at II maiQrity ot
the lJisuld a.nd nutlltMdfl'le- vodnfl8tock 01 the col'pOl'atiC)'l.
(0 1.'he aOlU"d 01 Dtl'oowX"s is e:r;praa~ly lluthoJ.'bad tQ removl,I Ilt
any time. w1~ 0)' without c:aullO I MY atflc(Jl'lS ot tho corpol"o.tion •
!

~.

(5) '!'ha eorpol'lltion upon voto of tha pnrllons then holding n
m~jo.r.lty 0/ the iGII\.l.od nnd outotandin&" voting (ftock or this carporlltion

i

sholl ntl-Vtt the l'ig'ht at thalr aIOQtlOn to disllolvo tho ¢Otporli.uon and
wlnd up fu buainel!ll'l diwrlil Wid distributo It II dQSota
Ilnd the proceadlil thoroQl nmong ita E1tocl<holdOl'$ U$ they may oflvarally b~ entitled to l'cCf.li vo 0)0 lIamo ll.O nfpJ."OIliUd.

SlIllitll III1GOt:B,

CO) Tho aotlrd of Otroctorlil IIhll1ll1tl'ViI the o.uthol"ity to C4utho.l."b'l:!
the f.asuMao ot any prov.f.ol.JS},Y unls/tucd stoak llutho~!1ied by thooo
a.rtll:lea without thQ OOWIont of oro¢kholders .

IN WLtNESS WHSREOF. tho (JlIid incorporlltot'li

their hllnd; and I!IQll.lB Md t:lxecuted tho lorogoini At'tiCJlolI

f:rfpliclito thi!l

;? 'b*-

day

ot

dA N«MY...
'J

hnv~

.

hQl'ounto ilot

Qr [ncorpol."llt!on

in

11)71.

:ffWL;-/

.A. Q ...

7

-8-
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:a;f=.!. .. ~ ~·m)

ST.A.1'.S Of'

• till

COUIit'y

Qf.

a ...e.-., ..)

I)n this ..;redBy or J.?,,"r.,;. .~( ....... '

--,'

,-

lll77. beforo mo, the und~r~

ulgooo(1, a Nota:ry f'ulHlc l/'l o.nd for tho Sto.tQ oC IdahO pOr$onlllly npDQllrod
LARRY S. PROPITT known to rill) to bo thc pcrtlon whose

nl1rn~

ill GUbsorlbod

to tJl4 wi.thin alia foregoina- inlltrum(tnt lind lleknowlOd[fod to mil that he lIxeculod

.

the Ume.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. 1 ,,00VI) I:!cl'eunto aot my hn.~d and ll1t'bccd my

STAtE OF LD/l,l-{O
: Il.G

C01.l-nt;r of N'r,z P41'ClQ
On this

£

)

dllY or

..JA tJIJ.l\:i';l._.. __ 11'177. b~orQ rna

linOl)rsl{!rtQi;l, a Notlll'}l' PubUa In Ilm') for

thQ

IU'I)

th"

Stllto of Idaho, pCr:lonally nppcU"od

REf:D J. TAYLOR ttn(l·R. JOHN.TAYLOR, known 10
nlll1lt)~

f

rTiQ

to

l)~

the pal'l!ioml whoso

,pblJOlc'fbed to the within and CoraQ'oing 'nlil~I"l4mt lind ftcknowlndS't)(i

to me thllt they Qxec.:utod tho &'nml'j.

IN WrTNESS WHEREOF, I hav/) hOl"ot.lnto set my hand and rUl'ixod my
oftjcif1l seal tho day md yea~ htllt'einllbOV'!, a

-9-
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CERTIFICAT.E OF JNCORPORA'l'ION
T,

!'JI7."Z T.

,-,

ClJNA'RRUSA., 6.aeW'Y of Btata 01 the StAU at Idaho, IUId Ie,raI ou.to-

;

dJmI of tho DDI'DOnUon mlotda at tho Btat. of Iuho, do hareb7 oert1f1 that tho DrlJlnaJ of
til. utfc.la of IIIco1JHll1ltJon at
A • .r•.\.

,rw.

cia,
ot

.7A1:1UUV

;rJ;~.d

011

A..D.. 0111 TboUM1III Nint! BIlndn4

~t'.1..Z.IIIot

RMOI'd

at

Do.DIutla Col'JlOntJDn.,

Ma.bD, and tlI .. tho ~ ariida ecmtaJn til••tatemont at facti roqulTOd 117

I

rultT8ER

ClCaTlB'Y,

nat

md

-9'OIttU-.cwmJ

UI. panCll\l lIlI.cuttDr th. artIaI..

Qf the StAte 01 .
8oct1011

~d ~

a0-10l,

.._lat..

aDd .~ an hlm1 CIIUtlliltAld • CIOJ:POr&t!OJl, b¥ tha nama h~onll at.tH, tor

.

H~tuAl Itd~~m

tho date hereof. wIth Ita nailtlHd offIc. In till. Bta'- locate4 at

r.-Jrton,.rdah:t

in till Coanl;y

ot

60, ~

IN '.I'Ji.lS'l'DrlONY WlmRlCOr, 1 ban

h~J;o

Nt JIU' iw\d and IIftIzad the Great Seal. ~ dIG

stat... .000. at &IIa OI~, tll. CepftaJ af Idaho,
th'I.

JJ.rt

LD.. I.a 77 •

Pete T. CenattUsa

~.-,
':1:

DgmcsUc
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~

l'

r ~ILMED
"',~

'80 /"

rlo ,

AUG 14 1981 ROLL 4 8 7'
..
(.

j,
r

~.

~"..

,"

t..S

I \(;~R1JFJCA TE OF APl'OINTM!NT
t!lliiRJi:GISTEREO AGENT

"

":'
4ft/ /t)
ALi::4V1Jf}j~~
.. tHESE PRESil.'lTS:
Tliat
41t,f9,C.· dJT.""
.

KNOW

&-=-

l:!:

1,1 ,.'

"

an Idaho corporation, pursUAnt to IklctiOI1 30.]·12, Id.... o Code, and by authority of its Boord of Directors, docs
R. John Taylor

hC::i'Clbynppoml - ,-----.....:;;..::..-----::-:~_.__._..o:_-_:_'"_._-........-.,--------.-(HAIIUI 0( RaalJ\lIrn<I

301 0 ~treet, P.O. Box 1444

of

AIOIlt)

__L_e_w_is_t_o_n...,___6~3~5_0_1_ _ _ • Idnho

("RIC' Idd_.)

Q:J

its

(tic,)

Rogistered Agent in the Stat/:! of IdahO, up(m whom proces!! issued by authority of or under nny In wcfthc Stato of
Idaho mAY be served.
"
IN WITNESS WflER£OF the corporntion bllS caul/od thil:! certificate to be o~outed rmd vcrifllXi by its

PI'l::3idcnt (or Vice-President) on thi!l_.____2.;..2_ _ _~_ _ dny of '

Fepruary

,J9.!L...

A.I.A." Inc.

,

.
SLATE OF

_-=I;.;;:;Q~lt.-h(l;::..,~----l

P
County of .....
, _N_e_z_'_e_r_ce
_ _ _ __

Su"","b<d DOd 'worn 10 bd'"", me ,hI.

I

)

,1

•••

<Ziffd--..t- ,dayof

~

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, J have hl:tcunto /let my hand Ilnd
Il~~ my ~ar.
~ ,
.

: ,~ttzf,
(Tille)

.

=::

ARA 4-'11'1

LIlLIS
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Tn'

wleB Troxell

.,"

~

,.

• No

54973

i

AIflch. of h'corp1llnlflon.
of

..

.

Zii(lilt6li

is'

Piau of b."h'.,."...

.

'1~ (J{)
CapJtal Stock .
.
•••

Exl.o."...

STATE of .PAHO
Depprfr.nent of Stet.

BoIM. 'cksho

Appr'ovad, fff.,d Qftd admlHed 10 the

rDGon:b of articles of Iru:or'Paroatlcm
of iho 'State oflMf+o and certfR«J"
1.lued IftI, it.Im.UU1I'
"

day t)i~4-.
1

M.
s:

Ie

R;Q5 PAID

19_

1':;

o'clock

at

:

=

71.00
$ .1.40

filling
·Recordlng
CArt. Copy
C$rtlncal9
Licon" TQl(

-:'

~~:~ :)--

~QlJ.-••

J1.~

TOTAL

J,Z:I.J.()

$_ __

Peto T. Cenarru.sa

....J3o..Jro.,..Q" .

r

C(1~RAi'IQ

,..tJ~ '1>11

a.uv

t:iifli(

f,

4OY1

~

...0. ~ 114
.r:..rj~ ... r~
I
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Pursuant to the provisiogs of Sections 30.1-59 and 30-1 ~6 ( of the Idaho
B~slness

Corpo!ation Act, the undersigned corporation adopts the following

Articles of Amendment to its Articles of Incorporation. ,

FIRST: The name of the corporation is A.loA., INC.

SECOND:

Effective on January
,

..£,

1988, the sole shareholder of the

'

corporlltion adopted and approved the following am.endments, to the Articles of
Incorp,oration

of

A.I.A., Inc., pursuant· to which new Articles Eleventh and

Twelfth were added to tho original Articles of Incorporation of A.LA., Inc. as

rued on January 31, 1977:

"'ELBYEWH
• At. ea.ch meeting of shareholders, every sharebolder of record of tbe
corporation sh.lin be entitled .to One vote for each share of common stock
registered In his name on the books of the corporation. Sharebolders shall not
be entitled to vote their shares cumulativelY in the election of directors of the

oorporation.

TWELFI'H
A director of this corporation shaH not be petsonaHy lia.ble: to this
corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a dIrector, except for lIability (a) for any breach of the director's duty
of loyalty to thls corporation or its shareholders. (b) for acts or omissions not
in good faith o.r which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of
law, (c) under Section 30.l-48 J Idaho Code,- or (d) for any transactIon from
which the director derived an Improper personal beneflL If the, Idaho BusIness
Corporation Act Is amended to authorize corporllte action further eUminating or
IirnJting the personal Uability of directors, then the Ha.b1llty of a dIrector of this
corporation shaU be eliminated or nmited to the fullest extent permitted by the
Idaho Business Corporation Act, as so amended. Any repeal or mo~iificatlon of
thJs Article Twelfth by tQe shatehoIder$ of the cot:poratton shall not adversely
~ffect any right or protection of a director of the corporation existing at the

tIme of such repeal or modification.'"

,

,
.~.
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THIRD:

The number of shares of the corporation outstanding· at the time

of such adoption wa.s 3500; and the number of shares entitled to vote thereon
was 3500.
. FOURTH:

~ach

The designation and number of outstanding shares of

class

entitled to vote thereon a:s a class were as follows:
~lass:

3500

Common

FIFTH: The number of shares voted for such amendment

w~s

3500; and the

I-

t

:Qumber of shares voted against such amendment was O.

DATED

thls4?-~ay of January, 1988~
A.I.A., Inc.

BY~~
ee. Ta;¥iOr,
en

ATTEST:

VERlEI~[ON

STATE OF IDAHO)
:S5.

County of Nez Perce )

~

IJ ~1tili,*dJ,. U

• a Notary Public t do hereby ce(tif'y that on this
anuary, 1988, personally appeared before mc REED Jy TAYLOR,
w Ot· emg by me first duly sworn, decJared that he is the Presidcrlt of A.l.A. t
Inc. that he signed the foregoing document as President of tho corpor:ati~nt; and
that the statemqnts contained therein are tru
_ :\ .'
,

day

0

."

',t
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COLpo~~tion

Idaho Business

following A-rticlea

o~

the!! undersigned corpo-rat..ion adopt.s tha

Act.

Amondment to its

A~ticles

of Incorpo'ration.

FIRST: 1'ho n~ of the corporation ;la A4'I.A.,
E£fao:tiva on May S.

S}ItONlh

Troxell

corporation adopted and approvod the
o£ l:ncorporat:Lon of A.I.A., Inc.,

mc.

1990, thIS sale shareholder of tha
£o~lowin8

,p'U~s'Uant

amendment to the

~ticles

to which Article One of the

originnl Articles of Incorpol;'ation of A. LA." Inc. as rilad on January 31,
1977. shall read

B$

follows:

The nama of the
~:

co~potation.shall

hP AIA INSunANCE, INC.

The numbe-r of shares of the

co~oration out~tQnding

at the

t"imo of such adoption was J t 500; and tho numbe't' of shares entitled to voto

thereon was 3.500.

'l'he dc.siglUltion and nWl)ber of outstanding shares. of each

:roUR'lH:

class entitled

to vote theroon as a class were
Number of
3.500

~s

follows:

Sb~~~3

.

FD'l{(:

Tha number I)f sruu;es voted for such runondment was

the nlJlIlbe.r of shares \Toted against such amendment
DA'l,'EI) this

:l!:f( "",y of

~

3.. 500;

and

'WEllS Ea:J:!).

• 1990.

A.:t ..A. ~

R. J

nt

Lflll"7
•

-

'1"-

--. - 7 -

. . .--..,":' •
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\ '

,-\

I

)

STA'I'E OF IDAHO

:
County of Ne"l!l

~e't'cQ

ss.

)

9.r~dQy
II x. BOB~U?DELL;
of --=4

a Notary Public, do haraby certify that on this
$ 1990, parsonally Appaa.'t'ed befora me R. JaIIN
rAlLOlt. who,
ng y IIlQ first duly 5IWQr1lt daclaro(i thn:!; he is the
PT:es::f.dant of A. I. A. J Xnc., that ho signed the forGgo:!.ng documatl't as
Prasidant of the. cot:pol;'s:tion.t and t.hat: t
statOJil(lnts ontained theroin

,.

aro tru«;\.

!

rt,
,
t'

l'

•...

(

to ____ •_______ ,
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Tro~ell

........-

, -

Pu~atiant to the ptovimio~~
Bl,1l:1inQ~1:f

Idaho

of SQotiona 30-1-59 ~nd 30-1-61 of the

Co:s:po:S:4tion Aot, tne under!IJ.gnf;id oo.t'poratiort.. ,~ptG the

following Articles of Amendment to ita Articles of Ino¢~p6~ati~n.
The name of tho

FIJW!1!.

I

QOI:'Po:t'at::ion is AlA IN8tmANCB, mc.

"

gffective on Beptembo~ 23, 1994, tho ool~ ah~oh6ld~ o~

SBCONnt

thtt aorpora:t:.i.on adopted and approved tho fQllowing amendment to tho
Arti(llea of !rnooz:porat.i.on of AlA Insuranoe;

Artiole Ona of thQ

¢riq1n~1

Artioles of

Ina"

Xncorpo~ation

pursuAnt:: to ...,1\lch

~

~i
1-

of AlA Inaurano$,

-.f

J

1:no. (La f.i.lf,ld on J$nUiu;y 31, 1977 I tu'l.d as amendod Jul.y 16 t 1990, aha.ll.'

~

{

;("ead as .follow1u

Tho

nrune

.!\DHlmS~lU\TORS I

!!!KIRD.

"

of

tha

oOq?Qratiol'l ahall b.e FARHERS FIE1ILTll MLJ:.f\NOm

INO.

The number of ohares of the oor,pora.tion outotanQ:ing Q.t tha

time 91: .su(:n adopti.on was 6,279 an4 tn.",

num:b(l~

(;It

oharas an-cit:.led to vote

thereon, was 6,219.
FO~t

The dao.i.gnation and
tnQ~oon

olass entitled to votq
cla!!!P t,

FInal

numbe~

of outstanding

OhargD (;If Q~cn

as a class were AB followsr

NlJrnba:r of $baraa

The numbttr of shares voted for suoh amendment:

WAS

6,2791 and

the number of shares ~ed AqALnat euch ame~dmant was %oro.
.
"1Plf.
D~ED this ~ day of Ootober, 1994.

AIA

IMlO SEcRETARY OF stAle
J9!*uol 0900
m3 B
CK h U9700

1 Iii

CORP
30.00-

cusr.

137t8

30 .. 00

c
'p

~
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Tn:~awle~

Troxell

.
t,.

B'L'A'.t'll: 011' IDAHO

)

county ot Nez Perce

:
l

ss.

~ Ii SHERR! ROBERTS, a Notarf ~ublLa, do he~eby ce~tify thAt: on this
,Jf'~ day ot OQtober, 1994, pe~sonall:y ~peared bafore me 'Paul. 1).".••~~-1if1nt:1
~ b~ing by me fi~st dl,lly awo.ro, d.e¢lared·'that he ia t!.he Vi~.~~etl~tll:1t:i~·*
ot A:tA !nsuranae, 1%'IQ., tha.t!. he lJ1.gned t:hc!s fc;1ret;1oing docwnau,t:.- A¥ Vioill·.
President of the corpoJ;'",tion, and that th Q tdlmQ!:1t9 00 to-in - '-t.h$~o.tn '~
are true;..
-'.

•+
",

...
•

~#,

•

,I'
t

(

I

.t'

~.

.

"
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To:

Haw1e~

Troxe 11

P.2W21

~wr

,

crll(itNAL
o~

a

~

-,"\0

~

.--11.

~

o(./l

~~

~

C)~

~

t'"

to the provisions of sections 30-1-59 and 30-1-

pursuan~

the.: wiaersigned

61 of ths Idaho Business Co:t'poration Act'l

o'orporation adopts the toll.owing Articles of Amenc:'bnent to ita

Articles

! '

o~,Ineo~oration •

The name of the oQrporation is ]i'AlU(~S HEAL'rlt

. J'IRSi'1

lUaLULHCE ADHl:JiJ:B~!fOllS, INC.

SECOND:

Effsotiv~

the oorporation

to the

Art~cle~

adopt~d

pi

May 15 1 1995 I the sola shareholder

aman4men~

and approvad the following

Inoorpo~ation

ot

or Farmers Health Alliance

Administrators t Inc. I pursuant 'to whieh Article One of the

original Articles of Incorporation of Farmers Health Alliance
M:m.1nistr-ators t
amended

~uly

Inq. as filed on J.anuary :J 1 t 197'7, and as

16; 1990 t and »ovember I, 1994, shall

read

as

,
fo~lows:

ARTICLE PNE
IDUn.@

The nalne of the oorporation s1:).all, be .~~ '.~d!!" ~,fa~~ f

The number

of

shares

ot

the

corporation

outstanding at tha time of such adoption was 6,279 and the

number of shares entitled to
vote
,
Th~

FOURTH'

~h~eon

was 6,279.
,

ds.siqnation and pUlllber of outsta.nding shares

of eacb olass entit.led to vote theJ:'6on as a class war'a as

follows:
Class:

IDlll'llle:r: of Shams

Common

6,279

IIlIHl SEC!l£TARY IF SlATE
19!i5060S 09:XJ
94877
GK tl S!22.
IlJSTI 00168

e

1@

CORP
30.00g

30.00

c
'"

ir.

AFFIDA VII OF GARY D, BABBITT

,

.

L/lr; (

AIA001098

SEP-2~-2007 11:22 From:CLEMENTS BROWN

& MCN 208 746 9295

To:Hawle~

P.2V21

Troxell

""

J?i:J''mil
6/~i9;

nU~Qr

The

.

.

...

of shares voted for such amendment was

and the number of shares voted against such

~anament

was ZerQ.
DATED this

~d.ay

ot May, 1995.

By:

f

f:

sC!!ereta:ey

STATE Ci~ I01UlO

.)
w

County

of

ss •

Ne3 Perce )

'.Fha und~r
.... "¢d, i:t Notary PublicI does hereby certify
that on this
day of May I 1995, personally appeared ~efore
:me R. John 'ray or, wlio, ceing .by lIIe tirfil.t duly sworn, deolared
th~t
he is' the 1?residant of FARM:ItllS HEALnI ALLIANCE
APMINISTRATORS, INC .. I. that he si91l~d the foregoing document
Pr4aident of ·the corporation, and that the statements
,e~ntaln!ilc.'l. tharein are true.
.

k

as

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

'

..... -

-,"
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LAW OFFICES OF

SMITH, CANNON & BOND
JERRY V. SMITH

t

NED A. CANNON
RODERICK C. BOND"

t

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
SOB EiGHTH STREET
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501

PLLC
Telephone
(208) 743-9428
,

',',

~

F;;csimi/e

Retired (72-31-05)

(208) 746-8421

* Adinitted in Wcishington.orily

July 11,2008

Michael McNichols
tnmcnichols@clbrmc.coITl'

Gary BabBitt
gdg@liteh.cofu

Jon Hally
jhally@clarka.ndfeerrey.com .

ij g@qu'arles.com

Re:

James Gatziolis

Reed Taylor v. AIA SerVices Corporation, et at.
Case No. CV 07-00208
SC&B File No. 1048-004

Dear Counsel:
I regret fbrthe dehq in responding to the global settlement proposed by James Gaiziolis, but we
have been awaiting information, some of which has been provided (which I appreciate) ahd the
significant portion of wliicli has not been provided (financial information relative to Jolin
Taylor). SpecificaI1y~ ai:J.d in particular, Reed Taylor requires the financial statements and tax
returns, which have not been provided.

We appreciate tlieiliost recent settlement offer made by you. However, Reed Taylor rejects your
settlement offer. In addition, Reed Taylor is not willing to make a counter offer at this time
without tecei'vmg full disclos-iIfe.
Everyone mvolved in this caseunqeJ;$t!lQ,ds, tl1llt AIl\. Servic~s' assyt§ (including AIA Insurqrtce)
are insufficient to satisfy the $8,,5 Million owed to Reed Taylor, This fact makes Jolin Taylor's
financlal informf1,tiqp particularly import1U1t for me to advise Re~d on resolvingtliis case. It is nO
secret thaI Reed Taylor will be seekib:g the balance Mille funds owed and/or other damages
against the individual defendants, wliich sucli damages are supported by the facts in this case.
In recent days I have spoken witli several of you regarding the Defendants' settletnent offer, I
have also discussed specific facts. I wanted to confirm some of the discussion areas in writing at
this time.
.
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First, I have seen no evidence that John Taylor, Jim Beck or Mike Cashman have put any money
into Crop USA, other than John's credits/debits to his salary accrual account at AIA to allegedly
purchase his shares in Crop USA for a minimal amount.
Jim Beck and Mike Cashman
converted their worlhless Preferred C Shares in AIA Services into common shares oferop USA.
They also received common shares in AIA Services when they were not entitled to such shares.
Second, there is absolutely no evidence to indicate that Crop USA was formed, operated and
funded as a truly separate and distinct corporation. In fact, the documents all demonstrate that
ALA provided Crop USA with millions of dollars offunds, assets, labor, expenses and other costs
for which ALA was never compensated.
Third; probably the most dirty transaction in this case is the $15 Million transfer to Crop USA ill
eX9hangefor the worthless: Preferred. 0 Shares. In addition, this transfer acted asa double fraud
becatiseappr6xiIilafely $700,000 of the $1.5 Million was used to repay llioney Crop USA owed
to' AlA Insurance. Thus, the total value of the inappropriate transaction was $2.2 Million. Under
the fraudulent conveyance and related claims, the $1.5 Million would be returned to AlA
Insurance and Crop USA would owe AIA Insurance over $700,000.
Fourth, the evidence shows that many expenses were never allocated to Crop USA. Some
allocated expenses were never paid, i.e., approximately $500,000, while other expenses were
under..:allocated in a yet to be estimated amount.
Fifth, I will gratuitously say that if I was representing the individual defendants, I would be
advising them that there was a high probability that they will be tagged with a judgment of a
significant amount (millions of dollars). I hope that you all are advising your clients of the risks
of this litigation as I believe that such a fact is essential for resolving this case.
Sixth, had Reed Taylor put AIA Services in default in 2001, he would have oWiled Crop USA,
the $1.5 Million would not have been transferred; John would own no shares in AIA or Crop
USA, arid Jim Beck and Mike Cashman would own no shares in Crop USA or AIA Services.
This is important to think about from the perspective of the defendants.
Seventh, and most significant, I invite anyone of you to provide me with credible documentary
or other evidence to challenge the above assertioIls. That being said, I do not believe that you
will be able provide any evidence, because no such evidence exists.
Finally, as I have advised you, if this case is not resolved in a timely manner (days not weeks),
then other lawsuits will be filed agairist numerOus other defendants. I do not believe that this
will be productive for any future resolution, but Reed Taylor makes the decisions. Reed Taylor
fully understands the risks to continue litigating and is fully committed to see this case and the
others to conclusion regardless of the number of years of tiine required to do so. I hope that all
of your clients have been advised of the risks and are also willing to accept them.

AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. BABBITT
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The above being said, I believe-that this case could be resolved under the following general
parameters (most of which I have discussed with you all);
1.

Full disclosure by John Taylor of his. fmancial statements and tax returns (including all
information provided to Lancelot or other lenders).

2.

Jobi1 Taylor and Connie Taylor transfer at least one-half of their shares in Crop USA to
Reed Taylor (including all option shares).

3.

Jim Beck and Mike Cashman (and the other fanner Preferred C shareholders) transfer
an amount of their shares to Reed Tayloi' (but less than one-half). This could be in the
form of new shares issued to Reed Taylor orfriore of John Taylor and Connie Taylor's
shares transferred to Reed Taylor.

4,

Full disclosure is made on Crop USA and AlA Ser"vices (and AlA Insurance) in terms
of their assets, debts, borrowing ability, and businesses.

5.

The Lewis/Clark Plaza Mortgage is transferred to Reed Taylor free of all
encumbrances .

. 6.

John Taylor arid Connie Taylor'S parking lot that was purchased with AIA funds is
transferred to Reed Taylor.

7.

The Dahman Hoilse Condo is transferred to Reed Taylor.

8,.

Reed Taylor is provided with either a lUIllp sum payment, or if such funds are not
available or cannot be reasonably borrowed, then periodic payments of some sort
(maybe a combination of monthly and/or upon reaching certain targets). The amoUnt
and when such payments would be made would be predicated on the fmancial
condition of the individuals and companies as fully disclosed (one more reason for full
disclOsure). These payments would all be settlement payments only and not linked to
any consultation services; etc. The payments could be based upon percentages of
cottiniissions and/or back-end profits from underwriting.

9;.;

Donna Taylor is paid in full. Donna Taylor is also paid an additional sum or issued a
limited number of'shares in Crop USA to fully and fairly compensate her for the delay
in payment and related hardship. Finally, her her attorneys' fees are paid in full.
Donna Taylor could be paid with John Taylor and Connie Taylor's Avista shares if
limited funds are available. Of course, Donna Taylor's approval would be required.

10.

Reed's attorneys' fees and costs are paid in full.

11.

The settlement funds expected to be receive,d will go towards the payments to Reed
Taylor or Donna Taylor, depending how the other terms are structured.

AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. BABBITT
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12.

AIA Insurance would remain a subsidiary of AlA Services and would be merged with
R~ed Taylor's $8.5 Million debt would be
Crop USA as described below.
extingUished.

13.

AIA ServiCes and Crop USA merge. In the merger, Reed Taylor wants the innocent
shareholders of AIA Services to also haYe an ownership interest. Thus, the
dismtetested nlinority shareholders (the innocent shareholders) of AIA Services would
convert each comh1on share into 10 (or so) common shares of the merged company.
John Taylor, Jim Beck, Mike Cashman and the other old Preferred C Shareholders
holding Crop USA stock would get no new shares in the merger and their common
shares in AlA Services would be canceled.

14,

Protections are put into place to ensure the corporation is operated properly (whether
agreements, amended articles of incorporation or other mechanism). This would be the
best for eYeryone involved and woUld include required approvals for employee salaries,
compensation, stock options, etc. There would be no more salary accrual accounts, no
more IQaning money to related parties, and no mote inappropriate transactions without
shareholder approval.

15.

Appropriate creditor and disinterested shareholder approval must be obtained. With
the limited dilution from the above terms, I would suspect that the newer shareholders
of Crop USA would gladly approve the deal, particularly since AlA Insurance would
be part of the merger. Since they would also be treated fairly, I suspect that the
innocent shareholders of AIA Services would also be obtained.

16.

AIA Services' 401(k) Plan must resolved in fulL We could discuss possible options
here (such as converting to common stock and/or cash, etc.), subject to any necessary
approvals or opt outs.

17.

I believe that Reed may be even receptive to agreeing to vote his shares in favor of
certain designated people to be elected ari?Jor maintained on the board.

18.

Finally, I understand that many of the individual defendants may fear being sued by .
Reed Taylor in the future. Reed Taylor'S claims involve fraudulent transactions, not
business judgment rule transactions. If the company is operated properly, Reed Taylor
wouldtiot have the significant claims as he does today.

In closing, the Defendants' present offer would be a fair offer if there had been no corporate
m.alfeasance and the significant events described above (and others) had not occurred. However,
that is not the case as Reed Taylor has significant c1ainlS against named individual defendants
and others. If Crop USA is truly in as dire financial condition as it appears to me and you
represent, then transferring all of the shares in Crop USA owned by John Taylor, Mike Cashman
and James Beck should be no problem and I believe Reed Taylor would accept the other terms of
your settlement offer.
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Oil the other hand, the failure to disclose the fmances' of John Taylor and the refusal to transfer
significant shares in Crop USA to Reed Taylor for settlement can only be viewed as another
attempt for; the individual defendants to unfairly profit from this litigation and avoid fairly
compe:b.Sating Reed Taylor for his significant claims.

In sum, the time is right for all counsel to advise their respective clients of the risks of this
litigatioI,l. I can say that if I was representing the defendants in this action, I would believe that
settlement makes sense, particularly when the individual defendants should truly not own any
shares in either corporation and in light of the, significant claims against them. I believe the
above items provide legitimate and fair settlement parameters for all parties involved and permit
the individual defendants to retain significant ownership interest for which they are not entitled.
I tnISt that each of you will forward a copy of this letter to your respective clients. In addition, I
ttu~t that corporate counsel will provide copies of this letter to all of the shareholders of Crop
USA and AlA Services, as the parties presently directing this litigation on behalf of both
corporatlGns are interested directors and parties. Pertinent legal authority indicates that
disinterested drrectors shoUld be directing the litigation.

I am open to any ideas or suggestions that could be conveyed to Reed Taylor as a proposal to
fairly resolve this case to his satisfaction. r also look forward to a response from any of you
regarding my challenge to" produce any credible evidenc.e to support your defenses, as such
evidence (if it exists) would be useful to present to Reed Taylor to discuss settlement options.
I truly hope that you are all able to step back and revaluate this case based upon its true merits,
which pertains exclusively to the defrauding of a creditor owed over $8.5 Million. Thank you
for your time.

Sincerely,
ONDPLLC

cc:

Reed Taylor via email
David A. Gittins via email
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Michelle Neufeld
From:

Roderick C. Bond [rod@scblegal.com]

Sent:

Thursday, July 17,20084:38 PM

To:

Gary Babbitt; mbissell@cbklawyers.com; charper@quarles.com; Jack R. Little

Cc:

Michael McNichols; Jon; DavidA. Gittins; Gatziolis, James J.; John Ashby; rjt@lewistondsl.com

Subject: RE: Deposition Availability Dates for Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor
Hi Gary:
I appreciate your desire to depose Reed and Donna. I too have depositions to schedule that have been delayed
because of the tragedy at the Taylor family and in hopes that the parties will settle. However, it appears that this
case will not be resolved.
Mike Bissell's firm will be filing suit against you, John Ashby, Dick Riley and Hawley Troxell in the coming days for
aiding and abetting and violations of various rules of professional conduct, among other claims. Reed intends to
also forward copies of the Complaint to the bar association. In light of these pending events, please advise me if
your firm intends to remain as counsel on this case. Sorry to be so direct, but it does not make sense for me to
set up depositions when you will probably not be involved much longer.
The above being said, we will oppose any continuance as I have repeatedly advised all of the attorneys in this
case of the aiding and abetting and ongoing violations of rules of ethics. The problems have been recently further
compounded by your actions in directing Jon Hally to file a motion that has no merit, inappropriately pledging
assets to Crop USA, and refusal to peacefully hand over AlA Insurance to Reed, among the various other acts. I
recall sending you a clear and concise letter when you first appeared in this case, which you ignored. I can't
recall the number of phone calls and emails, but they are countless. That being said, I really don't savor the idea
of being one of the star witnesses against your firm, but you can't say that I didn't warn you.
Thanks.

Rod

From: Gary Babbitt [mailto:GDB@hteh.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2008 2:43 PM
To: Roderick C. Bond; mbisseIJ@cbklawyers.com
Cc: Michael McNichols; Jon; David A. Gittins; Gatziolis, James J.; John Ashby; John Taylor
Subject: Deposition Availability Dates for Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor
Dear Rod,

I would appreciate a list of available dates for Reed Taylor's deposition. I would need three (3) days initially to
cover preliminary material. Also, I would like to notice up Donna's Deposition for July 31 at the same time that
Mike has scheduled her deposition, as I have some questions.
Thankyou, gary
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Michelle Neufeld
From:

Roderick C. Bond [rod@scblegal.com]

Sent:

Monday, July 21,20086:18 PM

To:

Gary Babbitt; John Ashby; charper@quarles.com; Gatziolis, James J.; rjt@lewistondsl.com

Cc:

David A. Gittins; Jon; Michael McNichols; mbissell@cbklawyers.com; Jack R. Little

Subject: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al.

Hi Gary:
Thank you for your letter today. I presume that Mr. Bissell's letter today provides ample evidence and specificity as
requested in your letter today. I also presume that your letter was drafted and sent without knowledge of Mr.
Bissell's letter dated today's date. If you still need additional information, you will be able to obtain it through
discovery, however, that would be handled through Mr. Bissell's office.
Earlier on in this lawsuit, we moved to disqualify attorneys because of conflicts. Mike McNichols recognized this
conflict and withdrew, although at the previous hearing Judge Brudie indicated that a Motion was not appropriate
and that the Bar Association was the proper forum. I previously contacted the bar association providing a fact
pattern only without names. I was advised the conflicts were real and deputy bar counsel advised me that the
matter was subject to the Court for determination of disqualification. Thus, the Bar Association stated that it would
handle any complaints and would leave the issue of disqualification in the hands of the Court.
Based upon the above, your firm can either withdraw or Reed will file a new motion to disqualify. In the motion, I will
advise Judge Brudie of my conversation with deputy bar counsel and that the Bar Association's position is that the
Judge is the proper party to take action. I will also advise Judge Brudie of your lack of candor to the court. In
addition, Reed will also be submitting a detailed complaint to the Bar Association on all of the conflicts and RPC
violations of this case and others will be filed when Reed takes control of AlA Insurance. The defense (including
you) has constantly accused me of making threats. Alii have ever done is advised everyone of aI/ applicable
conflicts, try to resolve this case and try to prevent what is now transpiring. I know good and well that if the roles
were reversed in this case, you all would have turned me into the Bar Association yourself. I warned you and
warned you, and all you did was ignore me. Your firm has also continued aiding and abetting the defendants and
taking and/or failing to take appropriate action. Mike Bissell's letter today clearly tells the story. This is all a shame
and you should be ashamed of yourself. I reiterate again what I stated before, maybe it is time for you to speak with
Merlyn Clark and get his opinion? Just a thought.
If you are still adamant about deposing Reed and staying on the case in light of the pending legal action against you
and your firm and the clear detailed facts provided by Mr. Bissell today, I will make Reed available for his deposition
only by court order after we have made a new motion to disqualify. In the interim, I will block out my calendar for the
requested days to depose Reed and Donna pending instructions from the Court.
I am happy to bring the motion to disqualify, however, I presumed that such motion would only make something very
embarrassing for your and your firm even more embarrassing for you and your firm. Please advise me how you
would like me to proceed. If I do not hear from you, I will file a motion to disqualify. Thank you.
Rod

By: Roderick C. Bond
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth St.
Lewiston, ID 83501
Tel: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
rod@scblegal.com
This email and any attachments may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information, which only the
authorized recipient may receive and/or view. If you are not an intended recipient, please promptly dele_tile.tiihiiiiS_ _IIII!iII~m!~~
message and contact the sender at the above address. Thank you.
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John Ashby
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From:

Roderick C. Bond [rod@scblegal.com]

Sent:

Sunday, July 27, 2008 5:52 PM

To:

Gary Babbitt; John Ashby; Gatziolis, James J.; charper@quarles.com; rjt@lewistondsl.com

Cc:

jhally@clarkandfeeney.com; david@gittinslaw.com; mmcnichols@c/brmc.com; Jack R. Little;
Mike Bissell

Subject:

FW: Taylor v. AlA, et al.

Attachments: 5-11-07 Letter to Gary Babbitt.pdf
Hi Gary:
I really don't appreciate you and Ashby arguing to the Court that the conflicts are litigation tactics by Reed. You of
all people should know how often I complained about your ethical violations over and over again. I am forwarding
you my email and attached letter of May 11,2007, yes, over 1 year and 2 months ago. You might want to review
this letter again. And this was before you started representing Crop USA-the company you should be suing.
You don't represent John Taylor, James Beck or Michael Cashman, you represent the corporations, assuming
that Crop USA shouldn't be getting sued by AlA. I am also reminded of the tolling agreement referenced in the
board minutes, which simply confirms that you were aware of the ethical violations. I am really kind of getting
tired of your lack of candor to the Court. Your oral argument last week and your firms' newest brief are yet
additional examples. Even assuming all of your worthless arguments actually had merit, you owe your duties to
Donna and Reed long before John Taylor. Does greed blind you that much?
Rod

From: Roderick C. Bond
Sent: Friday, May 11, 2007 2:29 PM
To: 'gdb@hteh.com'
Cc: 'Paul Cressman Jr:
Subject: Taylor v. AIA, et al.
Gary:
Attached is my letter dated today, which was also faxed to you today.
Rod

By: Roderick C. Bond
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth St.
Lewiston, ID 83501
Tel: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
rod@scblegal.com
This email and any attachments may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information, which only the
authorized recipient may receive and/or view. If you are not an intended recipient, please promptly delete this
message and contact the sender at the above address. Thank you.
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LAW OFFICES OF

SMITH, CANNON & BOND
JERRY V. SMITH t
NED A. CANNON
RODERICK C. BOND

*

ATTOHNEYS AT LAW
SOB EIGHTH STREET
LEWISTON, IDAHO B3501

PLLC
Telephone
(208) 743-9428
Facsimile
(208) 746-8421

T Retired n2·3T-OS}
'* Admitted in Washington only

May 11,2007
VIA FACSIMILE (208) 342-3829

Gary D. Babbitt
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617

Re:

Reed Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et al.
Case No. CV 07-00208
SC&B File No. 1048-004

Dear Gary:
This letter is in response to your letter dated May 3, 2007, our recent telephone conversations,
and your email dated May 11, 2007.
Reed Taylor will not agree to extend any additional time to your clients as requested in your
letter dated May 3, 2007. While I am unaware of the date that your fIrm was retained as counsel
for AIA Services and AlA Insurance, there has been ample time for your clients to respond to the
Motion to Compel Audit and produce the requested documents. Reed Taylor's First Requests
for Production of Documents was served on your clients on March 23, 2007. Clements, Brown
& McNichols withdrew on April 13, 2007. Thus, your clients had 21 days to prepare responses
with prior counsel, an additional 8 days to prepare responses since the date of your Notice of
Appearance, and over 20 days without counsel. The requested documents could be easily
assembled by AlA personnel, including John Taylor, who is an active member of the Idaho Bar.
r note that you did not respond to my email request regarding the date your firm was retained as
counsel. In any event, your clients have had more than sufficient time to respond.
Pursuant to Rule 37, this letter serves as our last effort to have you comply with Reed Taylor's
Requests for Production. As noted above, AlA Services and AlA Insurance have already
received substantial additional time to respond and an additional 8 days since the date of your
letter. There is absolutely no reason why the corporations could not have already provided the
requested documents and further delay can only be viewed as an delay tactic. If the requested
documents are not made available to us for inspection by 5 p.m. on May 16,2007, Reed Taylor
will fIle a motion to compel and seek sanctions.
With respect to additional time for fIling an Amended Answer, please note that Reed Taylor will
be fIling a Motion to Amend the Complaint within the next week. Thus, your clients will receive
additional time to answer by way of a Third Amended Complaint.

LillJ I
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With respect to Reed Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, AlA Insurance and AlA Services were vigorously
represented by Mr. McNichols and your clients are not entitled to respond further. Reed Taylor
would vehemently object to any further responses on these motions and we would move to strike
all such responses.
The Court indicated that new counsel for AlA Services and AlA Insurance would be permitted to
file a response to Reed Taylor's Motion to Compel Audit. We believe that you have had
sufficient time to respond to the Motion to Compel Audit. All parties are also fully aware that
Reed Taylor requires pertinent documents and information prior to any mediation. Thus, your
clients' further efforts to delay or prevent an audit can only be viewed as inappropriate litigation
tactics.
This letter also confirms that you advised me that AIA Insurance and AlA Services do not have
claims against John Taylor. I am surprised at your position in this regard as you are exposing
your firm to claims from shareholders and other parties, including Reed Taylor. As the counsel
for the corporations, you have a duty to bring claims for the benefit of the corporations, their
shareholders and their creditors in light of insolvency. Furthermore, it is inappropriate for John
Taylor to direct litigation on behalf of the corporation in light of the substantial claims already
alleged against him. I am further surprised that you would not require direction and consent
from a disinterested board of directors prior to your representation of both corporations because
of the substantial claims alleged against John Taylor. A careful review of the pleadings, briefs,
oral testimony and hearing exhibits clearly demonstrates that the corporations have been
operated for years for the benefit of John Taylor and others to the detriment of Reed Taylor and
other creditors.

In addition, all of the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance are pledged to Reed Taylor. If and
when Reed Taylor is permitted to exercise his rights under the various agreements and/or Idaho
law, AlA Insurance will be bringing claims against John Taylor, Bryan Freeman, and JoLee
Duclos. Your firm will also be exposed to possible claims from Reed Taylor at that time. We
will not permit this issue to go unaddressed.
You previously advised me that the annual shareholder meeting of AlA Insurance would not take
place. Reed Taylor demands that you advise him of timely prior written notice of the time and
place of any shareholder meeting of AlA Insurance with sufficient time to seek emergency relief
from the Court for approval to vote the shares pledged to him.
You also indicated that your clients would seek to prevent Reed Taylor from obtaining the
documents requested in his subpoenas to your clients' auditors based upon accountant/client
privilege. As I advised you, such privilege is only applicable in situations involving the IRS.
Your clients' position in this regard leads to but one conclusion: What are your clients hiding?
In addition, Reed Taylor views such a position as further inappropriate delay tactics. I also
advised you that the time has expired for any objections to the subpoenas and both auditors failed
to timely object as required by the Court Ru1es. If necessary, Reed Taylor will move to compel
the production of all documents from the auditors for inspection and will seek sanctions.

AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. BABBITT

Gary D. Babbitt
May 11,2007
Page 3

Finally, attached is a list of documents provided to me by AlA. The documents were provided to
me in hard copy and not on a disk. The disk that you referenced is my work product, so a copy

will not be provided to you or any other party ..
I look forward to your clients' response to the issues raised in this letter.
Sincerely,

S1'VfITH, CANNON
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Reed Taylor wi enclos res via email
David A. Gittins w/enc SUTes
Jonathan D. Hally w/en~osures

Michael E. McNichols wfencIosures
Paul Cressman, Jf. w/enclosures via email
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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
AlA Consolidated Financial Statements, September 30, 2006
AIA Consolidated Financial Statements, December 31, 2005
AlA Consolidated Financial Statements, December 31, 2004
AIA Consolidated Financial Statements, December 31, 2003
AIA Consolidated Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 2002 and 2001
AlA Consolidated Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 2001 and 2000
AIA Consolidated Financial Statements, December 31, 2000 and December 31, 1999
AlA Consolidated Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 1999 and 1998
AlA Consolidated Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 1997 and 1996
AlA Insurance, Inc. - Financial Statements, November 30,2006
AlA Financial Statements & Auditor's Report, December 31,2005 and 2004
AIA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31; 2004 and 2005
AlA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31,2003 and 2002
AlA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 2002 and 2001
AlA Financial Statements, Years Ended D.ecember 31, 2001 and 2000
AIA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 2000 and 1999
AlA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 1999 and 1998
AIA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 1998 and 1997
AlA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 1997 and 1996
AlA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31,1996 and 1995
AIA Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31, 1995 and1994
Crop USA Insurance Agency, 1ncome Statement Pro Forma, December 31, 2006
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Financial Statements, November 30, 2006
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Financial Statements & Auditor's Report, December 31, 2005
and 2004
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Financial Statements., Years Ended December 31,2004 and 2003
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Financial Statements, Years Ended December 31,2003 and 2002
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Financial Statements, Year Ended December 31,2002
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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
AIA Confidential Limited Valuation Report of Series C Preferred Shares, December 31, 2005
VaIuation RationlInvestment V alue/WACC
Grain Growers Membership and Insurance Trust, as of January 1998
American Soybean Association Membership and Insurance Trust, Current Trust Declaration, as
of February 1998
American Independent Associations Participating Trust Agreement and Declaration of Trust,
Related as amended through November 5, 1998
National Contract Poultry Growers Association Membership & Insurance Trust, Restated as
Amended January 17, 1997
National Growers and Stockmen Group Trust Agreement, dated March 1, 1980
Administrative Services Agreement Between Trustmark Insurance Company and AIA
Insurance, Inc., dated December 1, 1997
Marketing Agreement between Trustmark Insurance Company and AIA Insurance, Inc., dated
December 1,1997
AlA - 2005 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, Form 1120 & other docs.
AlA - 2004 AmendedU.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, Form 1120X
AlA - 2003 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return for AlA, Form 1120 & other docs.
CropUSA - Principal Stockholders of CropUSA as of June 1,2004
AlA - 2002 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, Form 1120 & other docs.
AlA -.2001 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, Form 1120 & other docs.
AlA - 2000 Amended U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, Form 1120X
CropUSA - 2005 Corporate Return
CropUSA - 2004 Federal Tax Return
CropUSA - 2003 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, Form 1120 & other docs.
CropUSA - 2002 U.S. Corporation Income Tax Retum,Form 1120 & other docs.
CropUSA - 2001 U.S. Corporation Income TaxRetum, Form 1120 & other docs.
New Restated Bylaws of AlA Services Corporation, effective April 10, 1989
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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
Articles of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation, dated
February 17,1989, & other docs.
Bylaws of A.LA., Inc., dated January 5,1988
Articles of Incorporation of ALA., Inc., dated January 28, 1977, & other docs.
Bylaws of AIA Crop Insurance, Inc., dated January 11,2000
Articles of Incorporation of AlA Crop Insurance, Inc., dated November 17, 1999 & other
docs.
CropUSA Subscription Agreement & other docs - Maplewood, MN
CropUSA SUbscription Agreement & other docs - Houston, TX
CropUSAJTaylor/AGM - Closing Documents 2006
CropUSAlTaylor/AGM~· Loan and SecurityAgreement
Schedule A to Loan and Security Agreement, dated October 27, 2006
Exhibit A Request for Advance
Exhibit B Availability Report
Exhibit C Assignment and Acceptance Agreement
Exhibit D Compliance Certificate
Exhibit E Form of a Promissory Note
Exhibit F Form of Monthly Policy Report
Exhibit G Form of Retained or Excess Premium Report
Exhibit H Form of A&O Subsidy Aging
Exhibit I Form of Insured Premium Receivables Aging
Exhibit J Form of FCIC Premium Submissions, Reiections and Resolutions
Exhibit K Form of Insured Loss Claims
Exhibit L Form of Non-Renewal Report
Exhibit M Net Income Covenant
Promissory Note
Solvency Certificate, dated October 27, 2006
Guaranty/John Taylor, effective as October 27,2006
GuarantylAlA, effective as of October 27, 2006
Consent and Agreement, dated October 27, 2006
Control Agreement for Deposit Account at U.S. Bank National Association
Blocked Account Control Agreement
Certificate of Deposit Control Agreement TaylorlBecklCashrnan, dated October 27, 2006
Certificate of Deposit Control Agreement TaylorlLamberjack, dated October 27,2006
Pledge Agreement Taylor/AGM, dated October 27,2006
Pledge Agreement TaylorlLamberjack, dated October 27, 2006
Pledge Agreement TaylorlBecklCashman, dated October 27,2006
UCC Information Request and Authorization Form
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vec Financing Statement, dated October 31,2006
vec Financing Statement Amendment, dated October 31,2006
uec Financing Statement Amendment, dated October 31,2006
Officer's Certificate Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., dated October 27,2006
Exhibit A - Articles of Incorporation
Exhibit B - Bylaws & other docs.
Exhibit C - Resolutions of Corporation
Exhibit D - Certificate of Existence and Good Standing of Corporation
Exhibit E - Fictitious Name Certificates
Officer's Certificate of AIA Insurance, Inc., dated October 27, 2006
Exhibit A -Articles of Incorporation
Exhibit B - Bylaws
Exhibit C - Resolutions
Exhibit D - Certificate of Existence and Good Standing
Exhibit E - Fictitious Name Certificates
Zions First National Bank, October 26, 2006
Private Bank Minnesota, October 25, 2006
Private Bank Minnesota, October 27, 2006
Letter from Quarles & Brady LLP to LancelotiAGM, dated October 27, 2006
Letter from Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley to LancelotiAGM, October 27,2006
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